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Résumé en français
Malgré la forte globalisation actuelle de l’économie mondiale, le commerce international
est réalisé à des coûts non-négligeables. Les coûts liés aux échanges occupent une place
centrale dans la littérature moderne sur le commerce international, et peuvent être divisés
en deux catégories : des coûts traditionnels, identifiés avec les coûts de transport et les
coûts de la politique commerciale, tarifaires et non-tarifaires, et des coûts non-traditionnels,
comprenant les coûts d’information, de communication, institutionnels, etc.
Les déterminants non-traditionnels des échanges ont reçu une attention particulière
dans la littérature récente, surtout à cause des deux choses. D’un coté, il semble y avoir
beaucoup moins de commerce international qu’on ne le pensait pas. Trefler (1995) et Mc-
Callum (1995) montrent qu’il y a une importante différence entre le niveau des flux com-
merciaux observés et les prévisions de la théorie du commerce international, ainsi qu’entre
les flux internationaux et le commerce interne. D’après ces travaux, le commerce est di-
visé en moyenne entre 10 et 20 fois. De l’autre, le rôle des coûts traditionnels à l’échange
est assez faible par rapport à la quantité du commerce manquant. Anderson et van Win-
coop (2004) montrent par exemple qu’une grande partie des coûts liés aux échanges entre
les pays développés, estimés à un équivalent tarifaire de 74%, s’explique par des coûts
non-révélés relatifs aux devises, à l’information, au respect des clauses contractuelles, à la
législation et à la régulation.
Dans ces conditions, l’expansion de la gamme des coûts considérés dans la littérature
s’impose, afin d’englober dans l’analyse les barriers informelles aux échanges. De même,
ces résultats suggèrent qu’il y a probablement assez peu à gagner en termes de commerce
de l’élimination des coûts traditionnels à l’échange, et certainement beaucoup plus de la
xiii
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suppression des coûts moins traditionnels.
La présente thèse étudie l’importance des coûts non-traditionnels liés à l’échange en
mettant l’accent sur les institutions nationales et sur les réseaux transfrontaliers sociaux
et d’affaires. Au-delà de la nécessité d’identifier les coûts non-traditionnels, la question
se pose également de les quantifier afin de pouvoir estimer la création de commerce asso-
ciée à leur réduction et de formuler des recommandations précises en termes de politique
économique. Les institutions et les réseaux augmentent la sécurité et assurent l’application
des clauses contractuelles dans les transactions internationales, fournissent des contacts
et des informations sur les partenaires potentiels étrangers, fait qui implique des coûts
liés à l’échange inférieurs et moins d’incertitude dans les échanges internationaux. On
montre que les potentiels de commerce sont généralement sous-estimés dans la littéra-
ture : l’intégration économique régionale peut créer beaucoup plus de commerce que l’on
estime traditionnellement, et même quand la réduction totale des barrières aux échanges
est achevée. L’amélioration et l’harmonisation des cadres institutionnels peuvent générer
autant de commerce international que la libéralisation commerciale. Les réseaux sociaux
favorisent l’échange par l’intermédiaire de liens ethniques, linguistiques etc. communs, mais
aussi du à l’information et aux préférences acquises par la consommation des biens culturels
d’origine étrangère. Les réseaux d’affaires sont illustrés par des associations de migrants et
ont un effet positif sur le commerce plus fort que celui des réseaux sociaux.
La première partie de la thèse s’intéresse à l’évaluation des potentiels de commerce et des
coûts spécifiques à l’environnement institutionnel. Les applications empiriques développées
dans cette partie considèrent le cas particulier du commerce de l’UE à 15 et des PECO.
Dans le premier chapitre on estime la magnitude des coûts totaux liés à l’échange inter-
national et on développe une nouvelle méthode pour calculer les potentiels de commerce.
Nous appliquons des techniques spécifique à la littérature des effets frontière qui permet-
tent d’exprimer ces coûts en termes de volume d’échanges, et intégrons les progrès récents
dans la dérivation des équations de commerce de type gravitationnel à partir des différents
cadres théoriques. En particulier, on considère le modèle de concurrence monopolistique
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à la DSK, et celui de concurrence parfaite avec différenciation nationale des produits à la
Armington. Nous estimons ensuite la création potentielle de commerce en utilisant comme
référence le commerce de chaque pays avec lui-même et en supposant que les coûts liés aux
échanges bilatéraux Est-Ouest européens convergent à long terme vers le niveau plus bas
des coûts à l’intérieur de l’UE à 15. Nos résultats surpassent considérablement ceux trouvés
dans la littérature traditionnelles : en 2000 le commerce Est-Ouest européen représentait
environ 50% de son niveau potentiel. On construit également un test pour discriminer en-
tre les deux modèles de commerce et on trouve plus de soutient au modèle de concurrence
monopolistique.
Dans le deuxième chapitre on s’interroge sur le rôle des politiques de libéralisation com-
merciale et sur celui des réformes institutionnelles dans l’intégration régionale. L’originalité
de l’approche consiste d’abord dans la prise en compte de l’endogénéité entre le commerce
et les institutions. Des meilleurs institutions augmentent la sécurité des échanges, réduisent
l’incertitude et les coûts de respect des contrats, incitant les entreprises à échanger plus.
En même temps, la participation accrue aux transactions internationales augmente la de-
mande pour la réforme des institutions internes et enseigne aux agents économiques du
pays des nouveaux moyens pour améliorer les institutions existantes. Apart la qualité des
institutions nationales, nous considérons aussi leur hétérogénéité au niveau international,
mesurée à l’aide de la distance institutionnelle, et qui représente une barrière supplémen-
taire aux échanges. Nous comparons ensuite l’effet des réformes institutionnelles sur le
commerce international à celui de la libéralisation commerciale, et trouvons que les bonnes
institutions sont au moins aussi importantes que la réduction des barrières tarifaires et
non-tarifaires. L’accroissement du commerce régional Est-Ouest européen est susceptible
de se produire même après l’élimination totale de ces barrières. Des différentes mesures de
la qualité des institutions nous permet de distinguer entre les institutions qui favorisent le
développement économique général et les institutions spécifiques aux pays en transition.
Finalement, l’utilisation des variables quantitatives nous permet de donner des réponses
précises aux questions de politique économique. Ainsi, l’augmentation de la part du secteur
privé dans l’économie d’un pays en transition par un pour-cent génère en moyenne 1,6%
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plus de commerce avec un partenaire de l’EU-15.
Dans la deuxième partie on s’intéresse aux réseaux sociaux et d’affaires comme déter-
minants du commerce international. D’un coté on met en avance l’importance des affinités
culturelles en tant que dimension des réseaux sociaux, et de l’autre, on montre que la ca-
pacité des migrants de s’associer dans le pays d’accueil a des effets positifs sur le commerce
et les IDE.
Le troisième chapitre traite l’aspect culturel des réseaux sociaux, et développe une
mesure de leur intensité à partir du commerce international de biens culturels. La consom-
mation des produits culturels d’origine étrangère peut augmenter la connaissance et/ou
la préférence pour les produits de même origine. On considère 7 catégories de biens cul-
turels : les films, les livres, les autres matières imprimées, les journaux et les périodiques,
les cassettes, les autres supports audio enregistré, et certains produits agro-alimentaires.
(la vodka est par exemple un bien culturel, alors que le blé ne l’est pas.) On mesure ensuite
l’intensité des réseaux sociaux, identifiés avec des liens culturels, par la différence entre
le volume réel du commerce de ces biens et la prédiction du modèle de gravité, tout en
corrigeant pour la présence des liens bilatéraux sans contenu culturel, tels que la préférence
générale des Français pour les produits canadiens. La considération des différents types
de produits culturels, ayant des impacts différents sur le commerce, permet de séparer
l’effet information de l’effet préférence. Les journaux et les supports publicitaire imprimés
ont principalement un rôle d’informer les consommateurs et les clients, alors que les films,
les livres et les supports audio gênèrent surtout des modifications dans la structure des
préférences des consommateurs. Nous trouvons que l’affirmation de Rauch (1999), selon
laquelle les réseaux ont plus d’importance pour le commerce des produits différenciés que
pour celui des produits homogènes, est vérifiée seulement en partie.
Le dernier chapitre étudie l’impact des réseaux ethniques sur les transactions interna-
tionales en mettant l’accent sur les associations des migrants. Les migrants ont une con-
naissance supérieure de leur pays d’origine qu’ils amènent avec eux dans le pays d’accueil.
Leur capacité de s’organiser dans le pays de résidence, mise en evidence par la création
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des associations, est interprétée ici comme une forme spécifique des réseaux d’affaires, dont
la caractéristique principale est la présence des structures organisées. Quant aux réseaux
sociaux, similairement à d’autres travaux dans la littérature, ils sont mesurés à l’aide des
flux des migrants. De cette manière, on peux distinguer entre les deux types de réseaux et
estimer séparément l’effet de chacun d’entre eux sur le commerce. Nous utilisons une base
de données nouvelle sur les associations des migrants établies en France (les OSIM) et un
panel de 17 pays partenaires de la France : 16 pays africains et le Vietnam. On trouve
un effet significatif et positif des associations des migrants seulement sur le commerce des
produits différenciés. Dans le cas des importations français cet effet est supérieur à celui
des flux des migrants, c’est-à-dire l’information et les contacts fournis par les réseaux non-
organisés sont moins fiables que ceux procurés auprès des associations des migrants. L’effet
positif de ces structures sur le commerce peut être immédiat ou avec un retard de deux à
quatre ans, le temps nécessaire pour établir des contacts locaux en France et à l’étranger.
Enfin, on trouve des effets semblables et encore plus importants des réseaux ethniques sur
les décisions des entreprises françaises d’investir à l’étranger.
En conclusion, nous pouvons affirmer que les coûts non-traditionnels peuvent expliquer
une grande partie du commerce international manquant et leur réduction peut générer
d’importants effets de création de commerce. Le bon fonctionnement des institutions des
pays exportateurs et des pays importateurs, ainsi que leur harmonisation au niveau inter-
national est comparable en termes de création d’échanges aux politiques de libéralisation
commerciale. Les réseaux sociaux stimulent le commerce non uniquement à travers des
liens ethniques, linguistiques et historiques communs, mais aussi via les informations et les
goûts acquis par la consommation des produits culturels d’origine étrangère. Finalement,
la capacité des migrants de s’organiser en associations a un effet favorable sur le commerce
et les investissements directs entre le pays d’origine et le pays d’accueil.
On peut mentionner ensuite quelques pistes de recherche future. Premièrement, on peut
regarder les interactions entre les différents types de coûts liés à l’échange. La réduction
des coûts d’information, par exemple, peut être renforcée par des politiques commerciales
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plus libérales, alors que la présence de bonnes institutions peut faciliter les négociations
concernant la libéralisation des échanges. Ensuite, on peut considérer les réseaux comme
des formes d’organisation créés à l’initiative des agents économiques et analyser la causalité
inverse entre les réseaux et le commerce international. Il existe bien d’autres formes des
réseaux transfrontaliers qui méritent d’être étudiées, tels que l’emploi des étrangers par




It seems like from ancient times on, trade has been a source of wealth and power, and coun-
tries always sought to increase their exchanges with the outside world (Maddison (2001)).
History shows that leading trading nations have often acquired regional and even global po-
litical supremacy. Nowadays, the economic isolation of a country, its withdrawal from the
world economy is virtually impossible, and accompanied by a general decline of its economy.
Indeed, trade embargos are the harshest economic sanctions countries can impose on each
other. Although the specific reasons for which trade generates welfare have evolved over
time (availability of new products, exploitation of technological and factor-specific com-
parative advantages, scale and rationalization effects), countries continue to regard foreign
trade as a factor generating growth, and manifest large interest for its expansion.
Regardless of the amplified integration and globalization marking the present-day world
economy, cross-border trade is achieved at non-negligible costs. Trade (transaction) costs
occupy a central place in the modern international trade literature, and, in conformity with
the sequence in which they have been studied, can be divided into two large classes: tradi-
tional and non-traditional costs. The first group of trade costs refers to transport and trade
policy costs. Identified in theoretical and empirical works by bilateral distance, tariffs and
non-tariff barriers, they have been considered until recently as the only burden for trading
partners in a world with a geographically spread economic activity. During the last two
decades, this list was completed with other types of costs, conventionally labelled as non
traditional. This class of trade costs is very large, and is far from being entirely explored.
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xx GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Sources of trade costs advanced in the literature include: currency, information, com-
munication, search, contract enforcement, institutional costs, etc. Non traditional costs,
according to this definition, have been referred to by some authors as hidden transaction
costs. The explanation is simple: they are difficultly identified, and even more difficultly
measured. They comprise currency, information and partner search costs, and costs relative
to the enforcement of contracts and agreements (Rauch (2001)). Institutional costs, i.e.
additional costs induced by the poor quality of domestic importer and/or exporter institu-
tions, and the resulting risk and uncertainty with regard to the outcome of international
transactions also enter this category (Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)).
Non-traditional trade determinants received a particular attention in the recent litera-
ture. Two main motivations drove economists’ interest for new factors causing countries to
trade more: (i) the significant drop in importance of traditional trade costs, and (ii) the
observation of phenomena that could not be explained by traditional determinants of trade.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimate trade costs between developed countries to a
74% tax equivalent. This figure includes all directly observed and inferred border-related
trade barriers, and breaks down as follows: 21% transportation costs (both in terms of
freight and time), 8% trade policy barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers), a 14% currency
barrier, and 17% inferred trade costs, which include information, contract enforcement,
legal and regulatory costs (1.74 = 1.21 × 1.08 × 1.14 × 1.17). With all technological in-
novations that led to reduced transport costs, the latter still account for a large share of
international trade costs. Nowadays’s global trade liberalization reduced significantly the
friction induced by tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and as a consequence limited the gain
in trade associated with their elimination. By the end of 2004, 148 countries of the world
have joined the WTO, and have committed themselves to comply with multilateral trade
governing rules. Under the auspices of the WTO, negotiations have been extended even to
very sensitive issues, such as liberalization of trade in agricultural and textile products, and
in services. Moreover, regional trade agreements, increasing in size and scope, developed
in the different parts of the globe. Barriers relative to the use of different currencies in
the importing and exporting countries are large, but very difficult to reduce due to major
xxi
associated macroeconomic costs.
Trefler (1995) shows that there is a large gap between theory’s predictions and actual
trade flows, and introduces the term “missing international trade”. The same year, another
Canadian economist, McCallum (1995), established the disproportion between domestic
and international trade. This phenomenon, named the border eﬀect or the home bias eﬀect
in the literature, received increased attention in the following years. Authors have not been
able to reject the affirmation that there is much less international trade than one would
expect with respect to trade within national borders, although several sources inflating the
results have been identified (Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Head and Mayer (2002b)).
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) demonstrate that border-specific trade costs can explain this
surprising result, as well as other five major puzzles in international macroeconomics. Cer-
tainly, an expansion of the range of considered trade costs is required. Other attempts to
explain the mystery of missing trade have focused on informal trade barriers, especially
on weak enforcement of international contracts (Anderson and Marcouiiler (2002)), and on
inadequate information about trading opportunities (Portes and Rey (2005)) supplied by
markets.
Hence, there is probably little left to gain from the elimination of traditional trade
costs, and certainly much more from the removal of less traditional costs. But besides
the identification of specific non-traditional trade costs, one still needs to quantify them, in
order to evaluate the trade creation associated with their reduction, and elaborate pertinent
policy recommendations. Moreover, interactions between the two types of trade costs need
also be considered. For instance, the decline in information and search costs may be
reinforced by more liberal trade policies, or occur independently from them. Similarly,
trade liberalization measures are easier to implement when good institutions are at work.
A central place in this line of research is attributed to institutions and networks. Re-
forms, leading to better functioning of domestic institutions, and higher similarity between
institutions of different trading countries, permit a direct estimation of the gain in trade
attributed to the reduction of institutional costs. Similarly, the extra trade brought by
strong cross-border networks reflects the advantage of the removal of information, search,
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and contract enforcement costs. The use of institutions is not new to a number of economic
areas, such as the new institutional economics (Coase (1937), North (1990), Williamson ()),
and the growth and development economics (Acemogolu et alii (2001), Rodrik (), Kaufman
and Kraay (1999)). Networks have been imported into the trade literature mainly from
sociology and labour economics. But certainly, in the context of international trade, both
factors are conceptualized slightly differently than in the field of origin.
In the international trade literature institutions are defined as formal and informal rules
of behavior, means for ensuring their application, mediation procedures in case of dispute,
sanctions for violation of established rules, and organisations and bodies in charge with their
enforcement. Institutions’ quality is judged as more or less good by the more or less good
functioning of their different elements. Exemples include constitutions, judicial systems,
banks, corporate, collateral, and bankruptcy laws, tax collection and competition agencies.
Effective institutions are those ensuring that the incentives that they create actually lead
to the desired behavior.
Trade theory does not underestimate the importance of institutions. Rather, the prob-
lem is that it takes the ubiquitous existence of well-functioning institutions for granted.
However, only developed countries in recent times come anywhere near this ideal picture.
In most countries of the world the institutional apparatus is very costly, slow, unreliable,
weak, or corrupt. Under these conditions, international trade contracts are more time-
demanding, uncertain, harder and costlier to accomplish. Still, economic activity does
not grind to a halt because the government cannot provide adequate institutional under-
pinnings. Economic agents manage to find solutions even in such an imperfect world.
The description of a larger number of possible contingencies and solutions to them in the
contract, and international arbitration are only two examples commonly used by trade
partners. However, they will unquestionably generate an upsurge in transaction costs, and
lead to lower cross-border trade. The fragmentation of institutions at country level is an
additional source of larger international trade costs. Even in the case of well-functioning
institutions, national specificity introduces confusion and supplementary costs. Therefore,
similarity between institutional frameworks of the exporting and importing countries, along
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with the development of high-quality national institutions, has a trade creating effect.
Differently from previous works, recent developments in this field consider national,
i.e. country-specific, institutions. The idea itself has been borrowed from the literature
on economic growth and foreign direct investment, where institutional aspects were al-
ready an established factor. Recent research on trade and institutions coincides with the
development of a range of indexes characterizing the quality of domestic institutions by
different international agencies, and organizations (WB - Kaufman et alii (1999), (2003),
Fraser Institute, Freedom House, EBRD, etc.). Despite the increased popularity, this field
remains little investigated: there is only a handful of studies, and very reduced theoretical
modelling. Anderson and Young (2002), Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Dixit (2003a),
and (2003b) constructed theoretical frameworks for specific institutional aspects. Institu-
tional deficiencies are more acute in less developed countries and in transition economies.
A more thorough investigation of these cases is hence demanded.
For all its importance, there is unfortunately no clear definition of networks in the liter-
ature. The trade literature considers networks as groups of individuals or firms, connected
with each other with ties stronger than the ones found on the market. Rauch (1999) con-
siders networks as an alternative to market interactions. In some contexts the key feature
of networks is that their members are engaged in repeated exchange that helps sustain
cooperation. In other contexts the key feature is that network members possess thorough
knowledge on each other that helps them match each other or refer each other to outside
business opportunities. These features correspond to two definitions of networks used in
sociological literature. However, when considering the role of networks in overcoming trade
barriers, a narrower definition is required. Rauch (2001) considers that only networks that
were formed domestically and became transnational through migration or foreign direct in-
vestment, even if this internationalization has taken place generations ago, are suitable to
this end. Networks are also referred to in the literature as informal institutions: they often
operate outside the formal legal system, and reflect unwritten codes of social conduct. In
this line of thought, national institutions presented and discussed above are called formal.
The recognition that networks promote trade existed long before the issue has been
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questioned by economists. A poem published in June 1922 states:
”If I knew you and you knew me
’Tis seldom we would disagree;
But never having yet clapsed hands
Both often fail to understand
That each intends to do what’s right
And treat each other “honor bright”
How little to complain there’d be
If I knew you and you knew me...”
Source: Who’s Who in the Grain Trade 35, cited
in the World Development Report 2002.
Recent research by Greif (1993), Gould (1994), Rauch (1999), Feenstra et alii (1997), Cas-
sela and Rauch (2003) and other authors establish both theoretically and empirically that
networks play an important role in international trade. Economists have identified two
broad types of network ties, social and business, and three functions or channels through
which they shape trade (Rauch (2001), Combes et alii (2005)). Networks promote trade
due to (i) the increased information about foreign partners, and business contacts they
provide to their members, (ii) contract enforcement mechanisms they establish, that dis-
courage or limit the opportunistic behaviour, and (iii) shifts in consumer preferences and
tastes they generate. Social networks are based on common ethnic, religious, linguistic,
and other common ties. Business networks, as suggested by their name, rely on contacts
between firms or other organized entities. A main function of networks is to exchange de-
tailed information between members at zero or low cost. Transnational networks can help
members to match to profitable trade opportunities through providing market informa-
tion, letting suppliers know whether consumers in a particular country would be receptive
to their products and/or on how to adapt their products to consumer preferences in a
given country. Networks can also facilitate trade by building or substituting for trust when
contract enforcement is weak or inexistent. Repeated mutual contacts and punishment
schemes developed by networks discourage members from violating an agreement, reduce
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opportunistic behavior, and lower costs of implementing contract’s clauses. This second
function is specific to cross-border business networks. The preference effect, on the con-
trary, is present only in the case of social ties. Individuals with common ethnic or religious
origins situated in different countries have generally increased preference for each other’s
home country products. However, certain researchers aggregate the first two functions un-
der a single one. The reason is straightforward: perfect information about members of the
network can become a powerful device persuading firms to fulfill their contractual liabilities.
Business and social networks operating across national borders can help overcome informal
trade barriers, and at the same time help document and even quantify the existence of
these barriers. Research on the identification of network types and channels of their action
remains limited.
The literature on trade and transnational networks is closely linked to international
migration. The adoption of the network view of international trade contributed to a recent
upsurge of the literature on trade and migration. Increased empirical research of ethnic
networks benefited from the easiness of identifying their membres. Immigrants can pro-
mote bilateral trade by providing market information and supplying matching and referral
services. Members of coethnic groups share a set of common characteristics and ties defin-
ing social networks. In a different line of work, the ability to communicate in a common
language has been considered as the main feature delimiting social networks. Coethnic
networks active in international trade often display features specific to business networks:
they create the conditions for limiting opportunism and bridge direct contacts between
partners in the host and home country. Many ethnic networks will blacklist a business
owner violating an agreement and refrain from doing business with the guilty party. Em-
ployment of foreigners is often motivated by the desire of companies to develop business
contacts with firms in the country of origin. Alternatively, business networks have been
summarized to financial linkages developed through repeated interactions or foreign direct
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investment (e.g. French economic groups, Japanese keiretsu).
Organization of the dissertation
The study of issues described above is interesting not only for the understanding of a
series of today phenomena. It is especially useful for the formulation of relevant economic
policies. This dissertation approaches this problematic throughout four chapters, assembled
in two parts. The first part concerns the estimation of trade potentials, i.e. trade costs
expressed in terms of actual trade volumes, and costs specific to the domestic and foreign
institutional environment. Empirical applications consider the particular case of Central
and East European countries. This choice was motivated by the recent reintegration of
these countries into the world economy, the important shifts in the volume and structure of
their trade patterns, and especially by the deep trade policy and institutional reforms they
have suffered in the last fifteen years. Network ties linking the importing and exporting
countries are tackled in the second part of the dissertation. This part evaluates the role of
cultural exchange in defining trade-sustaining social networks, and regards the capacity of
ethnic communities to organize into voluntary associations as a form of business networks.
This time the geographical span of the sample used is very different from the sample used
in part one, and was dictated by the availability of data. The order in which different
aspects have been addressed in the dissertation follows the chronological evolution of the
literature during the last years.
The first chapter estimates total border-related costs, and addresses the issue of trade
potential. To asses the contribution of institutions and networks in overcoming formal
and informal trade barriers one needs first to quantify the barriers. The discussion is re-
stricted here to border-specific costs: all trade costs except the ones related to the physical
transportation of merchandize are particularly large or arise exclusively in international
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transactions. The literature on border effects permits an evaluation of costs in terms of
trade volumes. For example, McCallum (1995) finds that the Canada-U.S. border corre-
sponds on average to a reduction of trade between states and provinces by twenty times.
However, for multiple reasons, all this missing international trade is unlikely to be reached
as long as two countries remain separated by a political frontier. In the literature trade
potentials have been traditionally estimated with respect to international trade patterns of
a control or reference group of countries. However, a country’s trade with itself is a much
more reliable benchmark. We use advances in the literature on border effects and trade
potentials to construct a measure based on this principle. It is assumed that integration
translates first into a reduction of bilateral trade costs, and only afterwards an upsurge
of trade is obtained. This coincides with the logical evolution of events: firms increase
demands from suppliers when the reduction of costs has already been achieved. In our
specific case, East-West European trade costs are assumed to converge in the long run
to the lower level observed for trade between Western countries. Following the traditional
literature, trade potentials are computed with respect to a reference group of countries, but
it is computed in terms of differences in transaction costs rather than in terms of volumes
of trade. Taking domestic trade as a benchmark, one needs to compare total border-related
trade costs for the two groups of countries. Border effect techniques are applied to that
end. As a result, trade potentials are computed as second differences in trade volumes: as
the difference between the predicted and the actual volume of trade for the control group,
minus the difference between the predicted and the actual trade for the inquired group.
For the considered set of European countries, large possible trade creation is predicted.
Our results greatly surpass findings in the traditional trade potential literature, and warn
governments about the higher-than-expected effect of regional integration.
The new method introduced in the first chapter also permits to integrate the rich theo-
retical progress in deriving gravity-type trade specifications. In this case, the identification
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of the trade model that is best supported by the empirical data represents an additional
challenge. We construct a test for the compatibility of national product differentiation
à la Anderson (1979), and monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Krugman (1980) trade models with the observed data. Bilateral regional trade flows are
estimated with each model and predicted values are compared with the actual trade. The
exercise is repeated for different values of the elasticity of substitution, and the model with
a monopolistic competition market structure is identified as a better replica of European
trade. The corresponding elasticity of substitution estimated by the test to have a value
equal to three, which lies within the range of values found by previous works.
The size of estimated border effects and border-specific trade costs depends on a vari-
ety of factors, among which is the way in which distances are calculated. We address this
question in more detail in the last appendix to the chapter. This is not a debate on how
to compute internal distances, which will undoubtedly affect border effects, but rather a
discussion proposing the use of compatible computation techniques. All theoretical trade
models are based on a nonlinear relationship between distance and trade, confirmed by a
multitude of empirical works. However, this aspect is ignored in the calculation of distances
employed in trade estimations that pay attention to countries’ internal geography. Instead
of simply summing weighted bilateral distances separating the different regions of import-
ing and exporting countries, we develop and apply a nonlinear procedure for computing
distances between and within countries as a function of the estimated distance elasticity
of trade. An iterated procedure, consisting at each step of an estimation of the distance
elasticity and its employment in the computation of distances, permits to estimate the true
value elasticity that verifies the nonlinear correlation suggested by trade theory. Our results
confirm previous findings about the general overestimation of border effects in the litera-
ture. Our results suggest that defective computation of distances inflates border-specific
trade costs by a factor of two. Nevertheless, this effect is constant over time and does not
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affect the conclusions formulated in the first chapter.
In the second chapter we consider in more depth the role of institutions in international
trade. The idea of well-functioning institutions encouraging economic activity is not new
to economists, but it had few applications to international trade. We complement this
literature in several ways. First, inspired by the works on economic development, we study
the endogeneity between trade and institutions. It is not only that better institutions at
home and abroad increase the security of international exchange, reduce uncertainty and
contract enforcement costs, and thereby persuade firms to trade more, but also that in-
creased participation in international transactions generates more demand for institutional
reforms, and higher pressure on governments to finance and implement them. Trade, is
also a channel through which a country’s economic agents can learn of the ways to ame-
liorate existing institutions and design new, more similar to those of its trading partners.
Secondly, we consider two aspects of the institutional framework: the quality and the simi-
larity of national institutions. International fragmentation represents an additional barrier
to trade. Even firms from advanced countries with strong institutions might find difficult to
conclude mutual agreements with one another if institutions in their home country differ a
lot from those in the partner country. Unlike previous works, we construct a real measure
of institutional heterogeneity, the institutional distance, and find that it is a significant
determinant of trade, comparable in importance to the quality of domestic and foreign
institutions. Next, we compare the effect on trade of institutional reforms to that of the
foreign trade policy, and compute the share of each factor in total border-specific trade
costs. As in the first chapter, we consider the trade of transition economies with West
European partners. This choice is motivated by the fact that institutions in transition
countries have undergone profound reforms in the recent years, while their trade with EU
members benefited from increased liberalization. Similarly to other authors, we find strong
national institutions to be at least as important for international trade as the removal of
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policy barriers to trade. A further increase of regional trade is likely to occur even after
all tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated. Moreover, we distinguish between general
institutions promoting economic development, and those specific to transition economies.
As expected, the latter are of greater importance for our group of countries. Finally, we
employ both index and quantitative measures to evaluate institutions. The second type
of measures permit to formulate specific recommendations to governments in terms of eco-
nomic policy. Increasing the share of the private sector in the economy by one percentage
point, for example, would lead on average to a 1.6% raise in trade of a transition country
with an average EU partner.
The third chapter focuses on cross-border social network ties. They benefited from
an increased attention in the empirical literature due to the fact that they are relatively
easy to quantify. Previous research relied mainly on the use of stocks of immigrants or
shares of different ethnic groups in a country’s population, and share of the population
speaking a common language. A new aspect of social networks is studied in this chapter on
a large sample of countries. International trade itself can contribute to the development of
transnational social ties. Differently from the repeated interactions definition of networks,
exchange of cultural goods can increase the awareness of and/or preference for products
from the origin country in the same time period. Cultural goods, more than any other
products embody information of the origin market. Trade in motion pictures, books, other
printed matter, newspapers, or recorded audio media is much more sensitive to the presence
of common ties between countries engaged in the exchange. The presence of cultural and
social links increases the utility associated with the consumption of these products, and in
certain cases is even an indispensable premise for their consumption. We show that firms
and individuals can acquire increased information about foreign markets and in general
develop a higher preference for foreign products, by consuming cultural goods from those
countries. The amount of extra trade in cultural goods between two countries with respect
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to the predictions of the general gravity model is used to express the intensity of social
ties linking them. However, one needs to adjust for the presence of culture-free bilateral
linkages, such as the general preference of Americans for Canadian products. We control for
this element by including non-cultural ties, estimated as the residual trade in similar goods
without a cultural component: as an independent variable in the trade model. But even
then, the consumption of foreign cultural goods is found to contribute to the accumulation
of information about partners situated and goods produced abroad.
The main way proposed in the literature of separating the information from the pref-
erence effect of social networks consists in comparing the size of effects on exports and
imports. According to it, a larger network effect on imports testifies to the adoption of
foreign consumption habits. Nonetheless this approach is quite imperfect, as foreign-born
individuals can not only preserve their preference for products produced in their country
of origin, but also, given their increased knowledge of the host country acquired after mi-
gration, encourage family and friends at home to purchase more goods produced in their
country of residence. Indeed, community-specific studies confirm the presence of both phe-
nomena. Differently from this literature, we compare the effect of cultural ties estimating
it for seven types of cultural goods. By their very nature newspapers and periodicals,
booklets, and other printed advertising material have mainly an informative role, while
motion picture, books, recorded media, and agricultural goods are more likely to produce
shifts in consumer preference structure. We find strong evidence of both effects in the
data. Rauch (1999) states that networks are of particular importance when markets fail
to provide necessary information or enforcement mechanisms, i.e. in the case of differen-
tiated products. Applying his classification of goods into homogeneous, reference priced,
and differentiated, only partial support for this statement is found.
Fourth and last chapter addresses the role of business networks per se, and relative to
social networks. A possible way to quantify trade costs reduced by cross-border networks
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is to consider international migration. There is a recent and expanding literature showing
that international transaction costs are generally lower in the presence of large flows or
stocks of immigrants. The intuition behind it is straightforward: immigrants carry their
increased knowledge of the country of origin to the host country. From this point of view,
international migration can be viewed as a transfer of information. Countries which re-
ceive immigrants also import their knowledge of opportunities, practices and tastes in their
respective countries of origin. However, this literature does not consider the organized
activity of immigrants in the host country. Rauch and Trindade (2002) observe that many
ethnic groups living outside their countries of origin create formal and informal associations
to which coethnic businesspeople both from the host country and from the native country
have access. In this line of thought, the last chapter proposes a different view on interna-
tional migration. The classification of networks into business and social can be transposed
to migration as follows: overseas ethnic populations represent social networks referring to
common linguistic, ethnic, religious, and historical ties, while home country associations
established by immigrants in the host country depict business networks formed by inter-
linked firms and organizations. A central issue in the literature on business networks is
the presence of organized structures. The capacity of immigrants to associate, to define
common goals, to raise funds, and to undertake joint actions in the benefit of their home
country is, therefore, used as a measure of the intensity of business networks.
We employ a new, unexplored dataset on migrant associations established in France,
along with data on flows of immigrants to France in order to quantify the impact of social
and business networks on its trade with seventeen selected developing countries. A signifi-
cant effect is found only for trade in differentiated goods, but this result is most likely due
to the asymmetric composition of considered trade flows. Similar to Combes et alii (2005),
we find a larger impact on trade of business compared to social networks. Information and
business contacts supplied by unorganized immigrant communities, however, are irrelevant
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for French imports from developing countries. Home country associations generally become
convenient for trade immediately, or with a delay of two to four years, the time needed for
the establishment of local business contacts in France and abroad. Similar effects of net-
works are identified in the case of foreign direct investment of French firms. Interestingly,
results are stronger and more robust than in the case of trade. Still, the procurement of
information on the foreign market via migrant associations is more efficient than by the
word-of-mouth.
This dissertation shows that there is a large place for non traditional trade costs in
explaining missing international trade. Trade potentials may actually have been underes-
timated in the literature, and trade creation associated with regional economic integration
might be much larger than expected. This finding is illustrated in the particular case of
trade between East and West European countries. Results presented in different chapters
confirm the pro-trade effect of both institutions and transnational networks. The well-
functioning of domestic and foreign institutions is a factor comparable in importance to
foreign trade policies. Even after all tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed, institutional
reforms may generate a large increase in international trade. Social networks promote trade
not only via common ethnic, linguistic and other ties that connect their members, but also
via information and tastes acquired from the consumption of foreign cultural goods. A par-
ticular form of business networks studied in this dissertation are home country associations
established by immigrants in their host country. Migrant associations have a stronger effect









Border Effects and East-West
Integration
1.1 Introduction
Economic relationships between Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and their
Western partners during the last decade or so have been marked by the premises of EU
enlargement. In the early 1990s most CEE countries have formulated officially their de-
sire to integrate the Union, and have received an affirmative response conditional on the
fulfillment of several economic criteria. A decade latter, eight of them have acquired the
membership status and benefit from all insider’s advantages. The evolution of their eco-
nomic exchanges between these two dates reflected a gradual elimination of trade costs, and
a concentration of trade with ‘old’ EU partners. Regional integration between Eastern and
Western European nations has been accompanied by important trade creation effects, that
may continue even after CEE countries have joined the European Union. It takes time for
firms to grasp trading opportunities offered by the modified economic environment. The
economic literature employs the term trade potential to designate these effects.
The additional trade arising from an economic integration initiative is traditionally
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estimated in the literature by trade potential models that rely on the empirical success of
the gravity equation. The essence of these models consists in comparing actual trade to
the gravity predicted so-called “normal” level of trade, with the difference between the two
capturing the trade potential. Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1992),
Baldwin (1993), Gross and Gonciarz (1996), Fontagné et al. (1999), and Nilsson (2000) use
this approach to estimate European trade potential during the 1990s.
One drawback of this method is the mis-specification of the gravity equation used in
these models with respect to trade theory, and the sensitiveness of results upon the gravity
specification used. Another weakness of trade potential models is that they disregard the
large amount of trade taking place inside national borders and base their predictions on an
analysis carried exclusively on international trade.
The present chapter attempts to quantify the size of future increase in trade among
European countries, and introduces a new method for this purpose. Contrary to tradi-
tional trade potential models, we compute trade potential directly from cross border trade
costs. For that, each country’s domestic trade is used as benchmark for its trade with
partner countries. In other words, trade costs other than those induced by the distance
are assumed nil for transactions taking place within the same country. The rationale for
this the following: A country is a highly integrated and homogeneous economic space,
where full economic integration is achieved. Indeed, in the light of some recent studies (e.g.
Brunetti et alii (1997), Rauch (2001)) the presence of a single legislative system, central
administration, currency, communication network, and set of economic policies contributes
to an important reduction of transaction costs and fosters exchange. Under this perspec-
tive, international trade costs are reflected by border effects. The ratio between border
effects estimated for East-West European and intra-EU flows produces the CEE-EU trade
potential. This method eliminates the two drawbacks characterizing the traditional trade
potential models mentioned above. The use of border specific costs permits to account for
1.1. INTRODUCTION 5
the fact that a lot of trade is already “missing” at the international level, and the estima-
tion of border effects with theoretically derived trade equations corrects for specification
problems.
Trade both among CEE and between CEE and EU countries improved remarkably
during the last decade of the twentieth century, both in terms of border effects and trade
potentials. Our results predict much higher trade potential values for both CEE-EU and
intra-CEE trade than usually found in the literature with traditional trade potential models.
Results are very robust and are obtained with border effect estimates of all theoretically
sound specifications. Thus, at the beginning of the XXIst century trade between CEE
and EU countries represented about half of its attainable level, suggesting a possible 100%
increase with further EU integration. The possible upsurge of regional CEE trade in the
following years, despite the impressive reduction of bilateral border effects reached by the
beginning of the twenty-first century, is even higher.
While strengthening trade between ‘old’ and new members, EU enlargement is very
likely to have a non-negligible impact on trade between new joiners (e.g. between Hungary
and Poland). As revealed by the literature,1 the reintegration of CEE countries into the
world economy in the early 1990s marched side-by-side with their disengagement in regional
integration. The decline of trade with other CEE partners was beyond its normal level,
pointing out the strong competition between former socialist economies for obtaining a
higher share of the much larger EU market, and which is more important, for a positive
evaluation from the EU and augmented chances for accession. These tendencies have been
reduced and even reversed occasionally with the implementation of regional free trade
initiatives. With most of CEE countries joining the union and becoming members of the
same economic block, this rivalry will be significantly reduced, and intra-CEE trade will
most probably return to its ‘normal’ level. Moreover, it may even expand beyond that
level, as part of the new intra-EU trade. In this chapter we assume that trade among
1Maurel (1998), Gros and Gonciarz (1996), Baldwin (1993), Nilson (2000).
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CEE countries joining the union will reach in the long run the intra-EU level. CEE trade
potential is then obtained by taking the ratio between intra-CEE and intra-EU border
effects before enlargement.
The chapter is divided as follows: The next section describes the new trade potential
measure introduced by this chapter. Section 1.3 describes the theoretical trade model and
three different specifications used to estimate border effects. Border effect estimates within
and between country groups are presented and discussed in the next section. Main results
are displayed in section 1.5. Trade potentials for European trade flows produced by the
different approaches and their evolution in time are compared. In section 1.6 we build a test
for monopolistic and perfect competition models of trade, and the last section concludes.
1.2 Border Effects and Trade Potential
Recent empirical work in international trade reveals an interesting phenomenon: A higher
volume of trade takes place inside countries, within national borders, than between them,
i.e. across borders. It’s rather the size than the very presence of this phenomenon that
is surprising. Even highly integrated countries as Canada and US trade about twenty
times less with each other than with themselves (McCallum (1995)). The lower intensity
of international transactions than what could be potentially justified on the basis of trans-
portation costs alone pointed out by Trefler (1995) and Rauch (2001) is another indicator of
this ‘mystery of missing trade’. ‘Under-trading’ across national borders is usually referred
to in the literature as the border eﬀet. 2
To McCallum (1995) the border effect reflects how much more on average a region trades
with another region of the same country than with a region of equal size and situated at
equal distance but abroad. He uses a dummy variable for the border along with country
GDPs and bilateral distance in a standard gravity equation to capture this effect. A nega-
2Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) call this phenomenon the home bias in trade.
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tive and significant estimate of the coefficient on the border dummy reveals a large border
effect: a large amount of ‘missing’ international trade. Helliwell (1996) and Wei (1996) con-
firm McCallum’s finding of large border effects between some highly integrated economies
using identical or very similar equations on different data sets. Unlike McCallum and
Helliwell who use region level data, Wei (1996) estimates the value of missing trade from
country data. He computes unavailable internal trade as the difference between a country’s
production and its exports,3 and introduces a remoteness variable (multilateral distance)
in the trade equation to control for the relative isolation of a country from its trading part-
ners.4 Under this specification border effects equal to the ratio of internal to international
trade after controlling for economic size and distance.
We use these empirical findings to build our trade potential measure. Differently from
traditional trade potential models, our method resides in a direct comparison of interna-
tional trade costs for the integrating and reference groups of countries. We define the level
of trade integration of two or more countries by referring to the intensity of trade inside
these very countries. The more the volume of trade across national borders approaches that
of internal trade when controlling for standard variables such as size and distance, the more
integrated the trading countries are. The integration of two groups of countries is assumed
to lead to a drop in bilateral trade costs to the level of the lowest intra-group trade costs.
Under these conditions, the estimation of trade potentials is reduced to the estimation and
comparison of within and cross group border effects, with a lower border effect signaling
a higher trade integration. We call this kind of integration integration in terms of border
eﬀects. By its very construction this approach partially incorporates ‘missing’ international
trade and produces higher trade potentials.
In the precise case of European integration, trade between ‘old’ EU members is subject
3This permitted the estimation of border effects for a large number of trade flows removing the limits
set by the unavailability of regional trade data, and therefore the expansion of this literature.
4This correction of the gravity was embraced by further works such as Wolf (2000), Nitsch (2000), and
Evans (2003).
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to the lowest distortions and used as reference for other European flows, just like in the
related trade potential literature. The part of intra-EU trade in total EU trade remaining
at a steady level during the last decade suggests that the latter might well correspond to
the long term equilibrium. The East-West European trade creation effect may or not be
accompanied by trade diversion in the detriment of regional CEE integration. After the EU
enlargement to the East, trade between new members becomes intra-EU trade. Therefore,
trade costs associated with it will also reduce at least in the long run to the level of intra-EU
costs prior to enlargement.
Specifically, our approach implies two steps. First, the amount of missing international
trade relative to trade within national borders is estimated for each group of countries. Put
differently, these amounts to estimating intra-EU and CEE-EU border effects. Secondly, the
two border effects are compared and their ratio gives the potential of trade between CEE
countries and the European Union. This corresponds to the actual trade creation that will
occur once East-West European trade integration reaches the level observed among ‘old’
EU members, or the trade potential induced by full integration of these countries in terms
of border effects.
As shown above, a large part of the literature on border effects relies on the use of an
augmented gravity model. The gravity equation is a basic tool in international economics
usually used to express the volume of trade between two countries. It relates trade volume
positively to the size of the two countries and negatively to the distance between them.
Its wide use comes from its simplicity and good fit of empirical data. There is a large and
growing international trade literature based on the empirical use of the gravity. However,
its compatibility with the predictions of international trade theory remained questionable
for a long time. Until recently the neoclassical trade theory seamed unable to predict
a gravity-type relationship, and gravity-based works were considered therefore as lacking
theoretical foundation.
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Important progress has been made lately in deriving gravity-like equations from different
trade models, showing that gravity is compatible with trade in both differentiated and
homogeneous products.5 Trade models with differentiated goods account by far for the
largest part of this literature. Product differentiation can be defined in many ways, yielding
different but rather complementary explanations for why gravity works. Helpman and
Krugman (1985) and Bergstrand (1989) reach a gravity equation in a monopolistically
competitive setting with goods differentiated at firm level. Anderson (1979) and Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) use differentiation by country of origin to derive the gravity in
a perfect competition setup. Deardorff (1998) obtains a gravity equation in a neoclassical
framework with different factor intensities. Eaton and Kortum (2002) enrich the theoretical
underpinning of gravity with a Ricardian model of trade with homogeneous goods and
differences in technologies.
The last two results dissipate the tacit belief that the success of gravity should be
attributed to the presence of increasing returns to scale to the detriment of traditional
trade theories. In the same context, Hummels and Levinshon (1995)’s empirical study
reveals that gravity works for a wide range of countries, suggesting that it is consistent
with different trade models, and, as Deardorff (1998) states, “is therefore not evidence of
anything, but just a fact of life”. Evenett and Keller (2002) as well find support for both
theories.
Although gravity is shown to be compatible with both traditional and new trade the-
ories, each theoretical model produces a different final trade specification. This aspect
ignored by trade potential models is incorporated in our approach through the use of the-
oretically derived trade equations in the estimation of border effects. One can estimate
border effects from a national product differentiation setting as Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003), with monopolistic competition and firm-specific varieties like Wei (1996) and
5For a detailed review of literature on gravity see Deardorff (1998), Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001),
Feenstra (2003), and Harrigan (2003).
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Head and Mayer (2000), or yet estimate an average bilateral border effect as Head and
Ries (2001a). Three alternative specifications for domestic and foreign trade flows are used
in this chapter. The first consists in using country-specific effects to capture importer and
exporter groups of variables, allowing the estimation of coefficients on bilateral variables
alone. The second approach involves the incorporation the production side of a DSK mo-
nopolistic trade model, and the last approach implies the computation of average trade
‘freeness’.
The choice of the trade model, however, may have a direct impact on the magnitude of
trade potentials. It is important therefore to identify and use the model that best replicates
trade flows for considered countries. We address this question in more detail in section 1.6
by constructing a test for the national product differentiation with perfect competition,
and monopolistic competition with endogenously determined number of firms and varieties
trade models. According to it, European trade is better replicated by a monopolistic compe-
tition setting with endogenous firms and varieties, and an average elasticity of substitution
between internationally traded European varieties equal to 3 is obtained.
1.3 Theoretical Discussions
In this section we develop three specifications of trade flows, basing our theoretical mod-
elling on two trade models used in the literature: the national product differentiation model
à la Armington (1969), and the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
and Krugman (1980).
We start by describing an underlying preference structure with differentiated goods,
common to all trade specifications. The trade equation obtained includes variables that
are unobserved or inaccurately measured. This makes the trade equation unsuitable for
direct estimations. The issue of reaching an estimable equation is solved in three particular
ways, generating the same number of trade flows specifications. Each specification is further
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considered into details in a separate subsection.
1.3.1 A differentiated-good trade structure
We consider a trade structure with a differentiated good and ni varieties produced in each
country i. The model has a slightly different interpretation depending on the used data.
Each industry (when using industry-level data) or the entire manufactured sector (when
using aggregate data) is considered to be composed of a single differentiated product of
which multiple varieties are available. Product differentiation can be at country or firm
level. National product differentiation was introduced by Armington (1969) who proposed
an utility function in which consumers distinguish products by their origin. It can also
arise from a Heckscher-Ohlin model with no factor price equalization as in Deardoff (1998).
An alternative approach is that of Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (DSK) type monopolistic com-
petition models. In the latter, each variety is produced by a distinct firm, and the number
of varieties ni (identical to the number of firms) is endogenously determined by the model.
Consumer preferences are homothetic and represented by a CES utility function. Im-












with aij representing country j consumers’ preference for country i products, xij the volume
of goods produced in i and consumed in j, and σ the substitution elasticity between any two
varieties. Coefficients aij are introduced in order to allow for different preferences across
countries.6
We assume that consumers of each product are charged with the same price augmented
6Two forms of preferences are usually found in the literature: identical for all countries, aij = ai ∀j,
yielding symmetric utility functions (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)), and more pronounced for
domestic products, aij = exp(eij) if i 6= j and ajj = exp(ejj +β), producing asymmetric demand functions
(e.g. Bergstrand (1989), Head and Mayer (2000)).
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by trade costs. The difference in the price of the same good in two different locations
is therefore entirely explained by the difference in trade costs to these locations. For
simplicity, an ‘iceberg’ trade costs function is used. The price to country j consumers of
a good produced in i, pij, is the product of its mill price pi and the corresponding trade
cost tij. Two elements of bilateral trade costs are considered: transport costs proportional
to the shipping distance dij, and costs due to the presence of trade barriers such as tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, information costs, partner search costs, institutional costs, etc:
tij = dij
ρ︸︷︷︸ exp [(1− homeij) bij]︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (1.2)
transport border-specific
costs costs
The second type of costs arise exclusively for trade across national borders. homeij is a
dummy variable equal to one for internal trade and to zero for trade between countries.
[exp(bij)− 1]× 100 gives the tariff equivalent of border-specific trade barriers on country i
exports to j. In section 1.4 we introduce a more complex trade costs function by decom-
posing the second left hand side term of equation (1.2) in order to account for the presence
of a common land border or language, and different trade flows types.
Consumers of each country j spend a total sum Ej on domestic and foreign products:
∑
i
nixijpij = Ej, (1.3)
and choose quantities that maximize their utility function (1.1) under the budget constraint
(1.3). Country j’s total demand for country i products is given by:

















is a price index of the importing country j nonlinear with respect to the unknown parameter
σ. The estimation of trade equation (1.4) is possible only for particular values of the
substitution elasticity σ. But even then the presence of a nonlinear price index Pj, and the
difficulty of measuring the number of varieties produced in each country limit the accuracy
of results. Slightly different specifications are reached with national and firm level product
differentiation.
We adopt the following notation φij ≡ (tij/aij)
1−σ, imported from the economic geog-
raphy literature, and representing trade freeness (or φ-ness). Consumer preferences can
also be expressed as a function of bilateral variables, similar to trade costs. However, we
have no means to disentangle the impact of the same variable on preferences from its im-
pact on trade costs. Estimated coefficients on the latter will actually reflect the global
effect on both trade costs and consumer preferences. We assume throughout the rest of the
chapter unitary preferences for all products and consumers, and discuss the release of this
restriction at the end of the section.
The rest of this section is reserved to the presentation and discussion of three alternative
strategies to address these issues. The first consists in using country-specific effects to
capture importer and exporter variables, allowing the estimation of coefficients on bilateral
variables alone. We shall refer to it as the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach. The second procedure
involves a deeper use of the theoretical framework, in particular the production side of a
DSK monopolistic model, and the last approach refers to the computation of an average
trade ‘freeness’. We call those the odds and friction specifications respectively, following
Combes et alii (2005).
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1.3.2 The fixed-effects specification
The method presented below relies uniquely on the differentiated-goods structure pre-
sented above. As a result, it holds independently of the specific market structure and the
production side assumptions, and is equally compatible with both perfect and imperfect
competition, national and firm level differentiation of products. As implied by the name, it
resides in using importer and exporter specific dummies to account for market and supply
capacities, as in Hummels (1998), Harrigan (1995), Rose and van Wincoop (2001), and
Redding and Venables(2004).
An estimable trade specification can be derived directly from (1.4) by grouping i and j
terms of the equation, using the definition of trade freeness, and taking logarithms on both
sides:
lnmij = FEi + lnφij + FMj. (1.6)
Country fixed effects are used as proxies for supply and demand terms of the equation with:
FEi ≡ ln(nip
1−σ




Under this approach only bilateral variables are left in the equation, and all structural
parameters, in particular the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ, cannot be esti-
mated. This represents the major drawback of this approach.
Differently from the cited authors, we are interested in the estimation of border specific
effects, and consequently estimate equation (1.6) for international and domestic trade.
Trade costs in φij are decomposed according to (1.2) to reach the final trade specification:
lnmij = FEi + FMj + ρ(1− σ) ln dij + (1− σ)bij + (σ − 1)bijhomeij. (1.9)
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Accordingly, a higher coefficient on the last variable designates higher cross-border barriers
for country i’s exports to j. As suggested by (1.9) higher barriers can arise not only
from larger trade costs (larger bij), but also from a higher elasticity of substitution. The
trade loss due to country-specific trade barriers (e.g. high overall tariffs, or poor domestic
institutions) is disregarded by this measure of border effects and seized by country specific
effects.
Differently, one can first derive a gravity-type trade equation following Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003)’s approach for national product differentiation, and only afterwards
group supply and demand variables separately into country specific effects. This will pro-
duce identical estimation equations and results; the difference lays in the interpretation of
country and partner effects FEi and FMj.
Summing bilateral imports (1.4) across destinations gives the production level at origin
yi =
∑
j xijpij. Then the obtained identity can be further used to express the unknown
variable pi
1−σ (ni = 1, ∀i in this particular case), which is then re-introduced in the trade
equation (1.4). Differently from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), this can be accom-
plished without imposing market clearance (yi = Ei) using data on importer’s expenditure,
i.e. without assuming factor price equalization and balanced trade.7 A nice gravity equa-

















7Market clearance is a quite restrictive assumption for it implies balanced international trade (see
Appendix A.1), which occurs only at national level and in the long run. This assumption is not completely
inconsistent with the CEE-EU industry level pattern of trade. In 2000 net trade amounted to 20 percent
of total industry level trade between EU and Central and Eastern Europe, leaving four fifths of CEE-EU
trade to intraindustry trade. Trade imbalances are less important for the entire manufactured sector, but
not sufficiently low to suggest that realistic predictions shall be obtained by assuming market clearance at
aggregate level. Therefore we choose to use expenditure data, computed as the sum of domestic production
and foreign imports.
8Deardorff (1998) reaches a similar trade equation from a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model with differences
in factor prices across countries and complete specialization.
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P˜j is the importer specific price index, reflecting the average price of country j’s imports.
The higher the average price paid by consumers of an importing country, the higher is
the value of exports to that market. P˜ 1−σj , on the contrary, corresponds to the relative
isolation of a country in terms of trade costs and/or consumer preferences, and reduces
bilateral flows. P¯i is an exporter specific weighted average of price indexes of all its trading
partners including itself. Note that the expression of P¯ 1−σi in (1.11) is very similar to the
supplier market access used in economic geography models (2004). Consequently, we can
associate it to the access of country i’s products to all markets, including the domestic one.
The average partners’ price index reflects their purchasing power and is positively related
to trade. An improved global market access enjoyed by a country’s products translates
into higher total shipments to its partners. The impact on a bilateral basis depends on
partner’s market capacity.
Symmetric trade costs (tij = tji, ∀ i, j), and identical preferences across countries (aij =
ai, ∀ i, j) yield the symmetric solution P¯i = P˜i used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
to reach a more elegant version of (1.10). In our specific case of East-West European trade
this assumption is irrelevant because the two groups of countries followed uneven trade
liberalization timetables, a difference that we attempt to measure in the following sections.
As before, country and partner binary variables are used to capture demand and supply
















However the two fixed effects denote different things in this case, compared to equations
(1.7) and (1.8). Supply capacity, expressed by the exporter specific effect FEi in equation
(1.6), is equal to the logarithm of country’s production divided by the average market
1.3. THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS 17
access for its products. Market capacity, reflected by the importer specific effect FMj, is
actually the logarithm of the ratio between the partner’s expenditure and their relative
isolation from other countries.
1.3.3 The odds specification
This subsection presents an alternative trade model with monopolistic competition as in
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980), increasing returns to scale and firm-level dif-
ferentiated products. Similar trade models have been developed by Head and Ries (2001a)
and Head and Mayer (2000).
In a DSK setting firms set prices as if they face a constant price elasticity of demand,
equal to the elasticity of substitution between two varieties σ. Their prices, free of trade





We consider labor as the unique factor of production and a single equilibrium wage level
within any given country. Then a unique mill price is charged for all varieties produced
in the same country. Production technologies are assumed identical across countries and
wages are the only source of difference in production costs. Identical cost functions TCi =
Fwi+µqwi are considered, with F denoting fixed costs and µmarginal costs, both expressed
in units of labor. Firms enter the market until all profits vanish away π = 0, and qpi = CTi,
and the equilibrium price equals the average cost. This implies equal outputs q for all firms
and varieties:
q =
F (σ − 1)
µ
. (1.15)
The number of varieties produced, and of firms in each country, ni, is endogenous to the
model. Combining equations (1.14) and (1.15), and using the fact that a country’s revenue
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With full employment, the production yi is equal to the product of country’s endowment
with labour Li and the average wage wi. By dividing the numerator and the denominator
of the right hand side expression in (1.16) by the wage we obtain the expression of ni
usually employed in the literature: ni =
Li
σF
. Given the expression of the number of locally
















Using relative demands as explained variables, i.e. the ratio of trade flows to the same
destination, considerably simplifies the specification by eliminating destination specific right
hand side terms. Applied to our trade equation (1.17) this means the elimination of non-
linear importer’s price index and expenditure. Thus the set of explained variables shrinks
to the characteristics of the two origins. Particularly interesting for us is the case when the
destination country is taken as reference. With bilateral flows given by equation (1.17),















Note that assumptions on the production side imply that mill prices are equal to pi =
µwi(σ/(σ−1)). The price ratio in (1.19), which can also be written as the ratio of marginal
costs, becomes equal to the wage ratio. Unknown technological F and µ coefficients simplify
when using relative demands.
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Border specific costs can be estimated from equation (1.19) with destination country
as reference and the sample restricted to foreign-relative-to-domestic shipments (exclude
observations of the mjj/mjj type). Use the decomposition of trade costs (1.2) in (1.19)










+ ρ(1− σ) ln
dij
djj
+ (1− σ)bij (1.20)
The opposite of the constant term in the above equation reflects border-specific trade
barriers. ‘Missing’ international trade is measured in terms of actual domestic trade, i.e.
as the ratio of domestic-to-cross-border trade deflated by relative production, wage and
distance. More specifically, the border effect for imports of j from i is obtained from (1.20)
by taking the exponential of the negative free term: exp[(σ − 1)bij].
If consumer preferences were to vary with the goods’ origin, any disproportionate pref-
erence for domestic varieties would be captured by the border effect. With a generally
accepted perception of positive domestic biases in preferences, one should expect larger
border effects estimates with the odds specification.
1.3.4 The friction specification
The last approach regards the use of a transformation of the explained variable introduced
by Head and Ries (2001a). They use as left hand side variable the inverse index of ‘friction’









It reflects the geometric mean of foreign firms’ success relative to domestic firms’ success
in each home market. Head and Ries (2001a) assimilate the inverse of this index to the
actual border effect between Canada and the United States.
To stay consistent with the theoretical setup described in the beginning of this section,
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trade flows in the expression of Φij are replaced using equation (1.4). Take logarithms on
both sides to obtain:








Equation (1.22) can also be obtained following the same steps directly from (1.10) or even
(1.19). Its application is not therefore restricted to a specific market structure. According
to the above specification, index Φij actually represent the average trade freeness between
countries i and j relative to their internal freeness. In the light of economic geography
literature which assumes unitary internal freeness (null internal trade costs) and symmetric
trade costs, the inverse friction index Φij becomes precisely the trade freeness φij.
Note that equation (1.22) imposes equal coefficients on production variables. However,
it allows only for the estimation of the average border effect for any two trading partners,
rather than for two distinct effects, one for each trade directions. Use the expression of
trade costs (1.2) in the above equation to get:










An advantage of the friction specification is that it removes the need of using even origin
specific variables, which is an important gain when accurate production, price and/or wage
data is not available. As previously, the constant term refers to the magnitude of border
effects when unitary trade friction observations are excluded. It captures as well any bias
in consumer preferences of both importing and exporting markets when preferences are
allowed to vary across countries.
1.3.5 Differences in consumer preferences
The unitary consumer preferences assumption in the beginning of this section will not affect
the validity of results, but only requires a slightly different interpretation. Differences in
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tastes and preferences can be introduced by decomposing the preference term as follows:
ln aij = χhomeij +
∑
r
ζrCrij + eij. (1.24)
χ reflect the home bias in preferences, and Cij is a set of bilateral variables that may
induce additional differences in consumer preferences, and eij is a residual term. The
second element in (1.24) is usually associated with preferential bilateral relationships such
as between neighbor countries or countries with a common official language.
With non-unitary preferences aij, estimated coefficients in the above trade specifications
need be interpreted differently. Under all specifications the border effect reflects the sum
of bilateral trade costs and the larger-than-average preference for domestic products. Note
that sharing a land border or the same language with a partner can increase the prefer-
ence for its products, but also reduce reciprocal transaction costs and offer an improved
access to its market. The latter effect is ignored by the simplified trade costs function
(1.2), but will be considered in the next section through the use of a more complex func-
tion. While unable to differentiate the two effects, coefficients on bilateral variables present
in the structure of both trade costs and consumer preferences will actually reflect their sum.
Border effects under all specifications have two components: one reflecting the true level
of border specific trade costs (bij for the first two approaches and (bji + bij)/2 for friction),
and another coming from the elasticity of substitution between variables (σ − 1). This
means that even tiny trade barriers may generate important deviations of trade towards
the domestic market when the substitution elasticity is sufficiently high. None of the
specifications presented in this section permits the estimation of all structural parameters.
Therefore we can only estimate entire border effects with each approach, without being
able to distinguish the part ascribed to each of the two elements. We proceed in the next
section to estimations of European border effects.
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1.4 Estimating Border Effects Across Europe
The method proposed in section 1.2 computes trade potentials from border effects within
and between country groups. To analyse trade creation effects of European integration
trade between European countries is divided into four types: EU imports from CEE, CEE
imports from EU, intra-EU trade, and trade among CEE countries. The European Union
enlargement to the East will drive CEE-EU trade integration in the long run to the level
of integration between the fifteen ‘old’ EU members. To picture further (post integration)
increase in reciprocal trade the intra-EU integration level is compared to the CEE-EU
level. The deepening of East-West European integration was repeatedly argued and feared
by politicians to harm regional integration in Central and Eastern Europe. With CEE
countries joining the EU, trade between them becomes intra-union trade and will probably
regain attraction. The above mentioned partition of European trade permits to evaluate
each of these aspects. The data employed in estimations is described in section A.2.
1.4.1 Estimated trade equations
We estimate border effects for each type of trade from a single estimation on the entire
sample of countries. This method is preferred to estimating border effects separately for
each type of trade since it has the advantage of imposing the same coefficients of indepen-
dent variables for all trade types and yields more comparable results. Border effects are
estimated with the ﬁxed-eﬀects, odds, and friction specifications presented in section 1.3.
For comparison reasons simple gravity estimations of international trade, and domestic and
foreign flows are also presented. Estimations are carried separately for total manufactured
imports and for industry level imports.
Trade costs specific to each type of flows identified by the corresponding dummy vari-
ables, as well as reduced costs for preferential bilateral relationships (neighbor countries,
and countries with a common official language) are introduced by decomposing the border-
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specific term bij in (1.2) as follows:
ln tij = ρ ln dij + b1homeEUij + b2homeCEEij + b3CEEtowardsEUij (1.25)
+b4EUtowardsCEEij + b5intraEUij + b6intraCEEij
+c1contigij + c2comlangij + uij
Six dummies for domestic trade of ‘old’ EU members and Eastern European countries,
Central and East European exports to and imports from Western European countries, and
regional Western and Eastern European trade are used. The first two account for lower
than average domestic trade costs (negative coefficients b1 and b2), while the latter four
dummy variables allow for different trade costs across trade types. Similar to most empirical
studies on international trade, we control for a common land border between countries i
and j, and a common language for both countries by including the binary variables contigij
and comlangij respectively in the structure of trade costs. As both linguistic and neighbor
relations are likely to reduce trade costs, negative coefficients c1 and c2 are expected.
Observe that the first six dichotomic variables in the above trade costs specification sum
to unity. The use of (1.25) along with a constant term in a trade equation does not permit
therefore the estimation of all parameters b1 to b6. We choose to drop the intra-EU trade
dummy from all estimated equations. Cross-border trade between EU countries is reflected
then by the constant of the model, and all other flows are expressed as deviations from
the intra-EU level. Accordingly, a positive coefficient on homeEU reflects the difference
between international and domestic EU trade. In the odds and friction equations lower
trade costs for domestic shipments are directly accounted for by the specific form of the
left hand side variable, and home dummies become irrelevant.
A gravity equation very similar to the one used by McCallum (1995) is used for baseline
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estimations:
lnmij = α1prodi + α2consj + α3dij + β0 + β1homeEUij + β2homeCEEij (1.26)
+β3CEEtowardsEUij + β4EUtowardsCEEij + β5intraCEEij
+γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + ǫij
Exporter’s production prodi and importer’s consumption consj are used as proxies for na-
tional revenues. Variables CEEtowardsEU ij, EUtowardsCEEij, intraCEEij, homeEU ij,
and homeCEEij are dummies indicating the affiliation of each observation to a particular
trade type. The constant term captures the specificity of intra-EU trade. And a positive
and significant estimate of β1 shows how much more does in average a EU member buy
from itself than from other EU member countries.
The border effect for EU imports from CEE reflects how much less do EU countries
import from CEE partners than from domestic ones. It is obtained from comparing EU
imports from CEE countries to domestic EU trade while controlling for size, distance, and
other trade costs, and equals to the exponential of the difference between the coefficients
of the corresponding dummy variables: exp(β1 − β3). Similarly, the border effect for CEE
imports from EU is given by exp(β2 − β4). The intra-EU trade being the reference in
trade equation (1.26), the intra-EU border effect is simply equal to the exponential of the
coefficient on homeEUij: exp(β1). The intra-CEE border effects is obtained by taking the
exponential of the difference between the home and intra-group dummies: exp(β2 − β5).
The gravity equation (1.26) can also be used for international trade alone, in which
case the two variables for group specific domestic trade are to be excluded. Naturally, no
border effects can be estimated when this option is used. One can only appreciate how
much more or less CEE countries trade with each other or with ‘old’ EU members compared
to intra-EU trade. Similar specifications are used in traditional trade potential models.
The equation estimated with the ﬁxed-eﬀects procedure is obtained by integrating the
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more detailed trade costs function (1.25) in equation (1.6). However, the use of all group
dummies, country and partner specific effects is impossible due to collinearity problems.
The inclusion of all country specific effects is imperative for the estimation of average
effects for the entire sample, not relative to an excluded country pair. When we include
fixed effects for all importing and exporting countries, together with dummies for the six
types of trade in equation (1.25), a threefold span of the sample is obtained: Each of these
three sets of variables sum to unity. Under these conditions the estimation of coefficients
on all group dummies is possible only with reference to a given pair of countries. Three of
the six group variables in (1.25) become a linear combination of other group, country, and
partner dummies. Therefore, we choose to impose similar differences between foreign and
domestic trade costs for all European countries, and the estimation of the average CEE-EU
effect. For this purpose, a unique variable homeij = homeEUij + homeCEEij is used, and
variables CEEtowardsEUij and EUtowardsCEEij are replace by their sum:
lnmij = FEi + FMj + α ln dij + β0 + β12homeij + β34CEEandEUij (1.27)
+β5intraCEEij + γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + εij
As domestic trade for each group of countries cannot be identified, one can actually estimate
only average East-West trade and border effects. Moreover, in this case alone the intra-
group border effect estimates rely considerably on the equal foreign-relative-to-domestic
trade costs assumption for the two groups of countries: b1 = b2 in (1.25). The relative
difference between domestic and shipments to other EU countries is given by the exponential
value of β12. Accordingly, the intra-CEE border effect is equal to exp(β12−β5). With lower
relative trade costs for EU countries (b1 < b2), this method underestimates the border effect
within the EU, and overestimates the effect for trade between CEE countries. The border
effect between Eastern andWestern European countries, computed as exp(β12−β34), reflects
how much less on average EU countries import from CEE partners and CEE countries
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import from EU partners than from domestic ones.













+ β0intraEUij + β3CEEtowardsEUij (1.28)
+β4EUtowardsCEEij + β5intraCEEij + γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + υij
Differently from the ﬁxed-eﬀects specification, in this case we can introduce all group dum-
mies. However, variables home are inappropriate when the explained variable is relative
trade, and are excluded from equation (1.28). Relative production values are used for out-
put or revenue ratios. Of all specifications exposed in section 1.3, this is the only one that
estimates distinct border effects for each of the four European trade types. The amount
of ‘missing’ international trade is given by the exponential of the opposite value of the
coefficient of the corresponding dummy: exp(−β0) for trade between ‘old’ EU members,
exp(−β3) for Central and East European exports to EU countries, exp(−β4) for opposite
flows, and exp(−β5) for intra-CEE trade.
The friction approach estimates average two-way trade within and between the two
groups of countries. Differently from the ﬁxed-eﬀects method, dummies for both CEE
exports to and imports from EU are included. By construction, the coefficients on these
variables are identical and reflect the average CEE-EU border effect. The equation esti-
mated with this approach is the following:
ln Φij = α ln
dij√
djjdii
+ β0intraEUij + β3CEEtowardsEUij (1.29)
+β4EUtowardsCEEij + β5intraCEEij + γ1contigij + γ2comlangij + vij
As in the previous case, intra-EU trade is introduced on the right hand side of the trade
equation, and regional border effects are computed exactly in the same way. The amount
exp(−β3) shows how much more domestic products prevail over products originating from
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Central and Eastern Europe in EU consumers’ purchases. Coefficients β3, β4, and β5
may also capture the part of consumer preferences common to all countries of each group,
including any particular preference for domestic products, common to EU, and respectively
CEE countries.
The use of relative demands in the last two specifications introduces spatial autocor-
relation in the error term. This is corrected through a robust clustering procedure, which
allows residuals of the same importing country to be correlated. In the ﬁxed-eﬀects spec-
ification unilateral origin and destination trade costs and preferences are reflected in the
country and partner fixed effects. The last two trade equations, therefore, might produce
higher estimates of border effects.
1.4.2 Estimations for the manufactured sector
Border effects are estimated for total manufactured bilateral imports of fifteen EU coun-
tries and ten Central and East European countries with pooled ordinary least squares and
results are reported in table 1.1.9 Reference border effects are estimated with the gravity
equation (1.26) used on all international and domestic flows and production of the origin
and consumption of the destination markets (in column 2). Setting all dummy variables
equal to zero yields an estimation of intra-EU level of trade. All variables have coefficients
of the expected sign and are statistically significant. Production and consumption coeffi-
cients are close to unity, and the distance elasticity of trade is not significantly different
from -1, similar to most empirical studies in the literature. The parameters of interest are
the coefficients on the home variables and the dummies corresponding to different trade
types.
The estimate of β3 in column 1 is equal to -0.61 and is significant at the one percent
9The Hausman specification test rejects the fixed effects model, and the F test for the presence of
individual effects is not significant. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
states that the random effect model is not appropriate for the used data set. Therefore we choose to
estimate pooled OLS.
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Table 1.1: European trade integration: total manufactured imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model : gravity gravity FE odds odds IV† friction






− ln yiyj Φij
intercept -8.00a -8.31a 24.46a
(0.51) (0.47) (0.32)
ln production exporter 0.83a 0.82a
(0.01) (0.01)
ln consumption importer 0.76a 0.75a
(0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -1.08a -1.01a -0.99a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ln relative production 0.71a
(0.06)
ln relative wage -0.15a -0.38a
(0.12) (0.03)
ln relative distance -0.53a -0.84a
(0.15) (0.03)
ln average relative distance -0.69a
(0.08)
CEE exports to EU -0.61a -0.62a -4.40a -3.58a -4.10a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.41) (0.09) (0.25)
EU exports to CEE -0.59a -0.62a -4.42a -3.93a -4.10a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.39) (0.12) (0.21)
CEE-EU -1.14a
(0.07)
intra CEE -0.85a -0.85a -1.89a -5.12a -4.52a -4.77a
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.31) (0.08) (0.22)








common land frontier 0.87a 0.95a 0.92a 1.44a 1.10a 1.17a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.17) (0.08) (0.15)
common official language -0.09 -0.09 -0.25 0.14 0.21 0.28b
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
N 3387 3554 4261 3143 3143 3988
R2 0.835 0.862 0.899 0.692 0.570 0.509
RMSE .980 .970 .829 1.149 1.200 1.027
F tests for individual effects p-value 0.653 0.427 0.698 0.690 0.531 0.985
Breusch and Pagan test p-value 0.128 0.165 0.185 0.591 0.948
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test p-value 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels. † Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates are used in column 4 to correct for
endogeneity problems due to the simultaneous use of production and wage variables.
1.4. ESTIMATING BORDER EFFECTS ACROSS EUROPE 29
level. This suggests that a EU member country buys in average about 46% [= (1 −
exp(−0.61)) × 100] less from a Eastern European country that from another EU country,
when holding sizes and trade costs constant. Similarly, CEE imports from EU countries
represent only 55% [= exp(−0.59)×100] of intra-EU trade. EU countries trade about 134%
[= (1/ exp(−0.85)− 1)× 100] more with each other than equally large and distant Eastern
European countries. Hence, both East-West and regional East European trade integration
lies below the level reached by the fifteen ‘old’ EU members. EU imports from CEE lie
slightly below the intra-EU trade level while products are not significantly different from
intra-EU trade. The positive and very significant coefficient on the common land border
variable confirms the intuition that neighborhood increases trade. This comes not only
from lower trade costs with partners just on the other side of the border, but also from
more similar preferences among consumers. The negative non-significant coefficients on
common language is due to its high correlation with the common border variable, the low
number of dyads sharing both characteristics in the sample, and their uneven distribution
across country groups.10
Including internal trade in the regression (column 2) keeps the coefficients on all vari-
ables almost unchanged, and sets forward the fact that both EU and CEE countries rely
much more on domestic than foreign partners. A EU member country buys in average
about 10 [= exp(2.30)] times more from itself than from another EU country, while a
similar country from Eastern Europe buys about 38 times more. For similar countries,
East-West European trade and regional CEE trade is slightly above half of trade between
EU members.
Correspondingly, border effects for the four trade types can be computed from these
estimations and results are displayed in the upper part of table 1.2. The first column
shows estimates à la McCallum (1995) with standard gravity, and country and partner
10Indeed, in Europe most countries that speak the same language share also a land border: e.g. Austria
and Germany, Belgium with its neighbors. Out of the 552 distinct country-partner relationships in the
panel only 14 speak a common language, and all of them are EU countries.
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GDPs. Using country GDPs to control for size, suggests that EU imports from CEE
lie slightly below the intra-EU trade level while CEE imports of EU products are not
significantly different from intra-EU trade. Amounts in the second column correspond to
gravity estimations in table 1.1. A EU member imports about 19 [= exp(2.30− (−0.62))]
times more from itself than from a Central or East European partner with which it does
not share a common land frontier or language. Likewise, CEE countries’ imports from
EU are about 55 [= exp(3.39 − (−0.62))] times less than domestic ones, all other things
equal. Trade integration between EU countries is significantly deeper than between Eastern
and Western European countries for flows in either direction. The gap is even larger with
respect to trade between CEE countries. The latter trade 69 [= exp(3.39− (−0.85))] times
less with each other than with themselves.
Column 3 in both tables 1.1 and 1.2 shows estimates of the ﬁxed-eﬀects model for
the entire manufacturing sector. The positive coefficient on the home variable confirms
the existence of border effects, which are larger between Eastern countries and lower for
Western countries. Trans-European trade is about 32 [= exp(2.33− (−1.14))] times higher
than either domestic trade.
In the next two columns we present results from the odds approach. In column 4 we
simply estimate equation (1.28) with generalized least squares. We correct for endogeneity
problems due to the simultaneous use of production and wage variables, reflected by a
significant Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic, in column 5. A unitary coefficient on relative
production, as predicted by the theoretical model, is imposed and per capita GDPs and
employment levels (size of labour force) are used as instruments for wages. Standard errors
take into account the correlation of the error terms for a given importer. This is required
because the dependent variable is domestic imports divided by bilateral imports of the
same country j. All estimates except the common language coefficient are statistically
significant at the 1% level. The low coefficient on wages comes from the fact that the latter
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reflect quite poorly product prices. A ‘better’ estimate is not obtained even when wages
are replaced by price indices.11
Larger border effects than in all previous cases in columns 4 and 5 come at least par-
tially from the use of a functional form which attributes home biased consumer preferences
to group coefficients (see corresponding columns in table 1.2). Higher in absolute value
coefficients on wage and distance are obtained when endogeneity is controlled for. This
also induces a drop in European border effects which approach the estimates of the ﬁxed-
eﬀects model. Intra-EU trade being the reference, Western countries with no common
border or language trade with each other 14 times more than with themselves. The re-
lationship between CEE-EU border effects in both directions established in with gravity
is also maintained: EU domestic purchases overcome their imports from CEE partners
by 36 = [exp(−(−3.58))] times, 42% below the extent to which CEE domestic purchases
overcome EU-originating imports. The larger border effect for CEE imports from the EU
market has two possible explanations: large and similar preferences for domestic goods of
CEE consumers, and higher access costs to the EU market. Both similar tastes and large
transaction costs cas also justify the larger border effect for regional Eastern European
trade.
The last column in tables 1.1 and 1.2 sets out point estimates and border effects of the
friction specification. Bilateral variables used to express trade costs are the only explana-
tory variables of the model. By construction, error terms are not independent across obser-
vations, but are assumed independent across importer-exporter couples. A lower distance
elasticity of trade in absolute terms is obtained, but inside the range of values replicated
in the literature. A larger effect of sharing a land border and a positive significant effect
of common language are also found.
11In reality the labor is not the unique factor of production and there are many additional distortions in
the price structure not captured by the model.
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Table 1.2: Border effects for European total manufactured trade
Model : gravity∗ gravity FE odds odds IV friction
countries with no common border or language
CEE to EU 11.7 18.7 32.2 81.7 35.8 60.6
EU to CEE 73.2 54.9 32.2 83.5 51.0 60.6
Intra EU 9.6 10.0 10.3 24.4 13.7 18.2
Intra CEE 62.5 69.4 68.3 167.3 92.1 118.3
countries sharing a common border and language
CEE to EU 4.9 7.9 19.0 16.7 9.6 14.2
EU to CEE 30.6 23.3 19.0 17.1 13.7 14.2
Intra EU 4.0 4.3 6.0 5.0 3.7 4.3
Intra CEE 26.1 29.5 40.2 34.3 24.7 27.8
Average border effects, all EU
CEE to EU 6.8 10.0 17.1 45.3 25.5 30.1
EU to CEE 43.8 29.0 17.1 34.1 27.4 30.1
Intra EU 5.8 5.6 5.8 11.7 8.4 9.1
Intra CEE 35.5 35.2 34.8 71.1 51.5 54.7
Average border effects, ‘core’ EU
CEE to EU 1.0 1.4 4.1 5.9 13.0
EU to CEE 11.2 5.9 4.1 24.5 13.0
Intra EU 2.3 2.0 2.5 4.2 4.4
Intra CEE 18.8 17.8 21.3 55.1 53.0
Note: ∗ country GDPs rather than true production and consumption values
are used in the estimation.
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The model estimates that CEE-EU trade is on average 60 = [exp(−(−4.10))] times
inferior to domestic trade when keeping size and trade costs constant. This ratio is three
times larger than the similar foreign-to-domestic trade ratio for flows within the EU, but
only half of the one for regional CEE trade. The friction specification generates the highest
border effects, almost double compared to the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach. As both models
rely on the same hypothesis of identical relative differences in domestic and foreign trade
costs for Eastern and Western European countries, the difference in border effects can be
explained only by the variance in consumer preferences captured by fixed effects in the last
specification and attributed to border effects in the former one. If one is to ignore ‘missing’
foreign trade due to biases in consumer preference, estimates in column 3 should be used.
The first set of results in table 1.2 shows border effects with all specifications for coun-
tries without a common land border or language. These refer to most countries in the
sample. The next set displays to which extent countries that are direct neighbors and
speak the same language engage into trade relations with foreign relative to domestic part-
ners. These are obtained by subtracting the impact of common border and language on
trade from border effect estimates above, and refer to country-pairs like Austria-Germany,
Great Britain -Ireland, France-Belgium, etc. Obviously, in this case all border effects are
considerably lower. Interesting, the relationship between border effects under different
specifications is reversed, and larger results are obtained with the gravity and ﬁxed-eﬀects
approach. This reveals that consumers from these countries have also more similar pref-
erences. The original relation is restored when gains in trade costs due to contiguity and
common language are disregarded and border effects for average European countries are
computed (the next set of results). Finally, border effects for each trade type when EU is
resumed to its six founding members are presented. Trade integration between the so-called
‘core’ EU is twice as strong in terms of border effects than average integration within all
fifteen member countries, confirming the core-periphery structure of the European econ-
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omy. As for CEE countries, they have stronger commercial links with the ‘core’ EU, as
suggested by lower border effects. Lower border effects for CEE-EU trade than within the
‘core’ EU comes from non-significant positive coefficients on CEE-EU trade and should be
disregarded.
1.4.3 Estimations with industry level data
Results of estimations with industry data are set forth in table 1.3, and corresponding
border effects in table 1.4. When trade is broken down by industries, an important number
of zero value trade flows is observed. The problem with null trade flows is that they do not
occur randomly, but are the outcome of a selection procedure (e.g. a low supply or demand
for a particular group of products). We correct for this sample self-selection bias by giving
a positive weight to the zero trade mass by employing a two-stage Heckman estimator: a
first-stage probit model, and a second-stage OLS model. Significant coefficients on Mills’
ratio in the second stage displayed in the bottom of table 1.3 indicate the necessity of this
adjustment. When non significant coefficients are obtained (not shown in the table), the
Heckman procedure is not justified and we use simple OLS.
Estimates of the three trade specifications in line with the theoretical model correspond
to the last three columns in tables 1.1 and 1.2. As above, the first two columns give es-
timates of comparable gravity specifications. Coefficients on standard variables are very
close to values obtained for aggregate manufactured sector, with the difference that slightly
lower coefficients are obtained on supply and demand variables, and larger in absolute value
coefficients on distance. The positive and significant effect on trade of a common language
spoken by the exporter and the importer is more pronounced and appears in all five speci-
fications. Note that border effects are always smaller when industry level data is employed.
This finding testifies that most European trade liberalization was concentrated in a large
number of small size industries. The use of aggregate manufacturing data overestimates the
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Table 1.3: European trade integration: bilateral imports at industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5))
Model : gravity gravity FE odds friction




intercept -1.51a -1.82a 14.94a -
(0.18) (0.16) (0.13)
ln production exporter 0.74a 0.72a
(0.01) (0.01)
ln consumption importer 0.61a 0.60a
(0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -1.28a -1.18a -0.89a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln relative production 0.83a
(0.04)
ln relative wage -0.34b
(0.14)
ln relative distance -0.81a
(0.14)
ln average relative distance -1.54a
(0.19)
CEE exports to EU -1.25a -1.25a -4.71a -3.86a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.40) (0.22)
EU exports to CEE -0.87a -0.89a -4.12a -3.86a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.41) (0.21)
CEE-EU -0.97a
(0.04)
intra CEE -1.75a -1.71a -0.94a -4.89a -4.21a
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.29) (0.24)








common land frontier 1.04a 1.11a 0.88a 1.24a 1.00a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.10)
common official language 0.30a 0.31a 0.21a 0.46a 0.54a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.15)
Mills’ ratio 1.65a 1.26a -2.51a 2.49a
(0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.80)
N 59215 62180 103785 58308 65238
R2 0.621 0.673 0.608 0.486 0.280
RMSE 1.876 1.844 1.971 2.057 1.743
Durbin-Wu-Hausman p-value 0.976
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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amount of ‘missing’ international trade because it disproportionately reflects large sectors
with high barriers to trade.
With industry data the gap between East-West European and intra-EU trade is very
prominent under both gravity and odds specifications, the only ones that separate the
two types of trade. However, the gravity produces erroneous results even when industry
level demand and supply data are used because it ignores remote resistance terms implied
by the theory, particular strong at the industry level. A p-value of 0.962 of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test shows the absence of endogeneity in the data. Consequently, we have
no equivalent for instrumental variables estimates with aggregate flows in tables 1.3 and
1.4. Different from the aggregate case, with industry data the theoretically consistent
odds specification shows that CEE exports to EU face higher trade barriers than flows in
the opposite direction. This counterintuitive result is robust to changes in the estimation
procedure or country panel. The apparent paradox can be explained by the fact that EU
countries liberalized first their domestic markets for small and medium size industries, and
kept until late 1990s relatively important barriers in several key CEE industries such as
textiles, while CEE countries have adopted a distinct policy towards EU partners.
The logical relationships between border effects for different country groups identified
above for aggregate trade hold also when industry level data is used. According to table 1.4,
CEE-EU trade for non-neighbor countries is between 48 and 111 times lower that domestic
trade of European countries, and only 10 to 20 times lower for neighbors speaking the
same language. As previously, cross European integration is stronger with the six founding
members of the European Union.
The next section addresses the estimation and computation of trade potentials, the
central issue of this chapter.
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Table 1.4: Border effects for European industry level trade
Model : gravity∗ gravity FE odds friction
countries with no common border or language
CEE to EU 18.4 55.4 59.8 110.7 47.5
EU to CEE 156.0 77.3 59.8 61.5 47.5
Intra EU 18.4 15.9 22.6 25.4 14.7
Intra CEE 74.3 175.8 58.1 132.9 67.4
countries sharing a common border and language
CEE to EU 5.0 13.4 20.1 20.2 10.2
EU to CEE 42.7 18.7 20.1 11.2 10.2
Intra EU 5.0 3.8 7.6 4.6 3.2
Intra CEE 20.3 42.6 19.5 24.2 14.5
Average border effects, all EU
CEE to EU 18.4 27.7 30.7 50.9 14.4
EU to CEE 156.0 38.4 30.7 21.9 14.4
Intra EU 18.4 7.6 11.8 10.0 4.3
Intra CEE 74.3 85.4 28.8 48.4 19.5
Average border effects, ‘core’ EU
CEE to EU 6.8 9.7 15.1 25.9 12.2
EU to CEE 33.3 5.4 15.1 19.9 12.2
Intra EU 7.0 3.4 5.6 5.8 3.7
Intra CEE 47.8 48.4 29.0 66.7 28.7
Note:∗ country GDPs rather than true production and consump-
tion values are used in the estimation.
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1.5 Trade Potential and East-West European Integra-
tion
The important steps undertaken by Eastern and Western European countries for the re-
moval of politically imposed distortions on bilateral exchanges at the beginning of 1990s,
as well as efforts engaged with the scheduled EU enlargement translated into a continu-
ous increase in trade between these countries. The reintegration to the world economy of
Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the communist system was
accompanied by reorientation of their foreign trade towards the European Union. Not only
did these countries increase the share of their imports from the EU, but they also improved
their positions on Western markets. As shown in table 1.5, the share of CEE exports to-
wards the European internal market in region’s total exports increased during the period
between 1993 and 2000 with thirteen percentage points, reaching the share observed for
imports and which remained at the same level throughout the considered period. The
evolution was the most remarkable for the Baltic countries which were the least integrated
of the CEE group at the beginning of 1990’s.
The steady share of EU products in CEE imports is an aggregation artefact, and due to a
different trade diversification path undertaken by Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Already
in 1993 these countries imported a large part of products form the European Union, which
attests that main changes in the geographic structure of their imports occurred very rapidly
during the first years following the breakdown of the state centralized political system.
During the last years of the twentieth century all three countries expanded the number of
foreign supply markets which led to an inevitable fall in the share of imports originating
from the EU. Given the large size of their economies, these shifts outweighted the positive
effects recorded for other CEE countries. Indeed, the average effect obtained with equal
country weights is positive and displayed in the last line of table 1.5. A similar pattern
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Table 1.5: Geographical structure of CEE foreign trade in 2000 and change relative to 1993
Country Imports Exports

















Bulgaria 70.4 (3.7) 47.4 (4.5) 84.1 (39.1) 60.4 (30.7)
Czech Republic 76.2 (6.4) 60.6 (6.8) 67.5 (21.8) 52.7 (17.3)
Estonia 61.9 (29.8) 21.0 (12.2) 66.5 (44.5) 11.9 (5.7)
Hungary 67.7 (-17.9) 52.5 (-7.4) 72.8 (-3.7) 57.6 (-0.1)
Lithuania 69.8 (31.0) 45.9 (16.3) 57.7 (30.0) 32.9 (15.1)
Latvia 78.7 (17.4) 46.5 (9.4) 66.9 (36.7) 35.8 (17.8)
Poland 74.2 (-6.6) 57.8 (-5.3) 70.8 (-8.4) 55.0 (-8.7)
Romania 75.5 (3.5) 61.2 (0.5) 81.7 (31.4) 65.2 (23.8)
Slovakia 60.0 (17.9) 46.6 (15.6) 63.0 (32.2) 51.0 (25.7)
Slovenia 86.6 (-0.8) 65.9 (-5.2) 63.0 (-3.4) 50.0 (-6.9)
All CEE 72.5 (0.0) 55.3 (0.7) 70.0 (13.3) 53.5 (9.1)
Country average 72.1 (8.4) 50.5 (4.7) 69.4 (22.0) 47.3 (12.0)
Source: WTO Trade Statistics. Calculations by the author.
is observed for CEE exports, but the Hungarian, Polish, and Slovenian diversification of
supplied foreign markets had a lower scale effect of total region’s exports. Both exports to
and imports from the EU of the other seven countries grew during the 1990s at a higher
pace than their trade with other geographical regions. Consequently, the European Union
became not only their main foreign supplier of manufactured products, but also by far the
most attractive dispatch market for CEE countries’ products. In 2000 more than 70% of
CEE foreign trade was with EU partners, three-fourths of which was with the six founding
members of the Union.
In the view of EU enlargement to the East, the convergence of countries from Central
and Easter Europe towards the EU market is expected to arise in all economic areas,
including the manner to trade. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that in the perspective
the proportion of purchases of domestic relative to foreign products of CEE countries will
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Table 1.6: Trade Potential According to the Traditional and New Methodology










approach that of the fifteen ‘old’ EU members. We define therefore the potential of trade
between CEE and the EU as the ratio of the appropriate border effects:




and the regional CEE trade potential as the ratio between intra-group border effects:




In the traditional models, trade potential is estimated by dividing the trade of a reference
group of countries by that of the investigated group, both corrected for size, distance,
and other standard gravity variables. In our case the reference group is the EU. Thus,
according to these models, the potential of trade between France and Poland is obtained
by taking the ratio between the gravity adjusted trade of France with another EU country,
say Germany, and its trade with Poland. Differently, our method introduces national trade
as an additional benchmark for both reference and investigated trade flows. Following the
previous example, French-Polish trade potential is computed by dividing the numerator of
the previous ratio by German domestic trade, and the denominator by the trade between
Polish partners. In the end, this resumes to dividing the traditional trade potential by the
ratio of domestic trade of the two countries. This difference in methodology is exposed in
table 1.6.
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Trade potentials obtained with the new method reflects a trade integration in terms
of border effects (or international trade costs). This kind of integration reaches its peak
when the two groups of countries have identical cross-border trade costs and preferences.
Computations of (1.30) and (1.31) for each year, and border effect estimates of the four
trade specifications employed in section 1.4 are laid out in tables 1.7 and 1.8. Separate
border effects for each year from 1993 to 2000 and type of trade (CEE exports to and
imports from the EU, and between CEE countries) are obtained with equations (1.26)
to (1.29). Average East-West European trade potential for flows in both directions are
estimated using a single dummy for CEE-EU trade.
European trade potentials are computed according to both methods presented in table
1.6. First, we use a traditional trade potential model that relies exclusively on international
trade data. In line with the literature on trade potential,12 simple gravity is estimated for
trade of the reference group, intra-EU trade in our case. Specifically, equation (1.26) is
estimated for trade between EU countries. Obtained parameter estimates are used along
with GDP levels, distance and other bilateral variables to predict the ‘normal’ level of trade
for the rest of flows using an identical gravity equation. The difference between actual and
predicted (or ‘normal’) trade levels gives the potential of trade, displayed in table 1.7 as
a percentage of actual trade. The upper part of table 1.7 presents the results by year.
This method claims relatively low trade potentials for all four types of European trade:
By the year 2000, CEE-EU trade potential is appreciated around 30% of actual trade
values. Moreover, it advocates a slow East-West trade integration: During seven years its
deviation from potential trade remained almost unchanged. As for intra-CEE trade, the
model does not predict an increased regional integration, but rather a growing reticence of
CEE countries for mutual exchange. Nilsson (2000) estimates find even stronger results,
according to which a large part of these flows have already reached their potential by 1996
12Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1992), Baldwin (1993), Gross and Gonciarz (1996),
Fontagné et al. (1999), and Nilsson (2000).
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Table 1.7: European Trade Potential (in % of actual trade)
Trade flows CEE → EU EU → CEE CEE-EU Intra CEE
Traditional trade potential models†
1993 27.5 28.3 28.2 16.4
1994 27.0 30.3 28.8 27.2
1995 26.5 29.9 28.5 29.1
1996 29.1 32.8 31.4 32.1
1997 25.3 29.6 27.5 29.3
1998 25.2 28.2 27.1 28.5
1999 25.8 30.3 28.5 30.4
2000 25.8 29.1 27.6 31.2
Nilson (2000)†
1995-1996 -10.0 10.0 -40.0
Border effects with augmented gravity (McCallum (1995))‡
1993 31.3 1709.0 186.8 714.3
1994 29.1 987.3 184.3 398.5
1995 12.1 884.4 160.7 400.5
1996 2.5 908.3 141.7 432.6
1997 2.2 663.6 114.7 299.8
1998 -5.7 600.7 98.2 259.5
1999 -15.8 531.5 71.3 181.6
2000 -25.5 435.2 41.8 154.6
Note: Trade potentials are computed with industry level data: ∗ as exponential
values of estimated group dummies; † as the difference between actual and
normal trade, obtained with intra-EU coefficients; ‡ as a border effects ratio.
and did not cease to grow.
Secondly, Next, border effects are estimated with standard gravity, and trade potentials
are computed using (1.30) and (1.31). Much larger values are obtained with this specifica-
tion: see the last set of results in table 1.7. Coefficients on CEE exports to and imports
from EU, however, are rarely significant. This explains the very uneven East-West trade
potentials. The average CEE-EU trade potential, obtained from an estimated gravity equa-
tion with a unique home dummy, has a higher statistical significance and is therefore more
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credible. Although trade potential was high at the beginning of the period, it dropped
considerably to reach only 42% in 2000 for CEE-EU trade and 155% for intra-CEE trade.
Border effect estimates of the three trade specifications derived in the section 1.3 are
employed to find East-West and regional East European trade potentials according to
the method introduced above. Results are displayed in table 1.8. The three specifications
produce close results for East-West trade and situate its potential between 106 and 125% in
2000, much higher than any of the previous models. Depending on the approach, during the
considered period CEE-EU trade regained between 25 and 33% of its 1993 potential. The
odds specification is the only to produce differentiated results by flows’ direction. Except
for one year, the model exhibits CEE exports to EU more distant from their potential than
opposite flows. This matches the lower access of Eastern products to Western markets
finding in the last section.
According to all three approaches CEE countries traded very few with each other in
the first half of 1990s. In 1993 regional East-European trade amounted to one fifteenth -
one sixteenth of its potential. Regardless of the border effects estimates used to compute
trade potentials in table 1.8, all signal an important increase of regional CEE integration.
This reflects the drastic reorientation of foreign trade of these countries in the first years
following the collapse of the socialist system. Advances in the process of transition and
the development of regional economic agreements (CEFTA, the Free Trade Agreement
of Baltic states) encouraged regional trade, which augmented enormously in terms of its
potential. Odds and friction specifications yield a trade potential inside the Central and
Eastern European region slightly above actual trade flows for the year 2000. For the same
type of trade, the ﬁxed-eﬀects specification produces values more than twice as low and
similar to those with gravity estimated border effects. This difference in results is caused
by important country specific trade costs encountered when trading with CEE partners
(e.g. poor institutions or transport systems).
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Table 1.8: European Trade Potential (in % of actual trade)
Trade flows CEE → EU EU → CEE CEE-EU Intra CEE









Border effects with the odds specification
1993 355.5 447.9 399.8 1519.8
1994 516.5 178.3 317.2 748.0
1995 535.9 103.0 263.0 960.4
1996 310.7 191.7 247.2 552.0
1997 342.8 135.4 224.6 335.0
1998 319.2 95.1 187.9 316.8
1999 240.9 87.8 154.7 268.5
2000 166.6 65.4 111.2 113.2









Note: Trade potentials are obtained with industry level data by taking the ratio
between the border effect for a particular trade flow and the intra-EU border
effect.
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In contrast to trade integration in terms of border effects estimated with standard
gravity and the theoretically compatible specifications presented in section 1.3, models
based exclusively on foreign trade predict much lower potentials. The huge difference
comes from the use of different criteria for evaluating trade integration. Traditional trade
potential models ignore domestic trade and assign ‘normal’ trade to the prediction of the
gravity equation. The method introduced in this chapter compares directly trade costs
arising in East-West European and CEE transactions to costs existing between EU trade
partners. Trade within the domestic market is used as benchmark for the very estimation
of these costs. Thus, our method accounts for the discrepancy between domestic and
cross-border trade integration. It is important to signal that not all ‘missing’ international
trade is attributed to the trade potential, but only the proportion which corresponds to
the difference in trade impediments for specific types of flows. Regional integration is
evaluated here in terms of trade costs, expected to converge to their lower intra-EU level.
This uniformisation of costs will result in increased trade with more distant partners and
weaker concentration of trade in the immediate neighborhood.
Larger potentials obtained with the new method we have introduced here with respect
to traditional trade potential models confirm the necessity to account for domestic trade
in predicting the trade creation effects of regional integration. The disregard of internal
trade opportunities is likely to largely underestimate trade potentials. Our method has
the advantage of accounting for total international barriers to trade and therefore produces
results more in compliance with integration efforts made by countries. Globally, the access
of CEE goods to the EU markets improved considerably during the 1990s, and a large
part of the potential European trade creation was already accomplished. Nevertheless, by
the year 2000 the left CEE-EU trade potential was significantly larger than actual trade,
implying an almost twofold possible increase of trade in the years to follow.
We show industry level effects on trade of European integration with the ﬁxed-eﬀects
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and friction specifications in table 1.9.13 The first four columns refer to trade potentials
in 1993, and the last four for the year 2000. The first thing to notice is that with a few
exceptions trade creation effects are observed for all industries, both CEE-EU and intra-EU
trade, and under both specifications. As previously trade creation potentials are generally
larger with the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach. Trade creation effects (the relative change in trade
potential between 1993 and 2000) for CEE-EU trade are also more pronounced under this
specification. The largest trade creation for both two-way East-West and East European
trade was observed in the wood industry, followed by fabricated metal products, the rubber,
and footwear industries. For the former two trade has literally reached its potential by 2000.
Paper, leather, and non-metallic mineral products industries also enjoyed important trade
creation, but mainly for regional East European trade. The lowest trade integration is
found in the tobacco industry, subject to specific domestic regulations especially in EU
countries. In the case of intra-CEE trade, however, this comes from the fact that trade in
tobacco production between East European countries was below its potential level even in
1993. Moderate effects on trade are obtained for the rest of industries. By the year 2000
CEE-EU trade remains largely inferior to its potential (less than one fourth) only in seven
industries: food, beverages, tobacco, chemicals, and basic metal industries(iron and steel,
and non-ferrous metals). As expected, their number is larger for intra-CEE trade.
13The term European integration is used for all 24 European countries considered in this chapter. This













































Table 1.9: Trade potential with respect to intra-EU trade (in %of actual trade)
Trade flows CEE-EU CEE-EU Intra CEE Intra CEE CEE-EU CEE-EU Intra CEE Intra CEE
Model FE friction FE friction FE friction FE friction
Industry 1993 1993 1993 1993 2000 2000 2000 2000
Food 496 423 962 975 350 331 243 277
Beverage 944 814 2005 1099 655 695 473 230
Tobacco 367 254 -16 -60 361 355 -39 0
Textiles 768 727 4004 4270 36 66 236 170
Wearing apparel 434 276 3674 920 196 378 2269 0
Leather 237 167 3551 4407 47 78 205 330
Footwear 147 138 1574 2655 231 145 923 1595
Wood Products 163 147 1293 622 -3 3 2 5
Furniture 179 150 4236 2555 78 123 676 555
Paper products 876 643 1181 883 128 107 44 17
Printing, publishing 608 429 765 885 160 109 157 108
Industrial chemicals 559 516 713 795 355 316 799 353
Other chemical products 1218 829 2030 1840 365 342 230 228
Products of petroleum and coal 326 295 995 532 152 212 164 144
Rubber products 747 616 1316 2083 59 27 121 117
Plastic products 650 626 1211 1344 68 83 184 93
Pottery, china and earthenware 597 531 6813 19651 164 168 415 979
Glass and glass products 315 244 798 727 73 44 74 11
Other non-metallic mineral products 289 216 412 324 79 82 48 -14
Iron and steel 1239 1057 3158 2180 351 367 1050 291
Non-ferrous metals 632 477 767 549 463 302 989 416
Fabricated metal products 301 288 618 721 15 2 20 -7
Machinery 1294 869 5311 1811 154 256 474 539
Electrical apparatus 608 569 1656 1980 97 111 343 225
Transport equipment 1557 1287 2902 4774 199 137 353 558
Professional, scientific, etc. goods 783 958 1255 2934 143 179 334 239
Other manufacturing 932 667 7744 5848 171 160 603 503
Note: The trade potential is obtained by taking the ratio between the border effect for a particular trade flow and the intra-EU border effect.
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1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
EU exports to CEE
CEE exports to EU
intra−CEE trade
intra−EU trade
Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equation (1.28)
for each year with industry level data. Effects for countries with no common
land border or language are represented.
Changes in trade potentials described above can be also inferred from the evolution
of regional border effects. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 picture a similar evolution of CEE-EU
and intra-CEE border effects relative to intra-EU border effects generated with the odds
and ﬁxed-eﬀects approaches respectively. The most pronounced regional trade integration
was the one among Central and Eastern European countries. By the year 2000 trade
integration in terms of border effects within this group has reached, or even surpassed the
level of CEE-EU trade. Less spectacular, the drop in CEE-EU border effects is still very
important and reflects at once the reintegration of CEE countries in the world economy
and the reinforcement of regional integration across Europe. Meanwhile, intra-EU trade
integration remained unchanged, advocating its use as reference for other regional trade
flows in order to compute trade potentials. Similar evolutions can be seen with respect to
the level of integration within the ‘core’ EU (figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A.4). As
expected, trade integration is considerably more pronounced when only the six founding
EU members are retained.
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Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equation (1.29)
for each year with industry level data. Effects for countries with no common
land border or language are represented.
The reduction of both trade barriers and trade potentials for CEE-EU trade coincided
with an even more impressive evolution for trade within Central and Eastern Europe.
These results disseminate the fears formulated by politicians and some authors that that
CEE-EU trade integration will be accompanied by a lower commitment of CEE countries
to regional integration, reflected here by very larger intra-CEE border effects and trade
potentials at the beginning of the period. Still, trade potential figures in table 1.8 show
that manufactured trade between CEE countries may expand to as much as twice its actual
value.
Finally, the evolution of regional trade freeness is replicated in figure 1.3. The figure
shows the evolution of median industry trade freeness of manufactured trade between CEE
and EU countries, and separately for EU and CEE intra-group trade. Trade freeness
φij, as defined in section 1.3, reflects the easiness with which two countries participate to
reciprocal trade, and is an alternative measure of trade integration, usually employed in
new economic geography (e.g. Baldwin et alii 2003). Note that CEE-EU trade freeness
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Note: Trade φ-ness for each year and type of trade are given by respective median
values of Φij computed with industry level data.
increases under all previously presented specifications. With frictionless internal trade (null
trade costs within countries) and symmetric trade costs (φij = φji), trade freeness is equal
to the inverse ‘friction’ index Φij used by the friction trade specification. Since true trade
costs are unknown but only estimated, this can represent an additional benchmarks of our
results. Nevertheless, this method ignores internal trade costs, that usually increase with
the size of the country,14 and produces lower levels of trade integration. When trade costs
arise only for cross-border transactions, foreign partners are more distant from domestic
ones.
As can be seen in figure 1.3, trade freeness for among ‘old’ EU countries varies slightly
throughout the period, but without a clear tendency. Other European trade flows benefited
from an increase in trade freeness, larger for Eastern European regional trade. Other Euro-
pean trade flows benefited from an increase in trade freeness, larger for Eastern European
regional trade. Trade freeness for between ‘core’ EU is significantly higher than for all
14Larger shipping distances generate higher average transport costs.
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fifteen EU countries. CEE countries’ trade with ‘core’ countries is characterized by lower
trade costs (higher freeness), but convergence in this case is much less evident (figure A.3
of Appendix A.4). One can conclude that trade integration enjoyed by ‘core’ EU countries
reflects an integration level too high to be reached by CEE-EU trade.
The size of estimated border effects and border-specific trade costs depends on a variety
of factors, among which the way in which distances are calculated. We address this question
in more detail in the annex B.3.
1.6 National Product Differentiation vs. Monopolistic
Competition
The odds specification derived from the theoretical model in section 1.3 is based on hy-
pothesis characteristic to the Krugman (1980) monopolistic model of trade. Its predictions
in terms of border effects and trade potentials, are quite close to those obtained with the
other theoretically consistent approaches. Is this a sufficient indicator of the fact that a
monopolistic structure replicates fairly well trade between European nations? Does such
a model produce better results than a perfect competition approach? We address and
attempt to answer these questions in this section.
In a monopolistic model of Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman type, traded varieties and the num-
ber of firms that produce them at the equilibrium are endogenously generated by market
forces, and are proportional to a country’s output. Alternatively, trade can arise in a perfect
competition setting with identical locally produced varieties. National product differenti-
ation fits the perfect competition structure because it imposes a much higher competition
among the firms of a country. We take a step further and assume marginal cost pricing
in this model, similar to Head and Ries (2001a). Market power and scale economies are
features specific to imperfect competition structures and nonexistent in this type of models.
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We shall thus refer to the models based on monopolistic and perfect competition also as
the DSK and national product differentiation (NPD) models respectively.
We use the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach from section 1.3 to construct a test for monopolistic
versus perfect competition trade models. Independently from the form of competition
and the market structure, trade between two countries can be expressed using equation
(1.6). The difference induced by the two trade models refers to the particular structure of
country and partner fixed effects. The theoretical structure shared by both NPD and DSK
models, gives also the expression of exporter and importer fixed effects. Since equation
(1.6) explains trade flows in logarithmic form, true supply and demand capacities are given












Since total imports of a country, plus the purchase by domestic consumers of nationally
produced goods gives the expenditure level of that country, the following identities hold:





























Summing the exports of a country and its internal shipments yields the country’s level of
output. Using the above expressions of country fixed effects and trade equation (1.4), this
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generates a second identity:





























Trade friction is obtained by assuming unitary preferences and the decomposition of trade
costs presented in equation (1.25):
φij = α ln dij + β0 + β12homeij + β34CEEandEUij + β5intraCEEij (1.36)
+γ1contigij + γ2comlangij,
where parameters b are the coefficients estimated with the ﬁxed-eﬀects method.
We test the expenditure and output identities above first with directly estimated coun-
try specific effects. Results for different countries are exposed in table 1.10. Although a
perfect fit of equation (1.34 and (1.35)) is reached only with CEE countries’ output values,
coefficients reasonably close to unity are obtained by regressing respectively expenditure
and output on the right hand side expression. Except for the case of CEE economies, com-
putations of countries’ expenditure and output values with importer and exporter effects
overestimate true amounts. The right hand side expression of (1.34) and (1.35) are in the
average 10% larger than actual countries’ expenditure and output values.
The relationships between country and partner fixed effects, output and expenditure
levels set by equations (1.34) and (1.35) are equally verified under monopolistic and per-
fect competition. We apply features specific to each model to construct the two sets of
effects with NPD and DSK respectively. Testing the two models resumes then to compar-
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Table 1.10: Testing expenditure and output identities with the ﬁxed-eﬀects trade specifi-
cation
Countries All European EU countries CEE countries
expenditure 1.10 1.13 0.96
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
output 1.10 1.14 1.00
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Note: Figures are inverse values of coefficients estimated by regressing country out-
put yi and expenditure Ej on values predicted by each model model and expressed
by the right hand side of (1.34) and (1.35) respectively, in logarithmic form and
with no constant term. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. More accurate
results could be obtain by applying bootstrapping techniques.
ing computed country and partner specific effects to estimated effects obtained with the
ﬁxed-eﬀects specification (1.27), and testing the expenditure and output identities for each
theoretical model.
A number of simplification hypotheses are necessary to make possible the accomplish-
ment of the test. Labor is the only production factor in both monopolistic and perfect
competition trade models. This greatly simplifies the computation of country fixed effects
because marginal production costs become a linear function of wages. As previously, in-
variant consumption preferences are imposed and trade freeness resumes to a function of
trade costs.
The DSK trade model used here is the one presented in section 1.3.3. The number of
locally produced varieties can not be measured directly from the data, but is known to
proportional to domestic production: ni =
yi
wiσF
. Local prices are constant markups over
marginal costs: pi = µwi(σ/(σ − 1)). Substitute these in trade equation (1.4) to obtain

























appears both at the numerator and the denominator in (1.37), and
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simplifies. Grouping importer and exporter variables separately one obtains the expression
of importer and exporter fixed effects under DSK:







Next, plug production, wage, expenditure, and trade data into (1.38) and (1.39) to compute
theory equivalents of country specific effects.
We use a national product differentiation à la Armington (1969) to introduce perfect
competition in trade. Differently from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980),
in this model product varieties are defined with respect to their origin. In this case a
single variety is produced in each country, ni = 1,∀i, firms face a much higher level of
competition, and returns to scale are constant. Marginal cost pricing produces as in Head
and Ries (2001a) a producer prices as a linear function of wages: pi = µwi. Under these






The amount µ1−σ, invariant for all countries and partners simplifies, and the expression of








Using actual wages, expenditures and trade costs one can easily compute country and
partner specific effects for NPD.
For comparability, trade costs in both theoretical models is decomposed as in the ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimation equation (1.27) into distance-induced costs, gains from common border
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and language, and specific regional costs. The latter refer to costs specific to trade between
EU members, among Central and Eastern European countries, or between the two groups
of countries. This choice is motivated by the use of the ﬁxed-eﬀects specification in the
construction of the test. Estimates of coefficients on distance, language, border and regional











× exp(βˆ5 × intraCEEij)
1−σ exp(γˆ1 × contigij)
1−σ exp(γˆ2 × comlangij)
1−σ.
Coefficients used in (1.43) are parameter estimates presented in column 3 of table 1.3.
The last difficulty regarding the computation of expenditure and output levels with
the two models comes from the presence of the unknown parameter σ. Estimates of the
substitution elasticity σ in the literature suggest that it takes values comprised between
2 and 10. We compute expenditure and output levels with DSK and NPD models for
different values of σ, and search for those which yield the lowest deviation from estimated
country and partner effects.
Coefficients of a simple regression of computed effects on corresponding estimated effects
in logarithmic form for the two models and different σ are displayed in table 1.11. The
national product differentiation model produces negative coefficient values on exporter
specific effects, and very large coefficients on importer effects for all reasonable substitution
elasticities. This model proves to be inappropriate for trade between European nations.
On the contrary, the monopolistic model yields much more precise country effects. Values
close to unity are obtained for ratios ̂FEDSKi/FEi and ̂FMDSKj/FMj and an elasticity σ
approaching 3. In figure 1.4 we plot the difference between the the exporter fixed effects
estimated with the ﬁxed-eﬀects trade specification and similar effects predicted by the DSK
and NPD trade models, against the value of the elasticity of substitution σ. The horizontal
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Table 1.11: Testing fixed effects computed with NPD and DSK versus estimated effects
σ FENPD FMNPD FEDSK FMDSK
σ = 1 0.00 1.91 1.39 0.41
σ = 2 -0.24 2.19 1.15 0.72
σ = 3 -0.48 2.41 0.91 1.00
σ = 4 -0.72 2.52 0.67 1.22
σ = 5 -0.96 2.56 0.43 1.34
σ = 6 -1.21 2.58 0.18 1.40
σ = 7 -1.45 2.60 -0.06 1.43
σ = 8 -1.69 2.61 -0.30 1.45
σ = 9 -1.93 2.61 -0.54 1.47
σ = 10 -2.17 2.62 -0.78 1.48
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from regressing computed country
and partner effects with the NPD and DSK models respectively on effects
estimated with the fixed-effects specification (1.27) with no constant term.
All coefficients are significant at 1% level.
line corresponds to estimated exporter-specific effects, and its intersection by the DSK or
NPD curve shows the verification of that particular model by the data.
In table 1.12 we test how well do NPD and DSK models verify expenditure and output
identities:
Ej = exp( ̂FMDSKj)
∑
k




yi = exp( ̂FEDSKi)
∑
k




tested above using estimated country effects. Again, the DSK monopolistic trade model
reveals as more suitable for European industry trade data. The national product differenti-
ation model underestimates importing country’s expenditure and inflates exporter’s output
for all reasonable substitution elasticities. Values very close to countries’ true expenditure
and output levels are obtained with the monopolistic competition for precisely the same
substitution elasticity as for country effects. This finding confirms once more the pres-
ence of important markups in the European market, and the necessity of using models
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Figure 1.4: Testing the DSK and the NPD trade models
integrating imperfect competition to account for them.
Combined, our results argument in favor of the monopolistic competition trade model.
This outcome is contrary to Head and Ries (2001a)’s findings for North-American trade
on the basis of a discrimination test based on the relationship between output shares
and demand share in a national product differentiation and an increasing returns model.
It complements the exiting literature, which relies deeply on the share of intra-industry
trade and the presence/absence of the home market effect to assess the empirical success
of perfect and imperfect competition trade models (Head and Ries (2001a), Evenett and
Keller (2002), Brülhart and Trionfetti (2005)).
However, our results rely deeply on the elasticity of substitution used, although it is
indirectly predicted from the data. Note that for high values of σ both trade models over-
estimate outputs and undervalue true expenditures. This signals possible mismeasurement
of expenditure and output values by equations (1.34) and (1.35). Nevertheless, an elasticity
of substitution equal to 3 is very realistic if one considers that it is obtained for both do-
mestic and foreign varieties. We are therefore confident when affirming that trade between
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Table 1.12: Testing NPD versus DSK models: verification of expenditure and output
identities
σ ENPDj/Ej yNPDi/yi EDSKj/Ej yDSKi/yi
σ = 1 0.36 1.72 1.40 0.62
σ = 2 0.16 1.93 1.18 0.84
σ = 3 0.01 2.10 0.99 1.05
σ = 4 -0.07 2.19 0.84 1.23
σ = 5 -0.10 2.23 0.74 1.34
σ = 6 -0.12 2.24 0.70 1.39
σ = 7 -0.13 2.25 0.68 1.42
σ = 8 -0.13 2.26 0.67 1.43
σ = 9 -0.14 2.26 0.66 1.44
σ = 10 -0.14 2.27 0.65 1.45
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from regressing computed country
and partner effects with the NPD and DSK models respectively on effects
estimated with the fixed-effects specification (1.27) with no constant term.
All coefficients are significant at 1% level.
European countries during the 1990s is best replicated by monopolistic trade models.
1.7 Conclusions
Trade both between CEE and between CEE and EU countries improved remarkably during
the last decade of the twentieth century, both when measured in terms of border effects and
trade potentials. The present chapter shows that there is still place for important growth in
bilateral CEE-EU transactions. This result contradicts with most trade potential gravity
models who claim that East-West European trade has already reached its highest inte-
gration level. Much higher trade potentials for both CEE-EU and intra-CEE trade are
obtained when one controls for the amount of trade within national borders. Results are
very robust and are confirmed by three different theoretically compatible trade specifica-
tions used. Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century trade between CEE and EU
countries represented about half of its attainable level, suggesting a 100% increase with
further EU integration. As for regional CEE trade, its potential ranges depending on the
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model between 112 and 175%. And this is regardless of the strong reduction of bilateral
border effects between these countries achieved during the 1990s. A discrimination test for
monopolistic against perfect competition trade models, based on the estimation of bilat-
eral trade flows with country and partner specific effects, is developed. According to it,
European trade is better replicated with monopolistic competition trade models à la DSK,
and an elasticity of substitution of traded varieties close to 3 is obtained.
Chapter 2
Trade Liberalization and Institutional
Reforms
2.1 Introduction
East-West European trade integration started with the reduction of tariffs on bilateral im-
ports, and generated an important increase of regional trade. However, as shown in chapter
one, even after most policy barriers have been eliminated, trade potentials remained very
large. This suggests that the reduction of other types of impediments to European trade is
possible. It confirms at the same time the existence of complementary trade determinants,
less explored in the literature, but not less important in shaping trade patterns. Another
aspect which suffered important changes during the same time period concerns institutions
in transition countries. The abandon of the centralized system by these countries, and
their increasing willingness to join the EU motivated their governments to undertake large
reforms in this area. Institutional reforms were a chief condition imposed by the EU to
new candidate countries. In order to permit the well-functioning of the enlarged Union,
candidate states have been demanded to adopt changes in their legislation, increase the
efficiency of the judicial system, reduce corruption, etc. However, unlike in the case of
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trade policy, progress made by different countries in this direction was more moderate, and
varied significantly across countries. The present chapter explores the institutional hetero-
geneity, and regional trade liberalization in Europe, and develops specific recommendations
in terms of economic policy for further trade integration.
The use of institutions is not new to a number of economic areas, such as new insti-
tutional economics (Coase (1937), North (1990), Williamson ()), and growth and develop-
ment economics (Acemogolu (2001) et alii, Rodrik (2002), Kaufman and Kraay (2003) etc.).
However, only very recently they captured the interest of international trade economists.
Institutions are generally defined as formal and informal rules of behavior, means for en-
suring their application, mediation procedures in case of dispute, sanctions for violation of
established rules, and organisations and bodies in charge with their enforcement. Institu-
tions’s quality is judged as more or less good upon the more or less good functioning of its
different elements. Examples include constitutions, judicial systems, banks, corporate, and
bankruptcy laws, tax collection and competition agencies. Effective institutions are those
ensuring that the incentives that they create actually lead to desired behavior.
Recent work by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Groot et alii (2004), Jansen and
Nordas (2004), Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003), Duc et alii (2005) illustrate the pro-
trade effect of institutions. However, this literature disregards the possibility of institutions
to be affected by a country’s participation in international trade. Inspired from works on
economic development, the present chapter studies the endogeneity between trade and
institutions. In conformity with the result of the differentiation test developed in section
1.6, we use a monopolistic competition model of trade to analyse the relationship between
trade and the quality of domestic and foreign institutions for 25 European countries. It is
not only that better institutions at home and abroad increase the security of international
exchange, reduce uncertainty and contract enforcement costs, and thereby persuade firms to
trade more. Increased participation in international transactions generates more demand
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for institutional reforms, and higher pressure on the government to finance and execute
them. Trade is, thus, a channel through which a country’s economic agents can learn of
ways to ameliorate existing institutions. Although the existing literature establishes that
fragmentation of institutions at country level is an additional source of larger international
trade costs, there is not a specific variable measuring the institutional heterogeneity. In this
chapter we introduce the concept of institutional distance to fill this gap. Even in the case
of well-functioning institutions, the existence of country-specific procedures and practices
introduces confusion and supplementary costs. Therefore, similarity between institutional
frameworks in the exporting and importing countries, along with the development of high-
quality national institutions, has a trade creating effect.
The effect of institutional reforms on trade is compared to that of foreign trade policy.
We compute the share of each factor in total border-specific trade costs, and find strong
national institutions to be no less important for promoting European trade than the removal
of policy barriers. A further increase of regional trade is, therefore, likely to occur even after
all tariff and non-tariff barriers have been eliminated. The separation of institutions into
general, and specific to transition countries, and the employment of quantitative variables
permit to formulate specific recommendations to governments in terms of economic policy.
2.2 European Trade Liberalization and Institutional Changes
In the early 1990s all transition countries have engaged into a firm process of trade liberal-
ization with the European Union. Despite the fact that time tables and specific measures
differed across countries, at the beginning of the 21st century trade with EU of each of
them is qualified as almost entirely free. Still, annual growth rates of CEE-EU bilateral
trade are far from being uniform. One can easily see from Fig.2.1 that the major increase
in CEE-EU bilateral trade occurred in the mid 1990’s. Meanwhile, most regional trade lib-
eralization measures became effective since 1995, and can be held responsable only for the
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later growth of bilateral trade. In the light of works on trade potential, the important early
boom in foreign trade of transition countries can be associated with their re-integration
into the world economic system.1
Still, the growth of transition countries’ trade with EU even after 1995 may not be
entirely imputed to regional trade liberalization. For instance, highest growth rates of
transition countries’ exports to EU partners do not always correspond to lowest values
of the average EU import tariff (table 2.1). It is straightforward that other factors are
at work. The present chapter focuses on the importance of one such determinant per se
and relative to foreign trade policy: national institutions. Institutions have been shown
to be strong determinants of economic growth.2 The economic development literature
stresses also on the reversed causality between per capita GDP growth and the quality of
institutions. Strong domestic institutions are an important premise for economic growth,
but are simultaneously shaped by the level of economic development of the country.
The examination of nation-level institutions in connection with international trade is
very recent in the literature. The pioneer paper on this subject is Anderson and Mar-
couiller (2002), and investigates the impact of corruption and imperfect contract enforce-
ment on international trade patterns. They conclude that inadequate institutions constrain
trade as much as tariffs do. Latter work of Koukartchouk and Maurel (2003), Groot et
alii (2004), and Jansen and Nordas (2004) confirm this finding. Despite the different insti-
tutional aspects considered in these papers, they all rely on index measures for the quality
of institutions. Groot et alii (2004), Turrini and Ypersele (2002), and Duc et alii (2005)
analyse the effect of similarity in governance quality but without constructing a proper vari-
able for institutional homogeneity. The possible endogeneity between trade and institutions
is ignored in all of the above studies.
The present chapter complements this literature in several ways. First, we consider two
1See Wang and Winters (1991), Baldwin (1993), Hamilton and Winters (1992), Harrigan (2003), Gross
and Gonciarz (1996), Fontagné, Freudenberg and Pajot (1999) for a further discussion.
2See Rodrik, Subramanian, Trebbi (2002), Frankel and Romer (1999), Sachs and Warner (1995).
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Figure 2.1: Annual growth rates of CEE-EU trade
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Estonia 647 -2.75 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.68
Lithuania 364 -2.75 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.61
Slovakia 323 -4.25 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.54
Hungary 288 -6.17 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.63
Romania 242 -2.58 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.43
Czech Republic 230 -6.17 0.67 0.61 0.64 0.67
Latvia 199 -2.75 0.57 0.52 0.58 0.65
Bulgaria 153 -2.58 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.50
Poland 149 -6.14 0.53 0.62 0.64 0.52
Slovenia 51 -4.42 0.50 0.56 0.68 0.57
Note: aChange in percentage points between first and the last year within the period for which
data is available.
bA value closer to unity corresponds to an increased level of a country’s economic freedom,
a better functioning of market institutions, or good governance.
types of institutions: general development-specific ones, and institutions specific to CEE
transition economies. We call the latter also market institutions, as they are mainly con-
cerned with the development of functional market economies in these countries. Secondly,
two distinct ways in which institutions affect trade are identified. Trade increases not only
when it is supported by strong institutions in the importing and exporting countries, but
also when the differences between the two are small. From this point of view, countries
with poor but similar institutions exchange more because they have already acquired an
experience by trading locally in overcoming difficulties induced by the ill institutional en-
vironment. Other things equal, engaging in transactions with partners from countries with
similar institutional deficiencies implies a lower burden for them.
Next, through the use of appropriate instrumental variables we examine the reversed
causality between trade and institutions. The quality of institutions can be influenced by
the extent to which the country participates in international trade. A high openness to for-
eign trade intensifies the demand for better institutions, which can increase government’s

















































Figure 2.2: The ‘magic’ triangle: Growth, Trade and Institutions
The sense of causality is given by the sense of the arrows.
willingness to improve existent institutions. Alternatively, trade per se can have positive
externalities, among which a learning effect about better institutions existing abroad. Com-
bining these arguments with findings in the literature on economic growth, we conclude
that institutions shape both international trade and per capita GDP growth, while remain-
ing sensitive to changes in either of the two. The interaction between trade, growth and
institutions can be represented by a triangle (Fig.2.2). The present chapter discusses only
causality shown in the upper part of the figure. The other double sided effects are explored
in depth in the economic growth literature.
Central and Eastern Europe represents a region with significant institutional changes
during the 1990s. The passage from planned to market-oriented economy induced major
reforms in domestic institutions, although they were uneven across countries. Hence, the
impact of institutional changes on trade is even more significant for transition countries.
Table 2.1 displays the scores of four institutional measures for CEE countries in the year
2000. The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) of the Heritage Foundation shows the level
of economic freedom within a country, and can be viewed as a measure of the quality
of development-specific institutions. The composite index of the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) reflects the advance of the transition process, i.e.
of reforms meant to ensure the passage to the market economy. For comparability the
last two columns show the corresponding institutional scores computed by Kaufmann et
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al. (2003) and by the Fraser Institute. Original scores have been rescaled in order to take
values on the [0; 1] segment. A score closer to 1 corresponds to an increased level of a
country’s economic freedom, a better functioning of market institutions, and an improved
governance. Countries are ranked according to the growth rate of their exports to EU
partners during the 1990s. The change in the average EU tariff on imports from each CEE
country is roughly equal to the average EU import tariff of CEE goods in 1993. Table
2.1 shows that countries with high institutional scores performed well on exports to the
EU. The largest increase in exports to EU are found for countries that obtained the best
score for the index of economic freedom. It can be therefore concluded that at least some
part of the uneven CEE-EU trade growth displayed in figure 2.1 comes from differences
in national institutions. We consider this to be a sufficient motivation for a more serious
investigation of causality between trade, institutions and trade policy, to which we proceed
in the following sections.
2.3 The Trade Model
We build a trade model in which bilateral trade is affected by countries’ economic environ-
ments. We apply Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)’s hypothesis that insecurity constrains
trade by raising the price of goods, in a monopolistic competition setting, with firm level
product differentiation à la DSK. As in Anderson and Young (2002) and Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002), imperfect contract enforcement is reflected in a price markup equiva-
lent to a hidden tax on trade. But differently from them, in our case hidden transaction
costs associated with the insecurity of international trade arise from poor institutions in
both importer’s and exporter’s country. Moreover, the national character of these institu-
tions is an additional source of fragmentation of the economic space, and constitutes by
itself a barrier to cross-border exchange. Hence, we account for the role of both domestic
and foreign institutions, as well as for their similarity.
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Consumers in each country solve a two-step budgeting function. First, consumers de-
termine the proportion of total expenditure Ej to allocate to internationally traded goods,








where xij is the amount of goods that country j buys from country i producers, pij is the
price of these goods, and the product mij = xijpij, gives the value of country j’s imports
from i. Secondly, the value of Ej is distributed across consumed varieties. We assume
that products are differentiated at firm level, that consumer preferences are homothetic,
of CES form, and identical across countries and varieties. The utility of the representative













where ni represents the number of varieties r produced and exported by country i, and
at the same time the number of firms in country i, because each variety is produced by a
separate firm.
The demand in country j for goods produced in i is obtained by solving the optimization








The denominator in equation (2.3) is a importer-specific nonlinear price index, representing








A tractable trade equation is obtained by dividing bilateral imports mij expressed by
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(2.3) by imports of the same country from a different partner. We choose a country’s trade
with itself as reference for purchases from all foreign partners in order to relate our model
to the literature on border effects. Nonlinear price indices Pj and importer’s expenditure on











A confirmed finding in the recent literature is that countries trade significantly less with
each other than the theory predicts (e.g. Trefler (1995), McCallum (1995)). The difference
is particularly strong when compared to trade within national borders, revealing a so-called
border eﬀect. Trade policy barriers and the quality of institutions are stated among the
various explanations of this result. One way to evaluate the role these two factors play in
economic integration is to compare their contribution to explain the lower than expected
volume of imports. Working with foreign-to-domestic trade ratios as in equation (2.5) is
very convenient for the estimation of border effects.
A single production factor, labour, is used to produce all varieties, and identical fixed
and variable costs in terms of labour units, F and µ respectively, for all countries are
assumed. In a monopolistic competition setup producers face a constant price elasticity of
demand equal to the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ, and maximize profits by





Consequently, the unitary price of each variety can be expressed as a function of the number
of labour units µ used to produce it, the unitary remuneration of labour force wi, and the
elasticity of demand σ.
The market equilibrium with free entry of firms arises with average cost pricing since
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One can express the mill price pi from equation (2.6) and substitute it in the left hand
side of equation (2.7). Note, that the price of any variety produced in country i is a linear
function of country’s wage wi. Wage on both sides of equation simplify and the number of
units of variety i produced at equilibrium becomes a function of invariable amounts F , µ,
and σ:
qi =
F (σ − 1)
µ
. (2.8)
With symmetric varieties, equal quantities q ≡ F (σ−1)
µ
of each variety are produced. A
country’s output yi equals the sum of outputs of its firms, evaluated at producer prices pi:
yi = niqpi. (2.9)
We allow prices at destination to differ across countries proportionally to bilateral trade
costs τij:
pij = pi τij. (2.10)
It is thus implicitly assumed that all partners are charged the same mill price.
Expressing ni from (2.9), and pi from (2.6) and substituting using the expression (2.10)














Next, we consider the structure of trade costs τij. The price of a good consumed in the
importing country j exceeds the producer price by the transport cost, the import tariff, the
tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers, and an “insecurity” markup. The latter represents
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hidden transaction costs associated with the non-existence or the poor functioning of na-
tional institutions (as defined in section 2.2). Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that
the magnitude of this insecurity markup depends on the quality of national institutions.3
The fulfillment of a cross-border transaction involves a set of procedures to be ac-
complished in the exporting and importing country. The search of a foreign partner, the
negotiation of the trade contract, the shipment of goods across the border, customs’ clear-
ance, and the international payment imply a direct interaction with institutions of both
countries. Therefore the complexity of these operations, associated costs and delays, as
well as the success of the entire transaction will be affected by the quality of domestic and
foreign institutions.
Three sources of trade costs are identified here: transport costs, trade policy costs (both
tariffs and non-tariff barriers), and institutional costs:
τij = dij
ρ(1 + tij)(exp [ntbij])
η(exp [Si])
γ1(exp[Sj])
γ2(exp |Si − Sj|)
γ3 (2.12)
exp [(1− homeij)bij].
Transport costs are instrumented by the distance. The ad-valorem import tariff tij gener-
ates a linear increase of total trade costs, and raises the price precisely in proportion to the
tariff. Non-tariff barriers (NTB) have a similar effect, but are considerably more difficult
to measure. We use the NTB trade coverage and frequency ratios to quantify the level of
these barriers, denoted by ntbij in equation (2.12).
Variables Si and Sj reflect the quality of institutions in countries i and j respectively.
As better institutions facilitate trade and reduce additional transaction costs we expect
coefficients γ1 and γ2 to be negative.
4 As shown by de Groot et alii (2004) it is not only
3Institutions for the defense of trade and factors that allow traders to use those institutions successfully
are considered by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002).
4Notice that Si and Sj need not necessarily contain the same elements. It is possible and even very
likely that different things promote (impede) trade in the origin and the destination country. However,
this aspect can not be investigated with the trade specification developed by this model.
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the quality of institutions in the trading countries that matters for bilateral trade, but also
the institutional similarity or homogeneity. We account for this aspect by introducing the
institutional distance, i.e. the opposite of institutional similarity, in the structure of trade
costs (2.12). Partners from countries with similar institutions are more familiar with each
other’s formal procedures and conventions, norms of behavior and even business practices.
They also face reduced adjustment costs and lower insecurity from the natural unfamiliarity
of the international environment when engaging in bilateral trade transactions. Similarity
of informal business procedures may increase bilateral trust, and institutional similarity
increases the compatibility of trading partners, which could explain a fair share of the
border effect. In our specific case this suggests a positive coefficient γ3 of the absolute
difference between the quality of countries’ institutions.
There may be complementary cross-border costs bij, other than the ones described
above. While we are unable to identify their source, we can still quantify them by in-
troducing a factor that takes values greater than 1 in equation (2.12) for international
transactions. Variable homeij is a dummy that denotes whether trading partners are from
the same country, and [exp(bij) − 1] × 100 is the tariff equivalent of border-specific trade
barriers on country i exports to j different from tariffs, NTB, and institutions.
Differently from the trade costs specification given by (2.12), the literature on border
effects dissociates trade costs into two broad categories: one corresponding to costs com-
mon to all flows, continuous across space, and another standing for border-specific costs
that occur only when traded goods cross an international border, i.e. specific to flows
between partners from different countries. Representative for the first category are trans-
port costs which arise for both international and domestic transactions. The presence of
border-specific costs, such as tariffs and different institutional environments, generate dis-
continuous shifts in trade costs and flows. Therefore, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and
the non-uniformity of national institutions account at least for a partial explanation of
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border effects. The quality of institutions, however, matters for all trade flows, foreign and
domestic, and refer to the first type of trade costs. For internal shipments, the second, the
third and the last two terms of the right hand side of equation (2.12) disappear. Domestic
trade costs are given by:
τjj = djj
ρexp [γ4Sj]. (2.13)
Note that if institutions matter for domestic trade as much as they do for foreign trade flows,
the following identity should hold: γ4 = γ1 +γ2. Different functional forms for internal and
cross-border trade costs with respect to institutions’ quality can be an additional source
of lower than expected international trade. Although this may be true, in the absence of
supporting evidence this aspect is disregarded in the present chapter.
Substituting equations (2.12) and (2.13) into the relative demand equation (2.11) and










+ ρ(1− σ) ln
dij
djj
+ (1− σ) ln (1 + tij) (2.14)
+η(1− σ)ntbij + γ1(1− σ)(Si − Sj) + γ3(1− σ)|Si − Sj|+ (1− σ)bij.
There are two institutional terms on the right hand side of equation (2.14). The difference
in the quality of national institutions in the exporting and importing country (Si − Sj)
reflects the impact of exporting country’s institutions on cross-border relative to domestic
trade, while the absolute difference |Si−S−j| shows how the dissimilarity between trading
countries’ institutional environments affects trade between them. A positive coefficient of
the first variable testifies that improved national institutions increase trade, while an esti-
mated negative coefficient on institutional difference reveals the positive role of institutional
homogeneity. Note that the two measures can be highly correlated, which may produce
biased and non-significant estimates of the corresponding coefficients. If the estimation of
true effects on trade of each of the two institutional measures is not possible in the presence
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of multicolinearity, one can still judge which of the two measures is more important. In
this case dropping one of the two variables from equation (2.14) allows to identify the main
channel through which institutions shape trade flows. The sign of the estimated coefficient
on the left institutional variable will indicate the prevalence of institutions’ quality or of
institutional similarity.
To compare the explanatory power of changes in foreign trade policy and relative to
that of the institutional environment, we need to estimate the total border effect between
trading countries i and j, the residual border effects unexplained by tariffs and NTB, and
by institutional variables separately. The total effect reflects the loss in trade caused by all
cross-border barriers, and is estimated by the exponential value of the constant of the model










+ ρ(1− σ) ln
dij
djj
+ γ1(1− σ)(Si − Sj) + (1− σ)Bij.(2.15)
Now we can introduce trade policy variables ln (1 + tij) and bntij in equation (2.15). The
exponential of the resulting constant term gives the corresponding residual border effect,
i.e. the drop in trade produced by all border-specific trade barriers except tariffs and NTB.
Similarly, one can estimate the residual border effect with institutional variables. The
computation of the incremental in trade induced by trade liberalization and by institutional
reforms separately is then straightforward.
In the empirical part of the chapter we focus on coefficients of the tariffs and NTB,
and institutional variables as features of trading countries’ economic environment. In our
model both factors have an impact on trade through trade costs. Trade liberalization and
an improved functioning of national institutions reduce transaction costs, and yield lower
prices of exchanged goods being charged to consumers. Institutional reforms may have
an even stronger effect on trade as they also increase the homogeneity of the institutional
environment: better institutions are at work in all countries. Full similarity is always
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ensured when trading partners are from the same country.
However, working with relative demands,mij/mjj, implies the knowledge of both foreign
and internal trade values. Unlike international trade, only very few countries provide data
on true trade flows taking place inside national borders. To overcome this limitation, one
can follow Wei (1996) and compute internal trade as the difference between a country’s
production and its exports to all partners. This approach, however, yields biased results
for at least two reasons. First, it does not permit to control for non-tradable goods and
thus inflates internal trade and border effects. Secondly, it can produce negative values of
internal trade for high levels of re-exports.
A possible way to tackle this problem is to use a different dependent variable. Rather
than taking the foreign-to-domestic trade ratio we can divide country i exports to j by
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+ η(1− σ)(ntbij − ntbkj) + γ1(1− σ)(Si − Sk)
+ γ3(1− σ) (|Si − Sj| − |Sk − Sj|) + (1− σ)(bij − bkj).
In this way only international trade data are employed. Due to the specific form of the
dependent variable, the quality of institutions of the importing country j drops out from
equation (2.16). The difference between the quality of national institutions in the exporting
and reference country accounts for the role of well- or miss-functioning national institutions
in stimulating trade, while institutional heterogeneity is displayed thus by a more complex
term than in (2.14). The two considered institutional dimensions are better separated
under trade specification (2.16), reducing the risk of multicollinearity. Although in this
case one can no longer estimate the border effects, the importance of institutions’ reforms
relative to trade liberalization, as factors stimulating trade, can be judged by comparing
the trade creating effects of total trade liberalization and of completed institutional re-
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forms. Respectively, comparing absolute values of coefficients of the relevant variables is
misleading, as they are directly dependent on the units used.
Thus, we employ trade specification (2.14) to quantify the relative importance of trade
liberalization and institutional reforms, the two strategies that countries can adopt to
intensify mutual trade, and (2.16) to differentiate the impact of institutions’ quality and
of institutional diversity.
2.4 The Data
Bilateral data on trade between ten CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) and the
fifteen EU members prior to Union’s enlargement of May 2004, from 1993 to 2000, is
used in this chapter.5 Throughout the chapter we shall call the old EU members EU
countries, and Central and East European countries, including the eight which received
EU membership status, CEE or transition countries.
During the considered time period, these countries undertook important trade liberal-
ization measures and reforms of national institutions. The almost complete liberalization
of trade between EU and CEE countries by the end of the period was concomitant with an
intensification of regional CEE trade. The passage of transition countries from the former
centrally planned economic system to the market economy called for a radical transforma-
tion of existing institutions, the elimination of certain structures, and the establishment of
new ones. Although vital for the transition process, institutional reforms faced and still
face major political opposition in many CEE countries, and are more difficult to implement
than the eradication of tariffs and NTB. National institutions of EU countries remained
mainly unchanged. Thus the selected panel of observations is characterized by important
variance in both trade policy and institutional variables (see the Appendix C) which we
5Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated into a single observation.
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explore in the empirical part of the chapter.
Bilateral manufactured trade data has been collected form the the COMTRADE (World
Bank) database. Internal trade mjj, i.e. imports of a country from itself, have been
computed following Wei (1996) as the difference between domestic production and the sum
of exports to all foreign partners. Production and wage data are from the World Bank -
UNIDO joint database “Trade and Production”. Missing data have been completed using
the “STAN” database of OCDE for production, and “NewCronos” database of Eurostat for
wages.
To avoid the identification of a country with its capital (or largest) city, international
distances are computed as the population-weighed average of interregional distances. Each
country is divided into comparable territorial units corresponding to European Union’s
NUTS II regions.6 The distance between two regions is simply the distance between largest
cities. Internal distances djj are computed following the same principle in order to ensure
comparability of the two measures: the population-weighed average distance from each
region to all regions of the country, including itself.7 For small countries consisting of a
single NUTS II region, NUTS III regions have been used. A region’s distance from itself,
which we call intra-regional distance, is computed as by Head and Mayer (2000): two-thirds
of the radius of a circle of an area equal to that of the region. This is equivalent to the
average distance between local producers and consumers when each region is identified with
a circle of an equal area, where producers are concentrated in the center, and consumers
are equally spread in the entire region.
Tariffs and NTB measures have been calculated using Haveman’s database constructed
from TRAINS database of UNCTAD.8 Data on tariffs is obtained from declaring countries.
Bulgaria and Slovakia do not appear as declaring (importing) countries in this database,
6NUTS regions are defined for EU members, as well as for countries having expressed officially their
will to join the Union.
7Helliwell and Verdier (2001) and Head and Mayer (2000) insist on the consideration of countries’
internal geography and a similar computation of cross-border and internal distances.
8I am indebted to Soledad Zignago (CEPII) for her help with the extraction and processing of this data.
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and not even in the original UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. Slovakia does not appear as
partner (exporting) country. Tariffs are supplied in Haveman’s database at a very detailed
level (tariff lines, using the Harmonized System six digits classification HS6). Since data
on production, wages, and trade use significantly less detailed classifications, tariff data
needed to be aggregated to corresponding levels. The only possible weight one can use
(from the point of view of the availability of data) is the value of imports for each HS6
position (tariff line). But it is straightforward that there is a strong and negative correlation
between the value of tariffs and the value of imports. To minimize the endogeneity bias and
still account for the different importance of each product in international trade, we follow
A.Bouët, L.Fontagné, M.Mimouni and X.Pichot (2001) and weigh the tariff protection of
each importing country by world imports.
The two bilateral measures of NTB employed are computed using the same database.
The NTB coverage ratio is equal to the volume of trade subject to at least one non-tariff
measure, expressed as a percentage of the total bilateral trade. NTB frequency is obtained
by dividing the number of bilateral non-tariff measures by the total number of tariff lines.
By construction, both NTB coverage and frequency range between 0 and 1. Lower values
are evidence of the fact that non-tariff restrictions apply either to a lower part of bilateral
imports, or to a smaller number of traded products, while a value equal to 0 shows the
absence of any NTB for the particular pair of countries.
We consider five sources of institutional variables: European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute, Kaufmann et alii (1999),
(2003) data, and World Development Indicators (WDI). The first four use index measures of
the quality of national institutions, while the latter is used to draw quantitative institutional
variables.
In this chapter we rely mainly on institutional measures provided by the first two
sources. The EBRD evaluates the status quo of the institutional environment in CEE
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countries and the progresses achieved in the transition process. We employ nine distinct
measures of the quality of countries’ institutions published by the EBRD on an annual
basis, separately and aggregated into a single summary index equal to their arithmetic
mean. These indices take values from 1 to 4 with a higher score indicating fuller or bet-
ter implemented reforms. EBRD’s transition indicators assess the quality of institutions
specific for the transition process, and have been computed for CEE countries alone. To
fully explore the information incorporated in these measures, we assume that all EU mem-
bers have well-functioning market economies, graded with the highest mark in the given
range. Specifically, this implies setting the EBRD indicators equal to 4 for European Union
countries. Accordingly, CEE institutions are classified as fully compatible with the market
economy when they become alike national institutions of EU countries, which is a logical
constraint since to most international bodies Western European economies are the main
guideline for CEE countries’ transition process. This adjustment is compatible with ob-
served scores for other institutional variables of the two groups of countries. As can be seen
from table 2.2, while all three indices exhibit a variability of scores across EU countries,
lower values are obtained for CEE countries. Moreover, the maximal score among the latter
group of countries never exceeds the average value of the same indicator for EU members.
The Heritage Foundation offers a measure of the quality of a country’s institutions in
the form of an index of economic freedom (IEF) published since 1995 for a large number
of countries. The IEF is computed as the simple average of ten component indices corre-
sponding to an equal number of institutional dimensions, and takes values running from 5
to 1. A score of 1 denotes an institutional framework and a set of policies that are most
conductive to economic freedom. The IEF is measured only since 1995, its use implying
a reduction of the time range of the data set, but unlike the EBRD composite index it
is available for all countries in the sample. To reduce multicollinearity problems between
institutional and trade liberalization measures, the IEF index is redefined as the average
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Table 2.2: Institutional scores for EU and CEE countries
Variable No. obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IEF for EU 80 0.67 0.08 0.47 0.81
IEF for CEE 55 0.50 0.10 0.28 0.67
KKM for EU 42 0.79 0.07 0.62 0.89
KKM for CEE 30 0.59 0.07 0.46 0.69
Fraser for EU 28 0.71 0.06 0.58 0.82
Fraser for CEE 20 0.52 0.10 0.31 0.68
EBRD for EU 112 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
EBRD for CEE 80 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.83
Note: Re-scaled scores running from 0 to 1 for all indicators are shown in
the table.
of nine component indices, trade policy being dropped out.
The Fraser Institute has developed an index of economic freedom of the world (EFW)
that measures the consistency of a nation’s policies and institutions with economic freedom.
It is published in the institute’s annual report “The economic freedom of the world” and is
currently available for 123 countries. The index measures the degree of economic freedom
present in five major areas: 1) size of government, expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; 2)
legal structure and security of property rights; 3) access to sound money; 4) freedom to
trade internationally; and 5) regulation of credit, labor and business. Unlike the previous
measures, the EFW index is computed only for two out of the eight years considered in the
empirical part of the chapter.
Kaufmann et alii (2003) estimate six dimensions of governance covering 209 countries
and territories for four distinct years: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Their indicators are
based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn
from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. We construct a
global indicator for the quality of a country’s institutions as the simple average the six
aggregate governance indicators.
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We rescale all indicators to run between 0 and 1, with a score close to 0 representing
a poor institutional framework, absence of reforms and low economic freedom. There is a
high correlation between the four institutional measures, shown in figure 2.3, suggesting
that they should be used separately. A more detailed discussion of component measures
of the EBRD and IEF indices is presented in the Appendix C. Additional continuous
institutional measures, obtained from the World Development Indicators database of the
World Bank and from the EBRD Transition Report, are used in the next section to infer
more specific results and to instrument the qualitative institutional variables.
2.5 Baseline Estimations and Results
In the empirical part of this chapter we estimate first the impact of institutions and trade
policy instruments on cross-European trade using global measures of a country’s institu-
tions. Then, we test the presence of a two-way relationship between trade and institutions,
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and use instrumental variables techniques to correct for endogeneity. Next, the contribution
of each factor to promote trade is judged from the perspective of the explained part of the
bilateral border effect and the supplementary trade flows generated by institutional reforms
and trade liberalization. Last, we investigate the different institutional aspects and employ
quantitative institutional variables in order to draw specific policy recommendations.
We turn now to the estimation of the impact of trade liberalization, represented here by
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and by countries’ institutional framework, on trade between
European nations. A first problem that we face is finding good measures for the quality of
national institutions. There are multiple measures one can use to asses diverse institutional
aspects. Besides the measures discussed in section 2.4, empirical studies have also employed
Freedom House country ratings, Euromoney country risk index, ICRG risk ratings, BERI
index of contract enforceability, etc.
In a first place useful insights are drawn by considering the quality and functioning of
a country’s entire institutional framework. For that, a single overall institutional measure
incorporating different institutional aspects is used. It simplifies the comparison of the
importance for trade of national institutions versus that of foreign trade policy. We restrict
ourselves to the use of IEF and EBRD indices separately in order to quantify the qual-
ity of nationwide institutions, but for comparability reasons report also results obtained
with Kaufmann et alii (1999), and Fraser institutional indices. The Index of Economic
Freedom is employed to picture the general (development-specific) institutions, while the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s composite index to show the state
and advancement of transition-specific institutions.
We estimate the demand for foreign products relative to the domestic demand using
equation (2.14). As we consider bilateral trade between countries of the same geographic
region, with common historical and linguistic backgrounds, the estimated trade equation
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+ β4borderij + β5langij (2.17)
+β6countryij + β7 ln(1 + tariffij) + β8ntbij + β9InstitDifij
+β10InstitDistij + ǫij
borderij, langij, and countryij are discotomic variables corresponding respectively to the
existence of a common land border between countries i and j, the same language spoken
by the majority of individuals in both countries, and the fact that both countries formed in
the past a single country. The last two variables in (2.17) reflect the nominal and absolute
difference in the quality of institutions in the importing and exporting countries. Note,
that equation (2.17) resembles to a certain extent the standard gravity, suggesting that
similar values and signs of coefficients should be found.
Table 2.3 displays results of estimating equation (2.17) with ordinary least squares
with year dummies (columns 1 to 4), and with generalized least squares (columns 5 to
8). The different columns correspond to the four distinct institutional measures employed.
Estimates with the re-scaled Index of Economic Freedom are shown in column 1. The choice
of the relative demand as the explained variable introduces spatial autocorrelation in the
error term. This is corrected through a robust clustering procedure, which allows residuals
of the same importing country to be correlated. All variables have coefficients of the
expected sign and most of them are statistically significant. The coefficients on production
ratio are close to unity and on distance within the range of values generally found in
the literature. The small and non-signifiant estimate of the elasticity of substitution σ,
the opposite of the coefficient of wage ratio, sheds doubt on the appropriateness of wages
as proxies for mill prices. Evidently, the labour is not the unique primary production
input. Nevertheless, poor results may be also due to endogeneity issues: large exports
can motivate firms to increase wages, imports can boost or dissuade domestic production
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depending on the share of intermediate relative to final products. Positive coefficients on
binary variables controlling for a common land border, common language, and historical
path show the importance of non-economic factors in reducing international trade costs.
Countries sharing a common land border or language trade 2 [= exp(0.73) ∼= exp(0.74)]
times more than two countries that do not, while being part of the same country at a
certain point in time increases trade by five 5 [= exp(1.64)] times even after disintegration.
The key parameters of interest are the coefficients on trade policy and institutional
variables. The import tariff enters the equation with a large and strongly significant neg-
ative coefficient of -19.38, while the coefficient on non-tariff barriers coverage ratio is not
significantly different from zero. The difference between the coefficients on tariffs and on
wages is much larger than unity, as predicted by the theory, and confirms the poor suit-
ability of a single production factor assumption. The very large coefficient on tariffs comes
from the choice of countries and years for which estimations are carried. Thus, the late
1990s were characterized by a general liberalization of European trade and a simultane-
ous re-orientation of CEE countries’ towards West-European partners. The coefficients on
both institutional variables are of expected signs but non-significant. The coefficient on the
difference in the quality of institutions reflects the effect of an equal simultaneous improve-
ment of institutions in both countries, while the coefficient on the other variable shows the
impact of convergence/divergence of these institutions. Low statistical significance may
be explained by the use of unappropriate econometric techniques, and ignorance of the
two-way causality between trade and institutions, described in section 2.2.
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Table 2.3: Relative demand for foreign products, trade
liberalization and institutions: importing country as ref-
erence
Dependent variable: mij/mjj
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutions index: IEF EBRD KKM Fraser
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
intercept -2.83a -2.72a -2.71a -2.75a
(0.20) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22)
ln production ratio 0.73a 0.75a 0.72a 0.71a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
ln wage ratio -0.20 -0.27 -0.42 -0.27
(0.16) (0.18) (0.27) (0.25)
ln distance ratio -0.57a -0.66a -0.52a -0.60a
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
common border 0.73a 0.73a 0.73a 0.70a
(0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
common language 0.74a 0.68a 0.65a 0.69a
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17)
same country 1.62a 1.49a
(0.20) (0.14)
ln (1+tariff/100) -19.38a -14.27a
(3.19) (3.55)
NTB coverage 0.06 -0.16
(1.04) (0.31)
institutions, quality 0.18 1.46 1.85 0.46
(1.01) (1.12) (1.40) (1.48)
institutions, distance -0.53 -1.32b -2.97a -1.19
(0.85) (0.64) (0.82) (1.59)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 1073 1356 546 314
R2 0.723 0.74 0.736 0.702
RMSE .802 .786 .73 .772
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.3: Relative demand for foreign products, trade
liberalization and institutions: importing country as ref-
erence (continued)
Dependent variable: mij/mjj
Model : (5) (6) (7) (8)
Institutions index: IEF EBRD KKM Fraser
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS
intercept -2.99a -2.86a -3.47a -3.32a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ln production ratio 0.72a 0.75a 0.75a 0.73a
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ln wage ratio -0.21a -0.32a -0.30a -0.24a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
ln distance ratio -0.55a -0.67a -0.66a -0.62a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
common border 0.75a 0.72a 0.98a 0.87a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
common language 0.65a 0.68a 1.04a 0.96a
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
same country 1.53a 1.56a
(0.36) (0.08)
ln (1+tariff/100) -19.05a -14.02a
(0.42) (0.30)
NTB coverage 0.05 -0.43a
(0.07) (0.07)
institutions, distance 0.19c 1.94a 1.25a 0.29a
(0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11)
institutions, distancee -0.68a -1.43a -1.21a -3.23a
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
N 1073 1356 546 314
Hausman specification test 4.56 19.51 28.60 5.49
p - value 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.24
Breusch and Pagan test 1418.91 1641.38 430.49 90.53
p - value 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00
Correlation of institutional
variables
0.17 0.32 -0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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The negative and significant constant term indicates that there are important border
specific trade costs unexplained by tariffs, NTB, and the institutional environment. These
additional trade costs generate a domestic trade of about 17 [= exp(2.83)] times higher
than with a similar foreign partner.
In column 2 we estimate equation (2.17) with the EBRD composite index. Results
are very similar to the previous ones, and all coefficients have expected signs. Moreover,
a statistically significant coefficient is obtained on institutional distance, confirming that
similarity between national institutions generates more trade.
To produce results more comparable to other findings in the literature we use insti-
tutional indices developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) (column 3), and Fraser Institute
(column 4), measures more frequently found in empirical studies. Unlike the previous two
indices, KKM and Fraser institutional measures are available for a smaller number of years.
This restriction of the data set removes all variability in tariff and non-tariff data, and the
common historical path captured by the country dummy. Therefore one cannot estimate
the corresponding coefficients. However, even in this case we find evidence of the posi-
tive impact of institutions’ quality (although not statistically significant) and similarity on
trade. Point estimates for institutional variables with all four indices are of comparable
magnitude. One can thus be pretty confident of obtaining credible results when restricting
the choice to the IEF and EBRD indices.9
In the second part of table 2.3 we display results with panel estimation techniques.
Cross-section times series generalized least squares estimates of (2.17) with the same insti-
tutional variables are displayed in columns 5 to 8. We have to choose between a fixed-effect
and a random-effect estimator. The presence of explanatory variables invariant in time in
equation (2.17) induces the impossibility to estimate their coefficients with a fixed-effects
procedure. However, in order to use random effects one needs to test the independence
9The high correlation of the IEF and EBRD index with the KKM and Fraser indices shown in figure
2.3 also supports our choice of institutional variables.
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of the individual (in our case country-pair) error term with respect to the right hand side
variables. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects is very
significant for IEF, EBRD and Fraser institutional indices. This indicates that individ-
ual effects are not constant across time, violating the primary random-effects assumption.
However, the Hausman test of fixed versus random effects specification indicates that very
similar coefficients are obtained with both models: For all three indices the χ2 statistic is
not significant at the 1% level. In the case of KKM institutional index, although the differ-
ence in coefficients is systematic (χ24 = 28.60, p = 0.00), the independence assumption of
the individual term is validated. As a result we prefer the random to the fixed effects speci-
fication with all institutional measures. We also control for panel specific heteroscedasticity,
since the error term can be correlated.
Interestingly, in this case coefficients of both institutional variables become significant
regardless of the index employed. We find evidence in support of both institutional channels
identified in section 2.3: Both better and similar institutions promote bilateral international
trade. Still, the effect is significantly larger if transition-specific institutions are targeted.
Despite the fact that the variability of the level of economic freedom across European coun-
tries is comparable to that in terms of market institutions, countries need to concentrate
their efforts on the latter in order to increase regional trade integration.
Thus, a 1% drop in the average bilateral tariff causes between 14% and 19% increase
in mutual relative to domestic trade, and a 5% drop can persuade firms in the importing
country to buy twice as many products from foreign partners. The significant estimated
value of the coefficient on NTB in column 6 permits to quantify the impact of these mea-
sures: One percentage less of trade subject to a NTB yields a 54 = [exp((−1)∗ (−0.43)−1]
percentage increase in relative trade. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the level
of economic freedom of a foreign partner will lead to a 3.4% = [exp(0.175 ∗ 0.19) − 1] in-
crease in imports from that country relative to domestic trade, and a comparable reduction
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of the institutional distance to that country to a 6.6% = [exp(0.10 ∗ (−0.68))− 1] increase
in the foreign-to-domestic trade ratio. Meanwhile, one standard deviation increase in the
quality of a partner’s market institutions and the corresponding institutional distance gen-
erate 79% = [exp(0.30 ∗ 1.94)− 1], and respectively 26% = [exp(0.21 ∗ (−1.43))− 1], more
trade with that particular country compared to internal trade. One can easily conclude
that despite the large effect of trade liberalization, institutional reforms remain an impor-
tant trade-creating factor, and European trade will mostly benefit from improved market
institutions in CEE countries.10
Almost unchanged estimates both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance are
obtained be replacing the NTB coverage ratio in equation (2.17) with the NTB frequency
ratio,. In the bottom of table we display the correlation coefficient between the two institu-
tional variables, i.e. the nominal and the absolute difference in the quality of institutions.
The latter coefficients are sufficiently low for one to worry about multicollinearity. There-
fore, we do not emphasize results obtained for the demand for foreign goods relative to the
demand for a reference country’s products.
The impact of trade policy and institutions on foreign trade with imports from a third
country used as reference is obtained by estimating equation (2.16) augmented by three













+ γ4(borderij − borderkj) (2.18)








+γ10(InstitDistij − InstitDistkj) + εij.
Germany, the main trading partner of most European countries, is chosen as the reference
10According to the transformation of institutional variables, EU countries already possess well-
functioning market institutions.
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country k. The last two variables stand for the difference in the quality of institutions
in the exporting country and the reference country, Germany, and the difference between
the institutional distance separating the importing from the exporting country and from
Germany. Regardless of the more complicated content of institutional variables in (2.18),
the interpretation of coefficients is similar. Moreover, according to the theoretical model,
coefficients in (2.18) should be identical to those obtained from estimating (2.17). The
constant of the model in this case is the difference in unexplained border effects between
the importing and exporting country, and the importing country and Germany, and does
not have any particular economic meaning.
Estimated coefficients of trade equation (2.18) with the four institutional indices as
above are displayed in table 2.4. Indeed, they differ quite little from estimates of (2.17) in
table 2.3. However, dividing imports from foreign European countries by imports of German
products suffers from several inconveniences. First of all, even if low prices attract foreign
customers, they can also signal the poor quality of traded goods. For small differences
in price, consumers may prefer more expensive similar German goods to other foreign
goods simply because high prices are perceived to compensate the difference in quality.
Secondly, because of the fact that Germany shares a land border with seven countries
from the sample, a common language with Austria alone, and was not a part of the same
country with any other European nation, equation (2.18) underestimates the impact of
contiguity, and amplifies the effect of linguistic and historical ties on trade. Finally, trade
specification (2.18) reduces the variability of institutional variables, which obviously leads
to less significant estimates.
2.6 Endogeneity Issues
Another issue we want to discuss in detail in this chapter concerns endogeneity in esti-
mated trade equation (2.17). The presence of a two-way causality between trade and the
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Table 2.4: Relative demand for foreign products, trade liberalization and institutions:
Germany as reference
Dependent Variable: mij/mkj
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutions index: IEF EBRD KKM Fraser
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
intercept 35.12c -2.87 30.04 50.52a
(18.76) (18.41) (19.56) (15.76)
ln production ratio 0.87a 0.86a 0.88a 0.86a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ln wage ratio 0.22a 0.47a 0.14 0.28c
(0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16)
ln distance ratio -0.56a -0.58a -0.46a -0.46a
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14)
common border 0.28b 0.28b 0.28b 0.26b
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
common language 0.93a 0.88a 0.91a 0.92a
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
same country 3.20a 2.97a
(0.25) (0.20)
ln (1+tariff/100) ratio -15.14a -1.85
(4.03) (7.20)
NTB coverage -1.84a -1.08b
(0.35) (0.46)
institutions, quality 0.96b 0.88c 2.60a 2.26a
(0.42) (0.46) (0.65) (0.60)
institutions, distance 0.16 -0.50 -1.23c -2.77a
(0.53) (0.52) (0.65) (0.54)
N 1017 1306 507 314
R2 0.862 0.868 0.884 0.877
RMSE .562 .558 .466 .48
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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independent variables can produce biased coefficients in OLS and GLS estimations. As
already stated in section 2.5, production and wage variables are one possible source of en-
dogeneity. Larger imports can favor domestic production when the latter relies heavily on
foreign intermediate inputs, but can also have a harmful effect if imported products crowd
out local producers through increased competition on the domestic market. Wages too are
affected by a country’s performance on foreign markets. This can be visualized within a
country through the gap between employees’ remuneration by exporting companies and by
local market oriented firms. Last but not least, the quality of institutions can change with
respect to country’s participation in international trade. The exchange of large amounts of
goods with foreign partners brings the firms more often in contact with deficiencies in the
institutional framework, and can determine them to lobby for reforms in the system.
Consequently, one calls for appropriate econometric proceedures when estimating the
relative demand for foreign goods. The solution is given by instrumental variable (IV)
and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations. However, these approaches rely
heavily on the availability of good instruments for each endogenous variable, i.e. variables
that are important determinants of a particular endogenous variable but have no direct
impact on the others. The literature acknowledges the difficulty of finding good instruments
for all three variables mentioned above.
In econometric terms, what counts is good instruments for right hand side endogenous
variables in order to find exogenous variations in production, wages and institutions, and
explain relative trade. From a theoretical point of view, truly exogenous variations are
unlikely to exist; it is necessary therefore to find sources of variation that are orthogonal
to other determinants of trade. The theoretical model predicts a unitary coefficient on
production. One can thus easily correct for endogeneity between trade and production
in (2.17) by imposing β1 = 1. Wages in a country are determined by demand and offer
conditions on the labor market: the size of the labor force, the number of employers (firms)
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operating on the market, unions’ bargaining power, and the productivity of labor. Of all
these variables, only the last one passes the Sargan over-identification test and is used to
instrument variation in wage ratio in first-stage estimations.
Endogenous institutions have been treated in the literature almost exclusively in devel-
opment related issues, such as to demonstrate their strong causality on per-capita income
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)). They use mortality rates of colonial settlers
as an instrument for institutional quality and find that the adopted instrument is strong.
From this paper it is possible to say that the characteristic of the environment found by
the colonialists is one of the most important reasons for the decision to establish them-
selves in a determined area rather than in another. Moving from the idea that geography
can explain institutions’ variations, Easterly and Levine (2003) and others instrumented
institutions with different geographic variables. They include different sets of instruments
for endowments like latitude, landlocked and ten different dummy variables representing
minerals and crops.
However, all theses studies adopt an approach specific to the breakdown of the world into
industrialized and developing countries, with past colonial ties. Therefore, instruments they
found are irrelevant for institutions of European countries. In our case instrumental vari-
ables need to account for specific differences between East and West-European economies.
None of the countries in our sample has been colonialized in the last centuries. Purely
geographic aspects cannot explain differences in the functioning of institutions across the
continent either. Although countries from the North tend to have better institutions, mov-
ing to the South, the passage to poorer institutions is far from being smooth. Moreover,
one should be able to provide an economic justification of the causality between the chosen
instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable.
We have considered a entire set of possible instruments for institutions, starting from
the mortality rate, and the share of non-tax revenue, passing through patents deposed by
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residents and foreigners, the share of rural population, market capitalization, the percentage
of listed domestic companies, the share of traded stocks in the national product, and
finishing with the per capita central government’s consumption. Plausible stories about
the effect on institutions’ quality can be told for any of these variables, but only three
qualify as good instruments according to Sargan test.
The first one is the mortality rate. The intuition behind is that a high probability of
dying tomorrow diminishes people’s valuation of future benefits, including the ones in terms
of well-functioning institutions. Therefore, there is less incentive for institutional reforms
in countries with high death rates. Building better institutions is a long-term investment,
and those who make the main effort may simply not be able to enjoy its future advantages.
High mortality has the same effects as political instability for government officials, who
continue to accept bribery and corruption as ordinary things.
Market capitalization, expressed as a share of domestic product, is the second instru-
ment employed. It reflects simultaneously the share of listed companies and the market
value of their stock. A high level of market capitalisation illustrates a large participation
of firms on the stock exchange, a high value of firms’ assets, or both. All three situations
correspond to increased needs (and pressure) for strong institutions. The stock exchange
alone can be viewed as an institution, and its condition can shed light on the state of other
institutions in the country.
The last eligible instrument for institutions is the government’s tax revenue. It is
generally accepted that a country’s institutions can change notably only with sufficient
support from the government. Support can come in two forms: political and financial. The
ability of the government to collect taxes determines the amount of its funds, and as a
consequence its capacity to finance institutional reforms. A severe limitation in funds on
which the government can draw to finance its actions reduces not only the scale of these
actions, but also their popularity among the electorate.
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Endogeneity compatible estimates of (2.17) are displayed in table 2.5. To control for
the panel structure of our data, country pair effects have been included in all second-stage
estimations. Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics for endogeneity are
constructed and reported in the lower part of the table. The null hypothesis associated
with this tests recognizes all the variables on the right hand side of (2.17) to be exogenous.
The alternative hypothesis requires wages and institutions to be endogenous. As the results
of these tests rely on the instruments selected, the Sargan validity of instruments test is
conducted to determine whether the instruments selected are appropriate.
The IEF is used in column 1 as a measure of institutions’ quality. Note, that lim-
ited availability of data on selected instruments reduces the number of observations and
the variablility in other exogenous variables. Thus, insufficient variation in import tariffs
makes impossible the estimation of β7. The gain in statistical significance of coefficients
on institutional variables is very small, but zero on wages. And the large p-value for both
Wu-Hausman (F = 8.67, p = 0.00) and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (χ2 = 29.99, p = 0.00) tests
reveals that controlling for endogeneity is unnecessary. The absence of endogeneity also
suggests that OLS and GLS estimations are reliable in this case.
Column 2 shows results with the EBRD composite institutional index. Both large
partial R2 in first-stage regressions and low Sargan statistic (0.01, p = 0.91) testify the
relevance of chosen instruments. The two endogeneity tests justify the use of instrumental
variables estimator. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on wage
ratio is equal to -1.03, yielding a more credible value of the elasticity of substitution σ.
Compared to OLS and GLS estimations presented in table 2.3, the effect of NTB and the
quality of institutions on cross border trade obtained with IV is much larger. The impact
of import tariffs and institutional quality, on the contrary, is lower with a IV estimator.
The elimination of tariffs for European trade, amounting at the beginning of the period to
a 5% average, generates according to estimates in column 2 a 43%= [5∗(−8.62)] increase in
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Table 2.5: Relative demand for foreign products, trade liberalization and institutions:
endogeneity issues
Dependent Variable: mij/mjj
Model: (1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Institutional index: IEF EBRD KKM KKM Fraser Fraser
Estimator: IV IV IV GMM IV GMM
intercept -3.58a -3.03a -2.33a -2.31a -2.37a -2.28a
(0.41) (0.15) (0.13) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26)
ln production ratio 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ln wage ratio -0.25 -1.03a -1.44a -1.43a -1.35a -1.23a
(0.22) (0.13) (0.15) (0.30) (0.22) (0.36)
ln distance ratio -0.57a -1.11a -0.85a -0.83a -0.84a -0.93a
(0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17)
common border -0.39 0.49a 0.39b 0.38c 0.31a 0.13
(0.25) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.26) (0.16)
common language 2.03a 0.96a 0.79a 0.81a 0.92a 1.02a
(0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.33) (0.19)




NTB coverage -0.63 -1.50a
(0.53) (0.16)
institutions, quality 0.50 4.34a 3.02a 2.18 4.34b 2.81
(0.53) (0.73) (0.86) (2.35) (1.80) (4.19)
institutions, distance -0.39c -0.79a -2.24a -2.39a -1.18 -0.22
(0.22) (0.28) (0.71) (1.15) (1.18) (1.79)
First-stage regressions
Wage: partial R2 0.088 0.765 0.414 0.414 0.536 0.536
Institutions: partial R2 0.169 0.758 0.398 0.398 0.332 0.332
Second-stage regression
Centered R2 0.990 0.950 0.427 0.406 0.382 0.414
RMSE .139 .299 .898 .91 .93 .91
Sargan test 1.49 0.01 3.42 0.63 4.25 1.25
p - value 0.22 0.91 0.06 0.43 0.04 0.26
Wu-Hausman F test 0.54 8.67 32.09 8.81
p - value 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test 1.92 29.99 57.73 17.10
p - value 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pagan-Hall test 396.01 22.73 16.06
p - value 0.29 0.00 0.01
N 607 867 494 494 288 288
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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trade. Different from OLS and GLS results, the effect of the quality of institutions on trade
is 5.5 times larger than the effect of institutional distance separating the trading countries.
Still, in the case of the EBRD, the two measures are not orthogonal: Any improvement in
the functioning of CEE countries’ institutions reduces the institutional distance separating
them from EU members. Results are very similar if the NTB coverage ratio is substituted
by the NTB frequency ratio.
Columns 3a and 3b, use the KKM general index to construct the two institutional
variables, and the last two columns employ the Fraser index. The χ2 score of the Sargan
test (equal to 3.42 with the KKM index, and to 4.25 with the Fraser index) is below
the 1 percent critical value, suggesting that the null hypothesis, stating that the selected
instruments are appropriate, should be accepted in both cases. The value of the Wu-
Hausman test statistic shown in table 2.5 (32.09, and respectively 8.81) is well above the 1
percent critical value of the χ2 distribution, indicating that wage and institutions are truly
endogenous variables in (2.17). IV estimations reveal institutions as stronger determinants
of trade. However, for both KKM and Fraser indices, the IV estimator does not correct for
heteroscedasticity in the system of equations estimated in the first and second stage. This
is reflected by the significant Pagan-Hall statistic shown in the bottom of table 2.5. The
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to fix this problem. Again, the
GMM equivalent of the Sargan test, also called the J statistic of Hansen or Jansen, confirms
that selected instruments are appropriate. Switching to the GMM estimator reduces the
statistical significance of institutional effects. However, we do not consider this loss to be
important as we base our main conclusions on IEF and EBRD index. Results in column
3a, the only one yielding significant estimates for both institutional variables, show that
the contraction of institutional distance separating two countries generates about as much
trade as an equal upward shift in the quality of both countries’ institutions.
Whenever endogeneity is present, IV and GMM estimates of the wage ratio coefficient
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are larger than 1 in absolute value, complying with predictions of the theoretical model.
It can thus be concluded that wages can be employed as proxies for mill prices only if one
corrects for the introduced endogeneity. Using either of the four institutional measures
described above yields similar results: International trade increases when national insti-
tutions work better, and are more alike. Trade liberalization, translated by lower import
tariffs and share of trade exposed to NTB, has a strong trade-boosting effect. Nevertheless,
the amelioration of institutions is expected to increase trade between European partners,
suggesting that trade integration can continue even when complete trade liberalization is
reached.
2.7 Trade Policy vs. Institutional Reforms
There are two possible ways in which one can judge about the relative importance of trade
policy instruments and reforms of national institutions for regional trade integration. The
first method consists in determining the share of the overall border effect explained by
each determinant. The second regards the volume of additional bilateral trade generated
by complete trade liberalization and fully accomplished institutional reforms. For both
approaches estimates of imports relative to domestic trade mij/mjj are used.
The contribution of each factor to the total border effect is actually equivalent to the
share of trade policy and institutional costs in the total border-specific trade costs. The
overall border effect between two countries i and j is an expression of total trade costs
between i and j in terms of lost trade volume. It reflects the loss in trade caused by all
border-related barriers, and is obtained by taking the exponential of the opposite of the
constant terms of equation (2.15). We denote it by BE ≡ exp(Bij). Equation (2.15) is
reached by dropping all border-specific trade cost terms from trade specification (2.17),
assuming a uniform effect of the quality of national institutions on trade within and across
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national borders. Shall institutions be assumed to matter for cross-border trade alone, the
institutional term should be dropped from (2.15) in order to estimate total border-related
costs.
As we are unaware of all elements determining trade costs, we adopt an indirect method
in order to find the share of trade costs corresponding to tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade, and to the worldwide institutional diversity.11 We compute residual border effects left
unexplained by each factor separately. Introducing trade policy and institutional distance


























+ c4InstitDistij + vij (2.20)
Again, if the quality of institutions is considered to be a border-specific cost, the term
InstitDifij is added on the right hand side of equation (2.20). The amount of border-
specific costs explained by trade liberalization, and institutions in terms of trade volume
is then obtained by subtracting the residual border effects estimated by equation (2.19),
and respectively (2.20), from the overall border effect BE. The computation of the share
of trade costs explained by each factor is straightforward:








Estimates of BTL and BIR with the IEF and EBRD index as measures of institutions’
quality for four years of our sample are displayed in table 2.6. Similar results when both
institutional quality and distance are assumed as costs specific to international trade flows,
11In deed, important border effects are obtained when we include trade policy and institutional variables:
tables 2.3 and 2.5.
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for the same years are provided in table 2.7. The contribution to overall trade costs is
calculated according to the formulas (2.21) with estimates of b0 and c0 obtained with
OLS and year fixed effects. By construction, results should range between 0 and 1. This
condition is verified except for IEF institutions in 1995 in table 2.7, corresponding to a
non-significant estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for the year 1995. Figures in
italic show the average European border effect for different years.
Table 2.6: The contribution of trade policy and institutional factors in promoting interna-
tional trade
1993 1995 1998 2000
Institutional measure: IEF
Total border eﬀect 45.8 35.2 23.4
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.62 0.45 0.26
Institutional distance 0.14 0.10 0.08
Institutional measure: EBRD index
Total border eﬀect 55.5 50.8 35.1 24.8
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.62 0.67 0.52 0.39
Institutional distance 0.31 0.23 0.13 0.06
Note: Figures in italic exhibit European border effect. The rest of the figures
in the table show the part of total border effect explained by each set of
variables. The quality of institutions is considered equally important for
both foreign and domestic trade, and can not be held responsible for a lower
level of international trade relative to internal shipments.
A first conclusion to be drawn from tables 2.6 and 2.7 is the important trade integration
that marked the region during the 1990s. International trade costs expressed in volumes of
trade were reduced by more than a half. By the year 2000 Europeans bought about twice
as much from regional foreign partners than they did in 1993 relative to domestic partners.
Secondly, trade policy instruments seem to impose larger costs on bilateral trade. In the
early 1990s around 60% of these costs came from tariffs and NTB to trade. A proportion
of 14% was generated by the diversity of general (development-specific) institutions and
32% by transition or market institutions. Obviously, there are aspects captured by both
types of institutions. Still, one can not ignore the greater burden of market institutions.
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Table 2.7: The role of foreign trade policy and institutions in trade integration
1993 1995 1998 2000
Total border eﬀect 57.7 52.6 36.4 25.7
Import tariff and NTB coverage 0.58 0.65 0.50 0.37
IEF score and distance -0.07 0.13 0.16
EBRD score and distance 0.34 0.26 0.16 0.09
KKM score and distance 0.04 0.03
Fraser score and distance 0.16 0.06
Note: Figures in the table show the contribution of trade policy and institutional
factors in explaining the total border effect displayed in italic. The quality
of institutions is considered to matter for foreign trade exclusively and is a
source of border effects.
Finally, the weight of trade policy instruments and institutional heterogeneity decreased in
time. Summing up the contribution of different factors, we conclude that tariffs, NTB and
institutions explained the quasi-totality of border-specific trade costs in the beginning of
the period, but their cumulative share decreased to 45%-53% of total border-related trade
costs by the year 2000. This indicates the increasing importance of other(auxiliary) trade
costs.12
Alternatively, the role of foreign trade policy and domestic institutions in promoting
regional trade can be compared through the trade volume each of them can generate.
As both trade liberalization and reforms of domestic institutions concern first of all CEE
countries of the sample, we focus on trade between CEE and EU countries. We compute
the trade creation effect of total trade liberalization between East and West European
nations using equation (2.17) and show results in table 2.8. Trade liberalization is said
to be completed when all tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated. Because of the low
number of observations for which NTB are available in the data, we use two samples: a
12When the share of trade policy and institutions in total border-specific costs is estimated from a single
trade equation, the joint effect of the two factors is only obtained. In terms of size, it is slightly superior
to the share of tariffs and NTB in table 2.6, but inferior to the summed share of the two factors.
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Table 2.8: The CEE-EU trade creation effect of trade liberalization and institutional re-
forms
small sample large sample
Trade creation source IEF EBRD IEF EBRD
Trade liberalization 15.2 16.4 76.7 53.3
Institutional reforms 7.1 4.1 3.9 135.7
Trade liberalization and institutional reforms 23.4 21.2 79.8 261.4
Note: Figures in the table show the trade creation in percentage of observed international
trade produced by complete trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Trade
liberalization translates by the elimination of existing import tariffs and NTB in
the case of the small sample, and by the elimination of tariffs alone in the case
of the larger sample. Institutional reforms consist in improving the quality of na-
tional institutions in CEE countries to reach the average level observed across EU
countries.
small sample corresponding to observations for which both tariff and non-tariff data exists,
and a large one combining observations for which only tariff data is available. Similarly,
the trade creation produced by institutional reforms is computed. The reforms of domestic
CEE institutions are assumed to increase the quality of the latter to the average level
observed for corresponding institutions in EU countries (as shown in table 2.2). Effects
are shown in table 2.8 for both general and transition specific institutions. All figures are
expressed in percentage of actual trade.
Trade creation associated with the two factors separately and jointly is very low when
small sample estimates are employed. However, these values explode when estimations are
carried on the large sample. Thus, the removal of import tariffs and NTB results in a trade
creation comprised between 53% and 77% of actual CEE-EU trade. The increase in bilateral
trade produced by reforms of development specific institutions is barely noticeable (less
than 4%), but is very large for reforms in transition specific institutions, and is exceeding
the effect of trade liberalization. Thus, even after CEE-EU trade has been completely
liberalized, the improvement of market institutions in CEE countries can have a comparable
trade creation effect. It may bring as much as 54%[= (1 + 135.7/100)/(1 + 53.3/100)− 1]
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of additional CEE-EU trade, post-liberalization trade used as base. Moreover, the data
reveals a large amplification effect when the two measures are conducted simultaneously.
Once more, evidence of a large positive role of reforms in market institutions is found.
2.8 Distinguishing among Institutions
A country’s institutional framework is, however, too diverse and broad to be properly
evaluated by a single variable. Therefore, as a next step, it is useful to distinguish the
different features of the institutional framework and to set forth the ones that matter the
most for cross-border trade flows.
Firstly, the institutional dimensions corresponding to each component indices used in
the computation of the Index of Economic Freedom average and the EBRD composite
measure are considered. The high correlation of individual institutional measures shown in
figure 2.3 and tables C.3 and C.4 of the Appendix C demands a separate use of each index
in trade specification (2.17).
Table 2.9 presents coefficients on the variables of interest and the summary regression
statistics for IEF component indices. In the first part of the table we show OLS results
when both institutional channels (quality and distance) are included on the right hand
side of equation (2.17). Coefficient values close to those with the average IEF index are
obtained for import tariffs and NTB. As for institutional variables, coefficients are rarely
significantly different from zero. A high inflation rate (corresponding to a low value of
the monetary policy factor) and a large black market cause the highest trade friction.
Statistically non-significant coefficients for other IEF factors are the outcome of the absence
of a corresponding effect on trade or of a high correlation of the institutional quality
and distance variables. Estimations with a single explanatory institutional variable are
reproduced in the lower part of table 2.9. Unlike previously, the Hausman specification
test falls short of the 5% percent critical value, justifying the use of the random-effects
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Table 2.9: The role of different institutional dimensions: IEF
Model: OLS with year FE tariff NTB instit’l instit’l R2 No.
Institutional dimension coverage quality distance obs.
Fiscal burden of -19.68a 0.03 0.39 0.39 0.724 1073
government (3.13) (1.07) (0.77) (0.59)
Government -18.81a 0.04 -0.26 0.23 0.726 1073
intervention (3.23) (1.07) (0.24) (0.22)
Monetary policy -17.98a 0.05 0.54a -0.82a 0.736 1073
(3.85) (1.01) (0.25) (0.27)
Capital flows and -19.76a 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.723 1073
foreign investment (3.21) (1.07) (0.36) (0.41)
Banking and finance -19.74a 0.07 -0.09 -0.03 0.723 1073
(3.36) (1.06) (0.35) (0.33)
Wages and prices -19.58a 0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.723 1073
(3.37) (1.06) (0.36) (0.42)
Property rights -19.61a 0.10 -0.08 -0.07 0.723 1073
(3.32) (1.04) (0.58) (0.37)
Regulation -19.79a 0.15 -0.31 0.52 0.726 1073
(3.33) (1.13) (0.47) (0.42)
Black market -19.49a 0.09 0.37 -0.68a 0.733 1073
(3.24) (1.09) (0.32) (0.25)
Model: GLS tariff NTB instit Hausman No.
Institutional dimension coverage test obs.
(0.61) (0.18) (0.04) (0.005)
Fiscal burden of -19.61a 0.12 0.23a 5.14 1073
government (0.30) (0.07) (0.07) (0.162)
Government -19.06a 0.12 -0.17a 6.47 1073
intervention (0.23) (0.11) (0.03) (0.091)
Monetary policy -19.93a 0.05 0.35a 0.14 1073
(0.52) (0.11) (0.04) (0.986)
Capital flow and -19.44a 0.09a 0.52a 4.37 1073
foreign investment (0.20) (0.04) (0.09) (0.112)
Banking and finance -19.54a 0.19a -0.05c 5.03 1073
(0.21) (0.08) (0.03) (0.170)
Wages and prices -19.43a 0.10c 0.06 6.73 1073
(0.24) (0.06) (0.04) (0.081)
Property rights -19.54a 0.24a -0.12a 1.97 1073
(0.16) (0.07) (0.04) (0.373)
Regulation -18.92a 0.14a -0.39a 4.78 1073
(0.25) (0.04) (0.04) (0.189)
Black market -19.02a 0.03 0.27a 7.49 1073
(0.37) (0.08) (0.03) (0.058)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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estimator. The coefficient on institutions reflects in this case the average effect of the
two channels. A positive value, such as in the case of fiscal burden of government, of
capital flows and foreign investment, and of black market, speaks of a larger effect of the
quality of institutions. A reduction of tax rates, of restrictions on foreign ownership and
of other specific restrictions imposed on foreign companies, and of the size of black market
economy by any of the two trading partners will increase their mutual trade. Negative
estimates, on the contrary, show the prevalence of the similarity in instituions channel.
This is the case of government intervention in the economy, property rights, and regulation
factors. For these aspects, extra trade occurs only for a joint effort in the importing and
exporting countries. Countries with poor but similar levels of property rights protection,
high corruption, and/or restrictions to create new businesses exchange more with each
other than with partners characterized by better functioning institutions.
The effect of transition specific institutions is displayed in table 2.10. Reported coeffi-
cients and regression statistics correspond to the separate introduction of each of the nine
factors used in the computation of the single EBRD index in equation (2.17). Fixed-effects
estimations are preferred in this case: the Hausman test of fixed versus random effects
specifications is always significant at the 10% level, and in seven out of nine cases also
at the 5% level. The variation in EBRD indices not only explains a larger share of the
variation in the dependent variable than IEF factors (larger R2 values), but also produces
coefficient estimates closer to findings in the literature. Moreover, coefficients on all vari-
ables in this case have expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. One percent
fall in the average import tariff produces an increase in bilateral trade averaging between
7% and 11%. The NTB coefficient is negative and highly significant for all nine EBRD
factors. The restriction of NTB by one per cent of bilateral trade flows produces a 1% rise
in trade. European trade integration will benefit from both better performing and more
similar market institutions, a statement verified by each dimension comprised in the EBRD
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Table 2.10: The role of different institutional dimensions: EBRD index
Model : FE tariff NTB instit’l instit’l R2 Hausman No.
Institutional dimension coverage quality distance test obs.
Price liberalization -10.81a -1.12a 2.72a -1.98a 0.785 25.073 1356
(1.33) (0.17) (0.43) (0.30) (0.005)
Foreign exchange and -7.08a -0.85a 2.44a -3.89a 0.792 28.450 1356
trade liberalization (1.32) (0.17) (0.97) (0.92) (0.002)
Small-scale -9.47a -1.27a 2.11a -0.96a 0.788 21.179 1356
privatisation (1.26) (0.20) (0.35) (0.34) (0.020)
Large-scale -8.62a -0.99a 2.28a -1.49a 0.795 17.119 1356
privatisation (1.51) (0.16) (0.27) (0.29) (0.072)
Enterprise reform -9.49a -0.97a 1.28a -1.14a 0.785 21.057 1356
(1.48) (0.17) (0.24) (0.21) (0.021)
Competition policy -11.92a -1.21a 2.20a -0.75a 0.794 24.506 1356
(1.36) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.006)
Infrastructure reform -8.94a -1.00a 1.61a -1.12a 0.790 19.018 1356
(1.33) (0.16) (0.24) (0.18) (0.040)
Banking sector -7.85a -1.10a 1.84a -1.37a 0.793 18.777 1356
(1.40) (0.16) (0.30) (0.26) (0.043)
Non-banking financial -9.81a -1.13a 1.69a -0.93a 0.793 17.464 1356
institutions (1.35) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.065)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
index. Still, the effect is more prominent for increased markets’ liberalization, privatisation
and domestic competition.
Despite of the improved knowledge of the role of specific institutions brought by results
presented in tables 2.9 and 2.10, one can difficultly formulate rigorous economic policy
recommendations on the basis of qualitative (index) variables. What does exactly mean a
rescaled score of 0.5 of the IEF or the EBRD index, or of any of their component factors?
To what corresponds a tenth point increase in this value and how specifically can it be
achieved by an economy? Questions like this are left unanswered by the previous discussion.
Government officials operate with very precise measures, and a more quantified view of
institutions is necessary to satisfy their inquiries.
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In the remaining part of this subsection we concentrate on CEE exports to EU, trade
flows with the highest growth potential within the region. Conclusions formulated below
can serve as guidelines for CEE countries’ governments for undertaking reforms that will
have the strongest positive impact on their countries’ export performance onWest European
markets.
All results obtained with index measures of institutions’ quality claim the principal role
of transition-specific institutions for trade among the selected group of European coun-
tries. Therefore we focus on quantitative variables characterizing this type of institutions.
Compared to CEE countries, all EU members have well-functioning market institutions,
and their amelioration is ruled out. This restriction is consistent with the economic policy
approach: CEE governments can at most produce changes in their domestic institutions.
Hence, one can ignore the quality of institutions in EU countries and derive an adequate













+ α4borderij + α5langij (2.22)
+α6countryij + α7 ln(1 + tariffij) + α8ntbij + α9Institi + ωij
A single institutional variable reflecting the quality of market institutions in the exporting
CEE country i, Institi, is included. Institutional distance is dropped because of colinearity
with variable Institi. Indeed, any change in the functioning of institutions in i trans-
lates immediately by a corresponding shift in the institutional distance with respect any
importing EU country j.
Eleven different continuous variables are used to portray CEE’s market institutions,
and the coefficients estimated with (2.22) are presented in the first column of table 2.11.
Coefficients are highly significant except for the average bribe tax. Average values of
institutional variables across CEE countries are also reported. The impact of each aspect
of CEE countries’ institutional framework on their exports to EU is computed for one unit
2.8. DISTINGUISHING AMONG INSTITUTIONS 109
and one standard deviation unit change in institutional variables and is displayed in the
last two columns of table 2.11.
The private sector accounts for about 62% of CEE economies. One percent point
increase of that share will generate a 1.57% growth of CEE exports to EU. The largest effect
is observed for budget subsidies and bribes. An equal change in the share of budgetary
subsidies and firms giving bribes reduces CEE exports by 2.89% and respectively 2.18%. In
Table 2.11: The role of transition specific institutions for CEE exports to EU
Model : OLS instit R2 No. Mean Effect on trade†
Institutional dimension coeff obs. (SD) ∆ = SD ∆ = 1
Private sector in GDP 0.04a 0.826 64 62.13 4.55 1.57
(0.01) (11.93)
Private sector in 0.02a 0.777 42 59.83 1.67 0.58
employment (0.01) (13.01)
Budgetary subsidies -0.08a 0.805 62 4.15 -8.03 -2.89
(0.02) (4.48)
Investment rate 0.05a 0.806 64 24.28 5.33 1.84
(0.02) (6.44)
Number of banks 0.01a 0.791 64 36.58 0.64 0.22
(0.01) (19.18)
Foreign owned banks 0.03a 0.799 63 13.54 3.29 1.14
(0.01) (10.35)
Non-performing loans -0.02a 0.832 53 17.88 -1.81 -0.64
(0.01) (13.47)
Domestic credit to 0.05a 0.852 63 22.02 5.24 1.81
private sector (0.01) (12.68)
Broad money M2 0.02a 0.826 64 42.55 2.41 0.84
(0.01) (18.05)
Firms giving bribes -0.06a 0.826 24 26.48 -6.10 -2.18
frequently (%) (0.01) (11.45)
Average bribe tax 1.07 0.834 24 1.24 ns ns
(1.28) (0.35)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels;
† Effects on trade are per cent changes in relative imports caused by one
unit and one standard deviation increase in the value of the institutional
variable respectively.
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a similar way, an increased number of non-performing loans reduces a country’s exporting
performance. On the contrary, the presence of foreign owned banks, as well as the increased
competition in the banking sector (associated with the fragmentation of the sector), gives
a larger access of well-performing exporting firms to funds and increases the trust of EU
partners in the respect of contract stipulations. Unsurprisingly, the private sector is a
leading factor of exports. Its expansion, both in terms of production and employed labor
force, together with an improved access to credit for private firms are an important premise
for CEE exports’ growth. Another important determinant is the investment rate in the
economy. During the 1990s it amounted to 24% of CEE domestic product. Raising this
figure by 1% will produce a 1.84% growth of exports to EU.
Hence, a CEE country preoccupied with the increase of its exports to the EU market
should start by reducing budgetary subsidies and corruption, and should privilege the
development of private sector and domestic investment. Banking sector and monetary
policy issues, although important, lead to less important gains.
2.9 Conclusion
Trade policy and national institutions are two important determinants of cross-border trade
flows. We use a simple monopolistic trade model with a trade costs structure with tariff and
non-tariff barriers, and institutions to investigate the role of these two factors. National
institutions measured both in terms of quality and similarity, along with instruments of
foreign trade policy, have a strong and significant impact on trade between European
countries. The result is confirmed by the use of both index and continuous variables as
measures for the quality of institutions. Still, the size of the effect on trade is smaller for
general development specific institutions, and larger for institutions specific to transition
economies. The reverse causality between trade and institutions is also considered, and
evidence is found that larger trade volumes stimulate reforms of the institutional framework.
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The role of trade liberalization in promoting regional trade integration is compared to that
of institutional reforms according to two methods. In each case, the part of total border-
specific trade costs explained by each factor, and the size of the trade creation effect of
complete CEE-EU trade liberalization and reforms of domestic institutions are computed.
Also, both approaches ascribe a non-negligible contribution to institutional reforms. A
further increase in CEE-EU trade, comparable to the that due to trade liberalization, is
possible even after all policy barriers to trade have been removed. Finally, the use of
quantitative institutional measures allows us to formulate specific policy recommendations
for increasing CEE exports to the EU market.
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Part II
The role of social and business





Trade in Cultural Goods and Social
Networks
3.1 Introduction
Recent empirical work by Rauch (1999), (2001), Combes et alii (2005) shows that cross-
border networks, both social and business, stimulate trade in general. They complement
the traditional determinants of international trade, such as transport costs, tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, the quality and the proximity of the national institutions. According to this
literature, networks emerge when the market fails to bring the necessary information to
partners or to impose reliable enforcement mechanisms.1
The literature advances three channels via which networks increase trade. First of all
networks permit a better information of members on potential partners, unavailable on the
market, or available at a higher cost. In this way networks contribute to the reduction of
information and partner search costs for its members, and a corresponding increase of their
profits on the foreign markets (Casella and Rauch (1997), Rauch and Trindade (2002),
Gould (1994)). Secondly, networks facilitate the punishment of opportunistic behavior via
1Thompson (1991), and Powell (1990) support this idea.
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well-established enforcement mechanisms, but also implicitly through a full and costless
spread of information between members. The non respect of contractual stipulations by
a member is quickly known by other members of the network, which strongly reduces
the chances of the former to find a partner inside the network (Greif (1993), Hsing (1999),
Anderson and Young (2002)). Finally, networks can induce modifications in the structure of
consumers’ preferences (Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999)). This latter channel is assigned
in the literature exclusively to social networks. For historical reasons, consumers of a
particular country can have a higher preference for domestic products, and it can be altered
by important flow of immigrants with different preferences.
Social networks are usually defined by common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, etc. ties of
consumers and/or producers, and are traditionally accounted for by the flows or stocks
of immigrants. The use of migration variables has the advantage of measuring not only
the presence or absence of a social or cultural tie, but also its intensity. Limiting social
networks to migration, however, reduces our understanding of the role of social and cultural
ties for trade. Other cultural and social aspects are less treated in the literature although
most empirical studies include dummy variables for common land border, language or past
colonial relationship. Helliwell (1999) and Melitz (2002) use data on the shares of countries
population speaking the same language, and highlight the positive role of linguistic ties
on trade. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show that the trust of European citizens
towards foreigners depends on cultural aspects (religion, history, wars, etc.), and exerts a
considerable impact on trade and investments.
This chapter highlights the presence of an additional dimension of social networks than
those considered in the literature and constructs a measure that permits to quantify the
intensity of cross-border social and cultural ties from international trade in cultural goods.
Cultural goods (books, music, films, newspapers, etc.) more than any other goods embody
information on the market of origin. Their international exchange implies at the same time
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an exchange of information and a reduction of the costs of access to the foreign market
for firms in each country. It will be assumed here that the intensity of the cultural trade,
compared to non-cultural trade, is proportional to the strength of transnational social
networks, expressed otherwise by linguistic, historical, or ethnic links. The surplus of trade
in cultural goods compared to the predictions of the trade model is associated to reinforced
social and cultural ties. The bilateral measure of the intensity of social networks built in
this way allows for variations in time and the direction of trade flows.
There is little empirical work allowing the separation of the three channels of action
of networks. The present chapter enriches this literature by introducing another way of
separating the information effect of social networks from the preference effect. Limited
support in favor of the preference effect on trade of social networks is found in the literature:
immigrants have a similar effect on exports and imports (e.g. Head et alii (2002)). Beyond
the reduction of transaction costs, imports of foreign cultural goods generate a shift in
local consumer’s preferences. The visualization of American films and TV channels, might
encourage the consumption of American products, the adoption of American values and
life style by the young population. The specific measure developed in this chapter proposes
a different way to separate the two channels of action. Used on a large sample of countries,
it suggests that the preference effect of social networks on trade prevails without ignoring
the role of information channelled through social networks. According to Rauch (1999),
networks are particularly important for trade in differentiated goods, and for repetitive
long term relationships. Using Rauch’s classification of goods into homogeneous, reference
priced and differentiated, only partial support for this thesis is found.
The chapter is structured as follows. A general discussion of cultural goods and social
and cultural ties is presented in the next section. Section 3.3 exposes the trade model
and section 3.4 some general results. The strength of social networks, their impact on
international trade, and information and preference effects are quantified in the following
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two sections, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Cultural Goods and Social Networks
Cultural goods are defined as products carrying an important cultural component, such as
information on consumer preferences, on business practices and opportunities in the origin
market. This cultural content is assimilated by consumers at destination in two possibles
ways: (a) by increasing their knowledge about the origin market, or (b) by transforming
their preferences for foreign products. One main feature of cultural goods is that the utility
associated with their consumption is usually higher in the presence of social and cultural
links between the origin and destination countries.
According to the World Customs Organization, cultural goods comprise cinemato-
graphic films, newspapers and periodicals, books, leaflets and other printed matter, and
recorded tapes and media. Each of these product groups is treated below separately and
when possible with reference to similar non-cultural goods. Additional to the above list,
most agricultural goods have some cultural components, and can therefore be qualified as
cultural. Of the latter, only alcoholic beverages are retained in the present analysis, a
category for which it is easy to find similar goods without the cultural charge. Trade in
cultural products is obtained from disaggregated data according to the SITC (Standard
International Trade Classification) Rev.2 and 3 at the 4-digit level. Table 3.1 lists cultural
products considered in this paper and their non-cultural equivalents whenever the latter
can be identified.
Imports of cultural products imply a simultaneous import of information on preference
of consumers in the country of origin, its market and public institutions, business practices,
trade opportunities, etc. Reading foreign newspapers regularly, for example, can help firms
to seize the best trade opportunities, find suppliers or outlets for domestic production. This
superior ‘market intelligence’ reduces transaction costs for firms in the importing country,
3.2. CULTURAL GOODS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 119
Table 3.1: Cultural and non-cultural goods
cultural goods non-cultural equiva-
lents
SITC Rev.2 classiﬁcation
112 alcoholic beverages 5121 acyclic monohydric alcohols
(both food and industrial use)
8830 cinematographic films
8921 books, pamphlets, maps, etc.
8928 other printed matter
8922 newspapers, periodicals 6411 newsprint rolls and sheets
SITC Rev.3 classiﬁcation
8985 magnetic tapes recorded 8984 magnetic tapes unrecorded
8987 other recorded media 8986 other blank recording media
and increases their access to the origin market. Moreover, consumption of foreign goods
with an important cultural component may develop a preference for similar foreign goods,
i.e. generate a shift in consumer preferences. Reading foreign magazines, or watching
foreign movies often encourages the young population to adopt foreign values and life
styles, reflected by a changed consumption structure. It is therefore not unreasonable to
associate large volumes of trade in cultural goods to the intensity of social networks.
But these are exactly the ways in which cross-border social networks stimulate trade.
Rauch and Trindade (2002), Girma and Yu (2002), and Gould (1994) use gravity type
models of trade with migration and find that ethnic networks have essentially an informa-
tional role for international trade. Similarly, Nicita and Olarreaga (2000) find evidence of
a significant positive effect of information flows on global trade. Still, social networks can
alter as well consumer preferences for goods produced abroad. Head and Ries (1998) and
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) estimate strong effects of migration on imports, highlight-
ing the importance of the ‘taste linkage’ established via social networks. Using imports of
different cultural goods from abroad, we also introduce a new way for separating the two
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effects. This ideas are developed in more detail in the following sections.
3.3 The Gravity Model and Data
The gravity model is a basic tool in international economics usually employed to express
the volume of trade between two countries. It relates bilateral imports positively to the
product of the two countries’ sizes, and negatively to the distance between them. Its
wide use comes from its simplicity and good fit of empirical data. There is a large and
growing international trade literature based on the empirical use of the gravity. However,
its compatibility with the predictions of international trade theory remained questionable
for a long time. Still, important recent progress in deriving gravity-like equations from
different theoretical structures confirms its compatibility with trade in both differentiated
and homogeneous products, and in presence of both constant and increasing returns.
A gravity specification integrating social networks is developed in this section. we use an
augmented gravity equation to include both information and preference effects of networks
on trade. Countries connected by strong social and cultural links face lower transaction
costs and/or have similar preference structures. Five dummies and one quantitative variable
most frequently found in gravity specifications in the literature are added to the standard
gravity variables to control for these aspects. Thus, country j’s imports from i in time
period t in logarithmic form are expressed by the following equation:
lnxijt = α0 + α1 lnGDPit + α2 lnGDPjt + α3 ln dij + β1contiguityij (3.1)
+β2languageij + β3colonyij + β4countryij + β5conflictijt
+β6 ln immigrantsijt + ft + ǫijt
Country products GDPit and GDPjt are used to control for economic size, and shipping
distance dij is the commonly used proxy for transport costs. The next six variables describe
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the intensity of cultural and social linkages between countries i and j, ft stand for the year
fixed effects, and ǫijt is the residual term.
Countries that share a land border, reflected by a dummy variable contiguityij equal to
one, are usually better informed each on the other’s trading opportunities and consumer
preferences, making mutual trade less costly. A common history, either as members of the
same country or same colonial empire, increases the knowledge of partner’s institutions and
business practices, and reduces international trade costs. These aspects are captured by
the binary variables countryij, and colonyij respectively. Improved communication skills
are achieved when both trading parties speak the same language. The dichotomic variable
languageij is employed to control for this feature.
On the contrary, countries confronted in a militarized dispute trade much less at least for
two reasons. Armed conflicts are usually accompanied by various trade barriers imposed
by governments on imports from, and exports to the enemy country. The embargos on
Iraq and Yougoslavia during the 1990s are two examples of such trade-deterring measures.
Secondly, a country’s involvement in an international conflict causes modifications of its
consumers’ preferences and utility function: lower or nil consumption of goods produced
by the enemy. The presence of an armed dispute between two countries is considered in
the model through the introduction of the dummy variable conflictijt.
Finally, bilateral migration has both a trade costs, and a preference effect. Immigrants
bring with them an increased preference for goods from their country of origin, have a
superior knowledge of trading opportunities with partner from their countries of origin, and
are in a better position to seize them. Migration flows in logarithmic form are represented
by variable lnmigrationijt.
Sharing a common border, language, history, harmonious political relations, and ethnic
ties reveal strong cultural and social linkages. Hence, social networks have a favourable
effect on international trade if positive point estimates for coefficients β1, β2, β3, β4, and
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β6, and a negative estimate for β5 are obtained.
Two additional specifications of trade flows are used. One of them consists in adding
importer and exporter fixed effects to equation (3.1):
lnxijt = α0 + α1 lnGDPit + α2 lnGDPjt + α3 ln dij + β1contiguityij (3.2)
+β2languageij + β3colonyij + β4countryij + β5conflictijt
+β6 ln immigrantsijt + FEi + FMj + ft + ǫijt,
Note, that trade equation (3.2) is a stylized version of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s
expression of bilateral trade flows. Indeed, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive ag-
gregate trade between countries i and j from a theoretical model of trade with nationally







where Yi and Yj are countries’ internal products, Yw is the world product, Tij are bilateral
trade costs, and Pi and Pj are exporter and importer price indices respectively. Using
an appropriate trade costs function and country fixed effects for difficultly measured price
indices, and taking logarithms, one reaches equation (3.2).
The other trade specification employed below consists in replacing country GDPs in
(3.1) by country fixed effects:
lnxijt = α0 + FEi + FMj + α3 ln dij + β1contiguityij + β2languageij (3.4)
+β3colonyij + β4countryij + β5conflictijt + β6 ln immigrantsijt + ft + ǫijt.
The data employed in this paper covers the period from 1988 to 2000 between 168
importing and exporting countries. Table 3.2 gives the source of the dependent and ex-
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Table 3.2: Dependent and independent variables: data sources
Variable Definition Source
Dependent variables
xij aggregate bilateral trade NBER-UN Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey html)
mij bilateral trade of all non-cultural goods NBER-UN Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey html)
mlij bilateral trade of selected non-cultural
goods l
NBER-UN Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey html)
ckij bilateral trade of selected cultural
goods k
NBER-UN Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey html)
gij bilateral trade of non-cultural goods,
except those with cultural equivalents
NBER-UN Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey html)
Independent variables
GPDi, GDPj domestic product World Bank, WDI
dij bilateral distance between capitals CEPII
contiguityij common land border CEPII
languageij common official language CEPII
colonyij past colonial relationship CEPII
countryij parts of the same country in the past CEPII
conflictij bilateral militarized conflict CORRELATES OF WAR
immigrantsij flows of immigrants EUROSTAT
planatory variables in equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.4). Eight independent variables are
used along with year and country fixed effects to explain four distinct types of bilateral
international trade: aggregate trade, aggregate trade of non-cultural products, trade of
selected cultural, and non-cultural goods. Bilateral trade data, both aggregate and at
product level, is obtained from (Feenstra and Lipsey html) database. Countries’ domes-
tic products are from World Bank Development Indicators, distance and various bilateral
linkages are from CEPII’s database, and cross-border flows of immigrants are from EURO-
STAT. Coefficients on all independent variables, except distance and militarized conflicts
which decrease trade, are expected to have a positive sign.
In the next sections we present estimation results for all trade specifications presented
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above, and all four types of international trade.
3.4 International Trade and Social and Cultural Ties
The current section presents estimation results obtained with traditional measures of social
and cultural ties employed in the literature. Bilateral linkages such as common language,
past history, and international migration are used to capture the preferential ties existing
between the trading countries. The difference of their importance for different types of
goods is also emphasized.
The augmented gravity equations presented in section 3.3 are estimated first for aggre-
gate international trade and results are shown in table 3.3. The first three columns give
results for the entire sample of countries. Importer and exporter GDPs are used in the first
column, countries’ GDPs and fixed effects in column 2, and country fixed effects alone in
column 3. The last three columns display results for a sub-sample of importing European
countries for which migration data is available. Columns 4 to 6 correspond to the same
specifications as in the first three columns. All specifications use year fixed effects. All
estimated coefficients are statistically significant and of expected signs.
According to results displayed in table 3.3, social and cultural links have a positive effect
on trade. Sharing a common land border augments bilateral imports by 84 to 139%, while
speaking the same language expands trade by 57 to 79%. Countries engaged in a common
colonial relationship in the past exchange up to three times more than similar countries
that did not. Trade between political entities that formed a single country in the past is
between 48 and 92% larger. A militarized dispute reduces international trade by at least
50%, and a 10% increase in the number of immigrants translates by a 1-1.7% increase in
the value of imports from their home country.
Despite the fact that militarized conflicts are accompanied by a lower domestic product,
and that countries that have a common official language are often neighbors or have shared
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Table 3.3: Total bilateral imports
large sample: all countries sub-sample: migration
Dependent variable: lnxijt lnxijt lnxijt lnxijt lnxijt lnxijt
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept -1.91a 3.35a 11.03a -4.45a 3.25a 13.07a
(0.07) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.91) (0.71)
ln GDP importer 0.79a 0.50a 0.86a 0.73a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
ln GDP exporter 0.86a 0.39a 0.93a 0.30a
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
ln distance -0.77a -1.04a -1.04a -0.68a -0.88a -0.87a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
common border 0.87a 0.61a 0.61a 0.68a 0.12b 0.14b
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
militarized dispute -0.92a -0.68a -0.69a -0.99a 0.08 0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24)
common official language 0.58a 0.46a 0.45a 0.13b 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
colonial relationship 1.06a 1.12a 1.12a 0.95a 0.63a 0.61a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
same country 0.14b 0.40a 0.39a 0.49a 0.65a 0.60a
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
ln immigrants 0.10a 0.17a 0.17a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
importer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 128265 128265 128265 18319 18319 18319
R2 0.597 0.722 0.716 0.732 0.847 0.844
RMSE 1.671 1.39 1.406 1.462 1.112 1.123
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
a colonial relationship, the correlation matrix suggests the absence of multicolinearity in
the previous estimations. It can be argued that the variable same country is redundant
in trade specifications above. Indeed, countries that formed a single political unit at some
point in the past are often also linked by some other bilateral ties. However, results are
126 CHAPTER 3. TRADE IN CULTURAL GOODS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
almost unchanged when this variable is dropped from the regression.
The impact of social and cultural variables on international trade in cultural goods can
be evaluated by estimating a gravity trade equation for distinct types of cultural goods
identified in table 3.1. Comparable production and consumption data at this level are
virtually inexistant. Using country products as in equation (3.1) is not an ideal solution,
as this permits to control for country size, but not for the size of the particular cultural
industry.
An acceptable solution, increasingly employed in the literature, is the use of a fixed-
effects specification. Using importer and exporter effects in the regression allows to account
for large/small industry-level production capacities at the origin and different consumption
preferences at destination. In this way one can control for a demand for, and supply
in cultural goods non-proportional to country’s economic size. Accordingly, the obtained
residual term contains purely bilateral information on the intensity of cultural trade.
A specification without the migration variable is chosen in this case in order to encom-
pass a larger sample of observations.2 Bilateral trade is estimated for each cultural good k
according to:
ln ckijt = a0 + FEi + FMj + a3 ln dij + b1contiguityij (3.5)
+b2languageij + b3colonyij + b4countryij + b5conflictijt + ft + e
k
ijt.
In the case of the cinematographic industry, for example, exporter fixed effects correct
for the large American and Indian film productions, and importer effects adjust for larger
amounts spent on watching foreign movies in developed contrary to developing countries.
For German imports of American movies, the residual term indicates then how much Ger-
man people prefer American movies to other movies unaffected by their general ‘love’ for
2Although the number of observations for aggregate trade between countries for which migration data
is available is relatively large (18319), only a small portion of them exchange individual cultural goods
(951, 4646, 2632, 4206, 5706, 2537, 4747 dyads).
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theater movies and by the large number of exported American films. An alternative illus-
tration can be given for British imports of French wine. Applying the fixed-effect technique,
one adjusts for the large wine production in France and the relatively low consumption of
wine in Great Britain. The estimated residual term shows how much British consumers
prefer French wine to all other wines, given their overall preference for alcoholic beverages.
Because of the large number of observations with zero trade in individual products
and/or product groups, the Heckman two-step estimation method is employed to estimate
trade specification (3.5). First, the probability of a bilateral trade flow to be nil, denoted
as mill’s ratio, is estimated with a probit model. In the second step it is introduced as an
explanatory variable in the gravity estimation, and a significant estimated coefficient for it
points out that results are statistically different from those when nil trade observations are
disregarded. The explanatory variables used in the first step regressions are level values
of the right hand side variables in the gravity equation (in logarithmic form) used in the
second step.
Table D.1 of the Appendix D shows estimates of gravity equation (3.1) for each cultural
product group identified above. The unusually low in absolute value coefficients on standard
gravity variables confirm that GDPs are poor proxies for the cultural industry size. Large
countries are not necessarily large exporters and consumers of cultural goods. Therefore a
fixed-effects specification is preferred in the case of specific products. The joint employment
of country products and country effects does not represent an acceptable solution. The only
reason for which the former are included in the regression is to control for the size of demand
and supply. The use of both variables is justified in the trade model developed by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) because it is specifically designed for aggregate flows.
Table 3.4 gives estimates of equation (3.5) with importer and exporter dummies. Results
are in accordance with those obtained in the literature. However, both distance elasticity
and cultural and social effects on trade vary significantly across products. Recorded mag-
128 CHAPTER 3. TRADE IN CULTURAL GOODS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Table 3.4: Imports of cultural goods: fixed-effects specification





















Dependent variable: ln cijt ln cijt ln cijt ln cijt ln cijt ln cijt ln cijt
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 11.61a 10.92a 9.27a 10.28a 3.00a 5.83a 5.58a
(1.83) (0.89) (0.79) (1.53) (2.12) (1.39) (1.29)
ln distance -0.66a -0.71a -0.87a -0.91a -1.11a -1.29a -0.73a
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
common border 0.15 0.55a 0.89a 0.74a 0.19 0.46a 0.94a
(0.12) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19) (0.14) (0.05)
militarized dispute -0.26 -0.15 -0.71a 0.12 -0.80a -0.98a -0.21
(0.31) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.34) (0.23) (0.16)
common official language 0.57a 1.06a 0.56a 0.91a 0.31a 1.20a 0.19a
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
colonial relationship 0.16 0.67a 0.47a 0.32a 0.25c 0.43a 0.66a
(0.14) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07)
mill’s ratio 0.47b -0.15c 0.21a -0.13c 0.54 1.28a 0.21a
(0.19) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.42) (0.39) (0.09)
importer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
exporter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2548 18783 18139 8391 10666 19216 22744
R2 0.482 0.608 0.593 0.604 0.518 0.621 0.560
RMSE .952 1.053 1.025 1.064 1.777 1.709 1.221
Note: Heckman estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent
respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
netic tapes and other media, newspapers, and periodicals are most sensitive to the distance,
reflecting the important role of news and novelty for the consumption of these products.
Note that to compare the effect of social and cultural variables on cultural and non-
cultural goods one needs to use comparable samples in both estimations. Table D.2 of
the Appendix D shows reference estimates for aggregate non-cultural goods on samples
identical to those used in table 3.4. Land neighbors exchange more cultural goods in
general, but especially printed matter, newspapers and agricultural products. Increased
communication skills, revealed by the same language spoken in the origin and destination
countries, generate more trade in cultural goods than in non-cultural products. A certain
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knowledge of the language employed is a necessary condition for the very act of consumption
for books and newspapers, yielding much larger coefficient estimates. Results in column 6
show that this is also the case of other recorded media: Understanding the words of songs
is probably a purchase criterion. Past colonial relationships, however, matter much less for
cultural goods’ trade. Depending on the product, the trade-inducing effect of a colonial
relationship is between 22 and 60 % of its effect on product with no cultural component.
International armed conflicts have in average a lower trade reducing effect for cultural than
non-cultural goods. Still, the effect is significant only in the case of other printed matter
and recorded sound media. The apparently positive effect for newspapers may come from
an increased demand in information on the enemy.
Compared to results for non-cultural goods, one can conclude that non-significant co-
efficients in table 3.4 are not due to a minor importance of corresponding social or cultural
attributes for trade in cultural goods, but rather to the low number of observations fulfilling
this characteristic in the sample. Because of the particular features of cultural goods, social
networks are more important for trade of this type of products: The presence of cultural
links increases the utility associated with the consumption of goods, and in certain cases
is a necessary condition for their very consumption (e.g. reading books and journals in a
foreign language is conditioned by the knowledge of that language by the the reader). A
volume of trade with cultural goods higher than the forecasts of the gravity model indicates
the presence of more important cultural ties between countries engaged in the exchange.
Hence, overall, international trade in cultural goods is much more sensitive to social and
cultural characteristics that trade in goods without a cultural content. We employ this re-
sults in the next section in order to construct a new measure of the intensity of cross-border
social networks.
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3.5 A Measure of the Intensity of Social Networks
This section addresses the strength of social networks in more detail. A first precision should
be made regarding the definition of social networks. In line with the existing literature,
social networks are identified with social and cultural ties between countries. Thus, strong
cross-border social networks are identified in this section with strong social and cultural
ties linking trading countries, and a more complex measure of social networks is developed
below.
A possible way to quantify the intensity of bilateral social and cultural linkages is to
use trade in cultural goods between the concerned countries. As suggested in section 3.4,
a larger volume of cultural trade than predicted by the model testifies of the existence
of important social and cultural ties. The extra trade in cultural goods compared to the
prediction of the gravity model is a direct indicator of the strength of these ties, and of in-
ternational social networks as well. We produce a two stage estimation method to evaluate
the impact on trade of bilateral social and cultural ties. First, trade in cultural goods is
estimated according to the gravity model and the bilateral residual term is obtained. The
residual in the first stage equation is used in the second stage as a supplementary explana-
tory variable for bilateral trade in non-cultural goods. The coefficient on this residual term
indicates the role of social and cultural ties/networks in international trade.
The first stage consists in estimating international exchanges of cultural products ac-
cording to the trade equation (3.5). The residual term eˆijt is introduced in the right hand
side of the trade equation (3.1) for non-cultural goods:
lnmijt = α¯0 + α¯1 lnGDPit + α¯2 lnGDPjt + α¯3 ln dij + β¯1contiguityij (3.6)
+β¯2languageij + β¯3colonyij + β¯4countryij + β¯5conflictijt + ν eˆ
k
ijt + ft + εijt
We call non-cultural goods all other traded goods except the ones identified as carrying
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a cultural component in table 3.1. The size of the error term of the trade equation es-
timated for the cultural goods reflects the importance of social and cultural ties between
partners other than linguistic, historical, ethnic and geographical ties already considered
in the model, and brings evidence of an additional dimension of social networks. A posi-
tive and significant coefficient ν confirms the assimilation of information and/or of foreign
preferences via the consumption of foreign cultural goods.
Second stage estimates are obtained for each product group used in the first stage esti-
mations (table 3.4) and are displayed in table 3.5 The residual ekijt measures the strength of
bilateral cultural links, other than can those displayed by the cultural and social variables of
the augmented gravity, leading countries to exchange more cultural goods. By construction,
links of different strength can be observed for the same pair of countries depending on the
direction of flows. Thus, links between British producers and American consumers are not
necessarily of equal strength as links between British consumers and American producers.
Used as an explanatory variable for non-cultural products, they reveal a complementary
dimension of social networks. The last line of table 3.5 displays coefficient ν estimates
obtained with different cultural goods trade residual. The seven columns correspond to
estimates using the residual terms obtained for each group of cultural goods displayed in
the same columns of table 3.4.
Thus, a twofold value of imported newspapers unexplained by the trade model (3.5)
generates an additional 13 percent increase of imports of non-cultural goods. An equal
upsurge for foreign films raises non-cultural imports only by 6 percent. Although the
supplied ‘amount’ of culture in the two cases is different at least because newspapers are
cheaper than films, results are directly comparable because the residual term represents the
logarithm of the trade volume the model cannot explain. The difference in unitary prices
is thus captured by the constant term of the second stage estimation.
Using residual terms normed by the average annual bilateral trade flow for each cultural
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Table 3.5: Imports of non-cultural products and cultural ties: cultural trade residual
Dependent variable: lnmijt lnmijt lnmijt lnmijt lnmijt lnmijt lnmijt
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)


























intercept 1.39a 0.13a 0.59a 0.42a -0.85a -1.89a -0.83a
(0.24) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11)
ln GDP importer 0.66a 0.74a 0.75a 0.69a 0.88a 0.84a 0.78a
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln GDP exporter 0.66a 0.74a 0.69a 0.73a 0.79a 0.91a 0.87a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln distance -0.51a -0.62a -0.60a -0.56a -0.80a -0.82a -0.79a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
common border 0.61a 0.59a 0.60a 0.59a 0.48a 0.58a 0.70a
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
militarized dispute 0.23 -0.83a 0.15 0.11 -0.77a -0.59a 0.00
(0.24) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14)
common official language 0.35a 0.21a 0.44a 0.36a 0.76a 0.64a 0.71a
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
colonial relationship 0.36a 0.43a 0.38a 0.17a 0.02 0.16a 0.50a
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
same country 0.97a 0.31a 0.28a 0.26a 0.07 0.35a 0.19a
(0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
cultural trade residual eˆijt 0.06
a 0.21a 0.18a 0.13a 0.07a 0.10a 0.19a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2548 18698 18110 8379 10222 18289 22744
R2 0.772 0.719 0.735 0.741 0.738 0.701 0.758
RMSE .804 1.054 1.004 .929 1.132 1.21 1.172
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively












where Nkt is the number of positive trade flows for each good k, yields very similar results.
Employing this measure in the second stage equation permits to interpret results in terms
of average trade flows in cultural goods.
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At first view, lower coefficient estimates seem to be obtained on most variables when
the cultural residual is added in the regression. However, one needs to keep in mind
that different country samples are used in the second stage. In fact, regardless of the
fact that we account for the proportion of nil trade observations in the panel, table 3.5
shows the role of information and preference compounds enclosed in cultural goods only
for a selection of country pairs and year for which positive exchange in cultural good
is observed. For comparison reasons the augmented gravity equation (3.1) is estimated
separately on each of the samples used in the second stage regressions and results are shown
in table D.2 of the Appendix D. Note that coefficients on most independent variables in
tables 3.5 and D.2 are virtually identical, suggesting that the positive and highly significant
coefficients of the residual term ekijt signal a different dimension of social-cultural links
between countries engaged in international trade not tackled by the other variables of the
model. A statistically significant coefficient ν of the cultural residual term is obtained for
all types of goods used in the first stage. This confirms the fact that the consumption
of foreign cultural goods leads to an increased ‘market intelligence’ and/or a more similar
preference structure in the destination country, both encouraging larger imports.
Estimates of similar size are obtained when the fixed-effects specification is used (see
table D.3 of the Appendix D). As previously, the statistically non-significant or relatively
low coefficients on social variables come from the fact that social dimensions count less for
the particular observation panels used, and not because they count less when the cultural
residual term is introduced in estimations.
A refinement of the previous measure is possible by substracting from the cultural
residual ekijt estimated in the first stage any non-cultural component. One way to do
this is to include residual terms of similar goods without a cultural component in second
stage estimations along with the cultural residual terms. The two methods developed
in this section for measuring the strength and the impact on trade of cross-border social
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networks are summarized in table 3.6. The use of the difference in residual terms for similar
goods with and without a cultural component is another available option to correct the
first measure of social networks discussed above. However, given the functional form of
first stage estimation equations, obtained residual terms represent logarithms of the extra
bilateral trade in specific cultural and non-cultural goods relative to the predictions of the
gravity model. Their difference is thus equal to the ratio of additional trade volumes and
is inconsistent for explaining the logarithm of import values in the second stage. However,
it can still serve as an illustration of the strength of social networks linking the trading
countries.
Table 3.6: Estimating the strength and impact on trade of social networks
1st stage estimation(s) 2nd stage estimation(s)
1. Rough measure of social networks
Explained variable Trade in specific cultural
goods ckijt
Trade in all non-cultural
goods mijt
Estimated equation Augmented gravity with coun-
try FE
Augmented gravity with cul-
tural residual ekijt
2. Corrected measure of social networks
Explained variable Trade in specific cultural
goods ckijt and non-cultural
goods mlijt
Trade in other non-cultural
goods gijt
Estimated equation Augmented gravity with coun-
try FE
Augmented gravity with cul-
tural residual ekijt and non-
cultural residual ulijt
The matching of cultural goods with culture-free equivalents needs a thorough inves-
tigation, because the structure of international trade in reference non-cultural products is
very different from that for cultural goods. Cross-border exchange of culture-free products
depends on countries’ dotation with factors and resources used in their production. Thus,
countries abundantly endowed with wood (e.g. Norvegia, Canada, Russia) are large ex-
porters of paper products. But this has nothing in common with their exports of books
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and newspapers. To control for this aspect, we employ importer and exporter fixed effects
in trade estimations. It is straightforward that non-cultural equivalents cannot be easily
found for all goods used in the first stage. Similar culture-free goods l are identified for
four out of seven product groups (see table 3.1). Non-cultural trade residual terms are
estimated using a similar equation as for trade in cultural goods:
lnmlijt = a˜0 + FEi + FMj + a˜3 ln dij + b˜1contiguityij + b˜2languageij (3.7)
+b˜3colonyij + b˜4countryij + b˜5conflictijt + ft + u
l
ijt
Trade residual terms for each cultural good and its culture-free equivalent are used as
explanatory variables for trade in all products but the ones used to obtain these residuals:
ln gijt = α˜0 + α˜1 lnGDPit + α˜2 lnGDPjt + α˜3 ln dij + β˜1contiguityij (3.8)
+β˜2languageij + β˜3colonyij + β˜4countryij + β˜5conflictijt
+ν˜ eˆkijt + µ uˆ
l
ijt + ft + vij
Accordingly, the residual term obtained for newsprint will be used together with the residual
term for newspapers and periodicals, the one for recorded media with that for blank media,
etc.
Thus, the new coefficient of the cultural residual term νˆ shows the importance of ‘pure’
cultural ties for total non-cultural trade less the specific goods used in first stage estima-
tions, i.e. corrected for any non-cultural ties. The use of cultural and non-cultural residual
terms jointly in the same trade equation also permits to evaluate the role of cultural versus
non cultural ties. Therefore, estimates obtained with equation (3.8) are to be preferred to
previous ones.
Table 3.7 shows second stage gravity estimates with both cultural and non-cultural
residual trade. Positive and highly significant estimates of similar magnitude are found
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for both residual terms. In all cases except alcoholic beverages and equivalent industrial
alcohols bilateral, cultural ties have a larger positive impact on trade than non-cultural
ties. This finding confirms the important role of social networks for international trade and
points out the presence of additional social and cultural ties unrevealed by the variables
traditionally employed in the literature.
Importer-exporter relationships with strongest cultural ties are displayed in table 3.8
shows . The upper part of the table shows country pairs which have the largest cultural
trade residual eˆkijt, and the lower part of the table shows country pairs for which the differ-





ijt is the most prominent. Strong ties are revealed for countries enjoying
or having enjoyed a preferential political relationship, such as Great Britain and Macao
or Cyprus and Malta, but not exclusively. Countries sharing common linguistic, ethnic,
or historical linkages are rare in the table because these aspects are controlled for in the
first stage equation via corresponding dummy variables. About half of large cultural ties in
the second part of the table come from negative values of residual non cultural trade (e.g.
Italy, Portugal, and Spain are net importers of paper and newsprint, causing their exports
to France and Germany to lie below the average bilateral trade flow).
Very similar results are obtained when the exercise is carried on the smaller migration
sample and the logarithm of the number of immigrants is an explanatory variable in both
first and second stage estimations. In this case the sample is reduced to imports of 28
European countries from 168 foreign partners over the same time period 1988-2000. Table
D.4 in the Appendix D displays estimated coefficients for the cultural and non-cultural
residual terms used alone or together in the second stage equation along with the number
of immigrants. Despite the apparent connection between the decision to immigrate and
the existing cultural and social ties between the origin and host countries, the correlation
matrix does not reveal any multicollinearity problems. non-significant estimates on some
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Table 3.7: Imports of non-cultural products and cultural ties: cultural and non-cultural
residual terms
Dependent variable: ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)












Similar non-cultural goods used














intercept 1.78a 0.72a -0.48a 1.69a
(0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13)
ln GDP importer 0.62a 0.83a 0.80a 0.69a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln GDP exporter 0.63a 0.69a 0.81a 0.67a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -0.42a -0.76a -0.76a -0.61a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
common border 0.53a 0.33a 0.49a 0.49a
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
militarized dispute -0.07 -0.80a -0.78a 0.02
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.13)
common official language 0.21a 0.79a 0.53a 0.52a
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
colonial relationship 0.09a -0.03 0.00 0.23a
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
same country 0.59a 0.01a 0.26a 0.21a
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
cultural residual eˆijt 0.16
a 0.08a 0.11a 0.10a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
non-cultural residual uˆijt 0.04
a 0.07a 0.05a 0.13a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2872 6868 11034 9234
R2 0.789 0.758 0.708 0.757
RMSE .728 .997 1.045 .867
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent
respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 3.8: Strongest cultural ties
Type of cultural products
newspapers, periodicals magnetic tapes recored other recorded media alcoholic beverages
Largest cultural residual, eˆijt
Brazil-Chile Indonesia-Norway Ecuador-Brazil Mongolia-Kazakhstan
Denmark-Sweden Indonesia-Sweden Armenia-Greece Russia-Moldova
Great Britain-Macao Hungary-Singapore Cyprus-Malta
Ireland-Slovakia Poland-Urugay
Largest diﬀerence in residual, ∆klijt
France-Italy Hungary-Singapore Chile-Sweden Germany-Greece
France-Portugal Netherlands-India India-Indonesia France-Poland
Germany-Slovenia Netherlands-Indonesia Israel-Ireland Germany-Romania
Germany-Spain Philippines-Germany Turkey-Sweden Germany-South Africa
Note: Exporter and importer pairs corresponding to the upper quartile of each measure are dis-
played.
variables (not shown in table D.4) are due to the very low number of countries sharing a
common language or having fought on opposite sides in an armed conflict in the employed
samples.
Positive and highly significant coefficients of the cultural residual term are obtained
regardless of the type of cultural goods’ trade used in first stage estimations. We add the
interaction term of immigrants with residual trade to test whether the impact of social
networks is reinforced by the means of international migration. Interesting, this affects
the sign and statistical significance of coefficients ν and µ. Except for the case of other
recorded media and alcoholic beverages, the coefficient of the residual cultural trade be-
comes completely non significant when the interaction term is added into the regression.
This is accompanied, still, by a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term.
This permits us to conclude that, apart the two exceptions stated above, social networks
increase trade only when they are complemented by bilateral flows of humans. Differently,
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since international migration is traditionally employed in the literature to account for the
presence of these networks, one can interpret this result as most cross-border social and
cultural ties being heavily dependent on the human factor.
Correcting for bilateral non-cultural ties through the use of corresponding residual trade
values confirms the trade-boosting role of social and cultural ties only in two cases out of
four. Significant and larger coefficients of the residual of non cultural trade are obtained for
magnetic tapes and alcohols. The trade creating effect of social ties measured by extra trade
in other recorded media and newspapers is robust to the introduction of interaction terms.
Contrary to non-cultural ties, the impact of social networks on trade is unaffected by the
flows of immigrants. The corrected method is preferred to the rough use of residual trade
in cultural goods at least for products for which similar culture-free goods are identified.
Therefore, we formulate our conclusion based on the last set of results. The positive role
of social networks expressed by an increased exchange of cultural products established
in this section is not conditioned by international migration between trading countries.
Nor does this phenomenon reinforce their effect on trade. Consequently, the innovative
method developed in this chapter permits to measure aspects of social networks totally
different from those identified in the literature, and shed more light on the way they affect
international trade.
3.6 Information and Preference Effects
Although all the seven product groups mentioned above qualify as cultural, they reflect
different aspects of social and cultural ties. Newspapers and other printed matter (which
includes various advertising materials) have essentially an informational function, while
films, books, recorded media and beverages are more likely to generate shifts in the con-
sumer preference structure. Thus, by comparing the impact on trade of the residual term
for different cultural goods, corrected or not by the residual trade of equivalent products
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without a cultural component, one can judge upon the importance of the information and
preference effects on trade of social networks.
The positive effect on trade in non-cultural products is largest for books, suggesting the
larger preference effect on trade (see table 3.5). The information effect, mainly attributed
to other printed matter and newspapers are only the third and fourth largest in size.
However, if one is to consider the pure cultural component of the measure presented above,
by including the residual trade of similar non-cultural goods in second stage estimations,
the information effect prevails. Note that not only the coefficient on the cultural residual
term is largest for newspapers, but also the coefficient on the non-cultural residual term
is smallest for newsprint rolls and sheets used to produce these newspapers (last two lines
in table 3.7). Still, the corrected measure of social networks can be constructed only for
a limited number of goods. Similar goods without a cultural content are very difficult
to be found for cinematographic films and printed books, two large categories of cultural
products affecting mainly consumers’ preference structure. Eliminating them from the
set of results compared undoubtedly will artificially magnify the role of the information
channel. Therefore we use the first set of results shown in table 3.5 to draw our main
conclusions. This analysis permits to distinguish the two channels through which social
networks have an impact on trade and to reveal the overwhelming change-in-preference
inducing role of social networks.
A different classification of goods can be applied to evaluate results obtained in this
chapter. Rauch (1999) divides goods into three broad categories depending on the relevance
and sufficiency of markets for international transactions. Homogeneous goods are those
traded on organized exchanges and the market mechanism allows successful transactions to
arise in most cases. There is an intermediate category of goods for which a reference price
exists on the market, but supplementary information from other sources increases the odds
of finding a good partner. Additional information about foreign consumers or partners as
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well as enforcement mechanisms are even more valuable for trade in differentiated goods.
According to Rauch, networks represent the alternative of markets and integrate social and
cultural ties, and count the less for trade in homogeneous goods and the most for trade in
differentiated products.
As can be easily seen from table 3.9, Rauch’s affirmation is confirmed for cultural ties
expressed by the residual trade in books, recorded media and food products. Results are
confirmed when residual terms obtained for similar goods with no cultural component are
used in second stage equations. The role of cultural ties in international trade of reference
priced and differentiated products is larger than their role for homogeneous goods’ trade.
The impact of cultural ties acquired via an extra trade of other printed matter, films, or
recorded magnetic tapes is not statistically different for the three types of goods. Printed
matter has a main informational component, while the other two types of cultural goods
have strong preference effects. Estimates in columns 1, 3 and 5 show that the increased
market intelligence of domestic firms and shifts in preferences are equally relevant for
imports of homogeneous and differentiated goods. This represents a weakening of Rauch’s
results.
Finally, information from foreign newspapers seems to be more relevant for international
transactions with homogeneous goods. This result does not contradict Rauch’s statement
regarding the importance of network ties because internationally traded newspapers often
list market rates for organized exchanges. More puzzling is the unexpectedly low effect
obtained for reference priced goods. The difference between the effect of cultural ties on
trade across types of goods is reversed when residual trade in culture-free newsprint is
added to the right hand side of the estimated equation (the lower part of table 3.9). Thus,
in line with Rauch’s prediction, information on foreign partners and markets included in
foreign newspapers and periodicals is particularly important for suppliers and buyers of
more differentiated products.
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The preference channel prevails for trade in differentiated and cultural goods, while
trade in homogeneous goods benefits rather from increased information brought through
cross-border social networks. The largest coefficients of the cultural residual in the case of
the first two types of goods are obtained when trade in books and alcoholic beverages is
used in fist stage estimations. The information effect of cultural ties developed by the cross-
border trade in newspapers, on the contrary, is larger for homogeneous goods. Homogeneous
goods, as suggested by their name, are very similar regardless of their origin and there is no
apparent reason for their international sale and purchase to be subject to uneven bilateral
preferences. Correspondingly, trade in these goods increases with an improved knowledge
of foreign partners, and very little due to altered preferences of consumers.
Thus, differently from most empirical works distinguishing the preference and informa-
tion channels of action of networks, we find evidence of a large preference effect on inter-
national trade of cross-borders social networks, without neglecting the role of information
exchanged through them. With some exceptions, our results confirm Rauch’s statement
that networks are of greater importance for sophisticated products. Similar effects of extra
trade in films, printed matter and recorded magnetic tapes for different types of goods
































Table 3.9: The importance of cultural ties for different types of goods: Rauch’s classification


































Cultural ties variable(s) in second stage esti-
mations:
Cultural trade residual
cultural residual, homogeneous goods 0.07b 0.20a 0.22a 0.24a 0.06a 0.09a 0.08a
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural residual, reference priced goods 0.04a 0.21a 0.19a 0.08a 0.05a 0.09a 0.31a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural residual, differentiated products 0.05a 0.24a 0.21a 0.14a 0.07a 0.14a 0.17a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cultural and non-cultural trade residuals
cultural residual, homogeneous goods 0.08a 0.19a 0.07a 0.04a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
non-cultural residual, homogeneous goods 0.04a 0.05a 0.04a 0.15a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cultural residual, reference priced goods 0.10a 0.06a 0.12a 0.16a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
non-cultural residual, reference priced goods 0.04a 0.05a 0.11a 0.18a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural residual, differentiated products 0.14a 0.06a 0.17a 0.13a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
non-cultural residual, differentiated products 0.07a 0.09a 0.03a 0.09a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels.
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3.7 Conclusions
A measure of the intensity of the social networks from the trade with cultural goods is
developed in this chapter. Results indicate the presence of bilateral social and/or cultural
linkages other than those identified in the literature and which matter for international
trade in general. Trade with cultural goods is an important interface for the assimilation
of information about foreign markets and preferences. The measure developed here is
preferable to dischotomic variables usually used in empirical studies, as it shows not only
the presence or not cultural ties, but also quantifies their strength.
The simple consumption of the foreign goods with a cultural component generates shifts
in the structure of the preferences, but also contributes to a superior information on foreign
partners and markets. The preference effect of social networks on trade, expressed by a
larger positive coefficient for the cultural and social ties measure obtained from the extra
trade in books and agricultural products, exceeds the information effect.
The literature on trade and networks suggests that markets are least sufficient and net-
works are of greater importance for trade in sophisticated products. Using Rauch (1999)’s
classification of goods into homogeneous, reference priced and differentiated goods, only
partial support of this affirmation is found. Only for three out of seven groups of cultural
products the role of social and cultural ties for trade in reference priced and differenti-
ated products is larger than their role for homogeneous goods’trade. Similar effects for
the three types of products are obtained in three out of seven cases, encouraging a further
investigation of this affirmation.
Chapter 4
Migrant Associations, Trade, and FDI
4.1 Introduction
Regardless of the increased integration and globalization marking the present-day world
economy, cross-border trade is achieved at non-negligible costs. According to Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) these amount to a 74% tax equivalent for North-North trade. This
figure includes all directly observed and inferred border-related trade barriers, and breaks
down as follows: 21% transportation costs (both in terms of freight and time), 8% policy
barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers), a 14% currency barrier, and 17% inferred trade
costs, such as information costs, contract enforcement costs, legal and regulatory costs, etc.
(1.74 = 1.21× 1.08× 1.14× 1.17). Despite the recent innovations in technology associated
with lower transport costs, authors estimate that the latter represent the largest share of
international trade costs. With today’s global trade liberalization the friction induced by
tariffs and NTB shrinks and the gain in trade associated from their elimination is reduced.
Barriers relative to the use of different currencies in the importing and exporting country
are large, but very difficult to reduce due to major associated macroeconomic costs.1
1Developing and transition countries have linked their domestic currency to a hard foreign currency and
reduced exchange rate volatility almost exclusively in periods of harsh economic problems. The European
monetary union was reached at a high cost and after a long history of economic integration.
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The present chapter focuses on the last type of trade costs in the above decomposition
and second in terms of importance. Rauch (2001) identifies them with information and
partner search costs, and costs relative to the enforcement of contracts and agreements.
Institutional costs, i.e. additional costs arising because of the poor quality of domestic
importer and/or exporter institutions, and the resulting risk and uncertainty with regard
to the outcome of international transactions also enter this category (Anderson and Mar-
couiller (2002)). As suggested by their name, hidden transaction costs are not easily quanti-
fied or even revealed, and make international trade contracts more time-demanding, harder
and costlier to accomplish than domestic ones. Inferred or hidden trade costs have been
less explored by the literature, but their contraction, if reachable, may represent a major
(or even the main) trade enhancing factor.
A possible way to quantify these costs is to consider international migration. There
is a recent and expanding literature showing that international transaction costs are gen-
erally lower in the presence of large flows or stocks of immigrants. The intuition behind
is straightforward: Immigrants carry their increased knowledge on the country of origin
to the host country. From this point of view, international migration can be viewed as a
transfer of information. Countries who receive immigrants also import their knowledge of
opportunities, practices and tastes in the origin countries. Migration per se is often used
to control for cross-border social (and even business) networks. However, this literature
does not consider the organized activity of immigrants in the host country.
We propose a different view of migration in this chapter. The classification of networks
into business and social introduces by Rauch (2001) and a number of other authors can be
transposed to international migration. Social networks refer to common linguistic, ethnic,
religious, historical ties. But this is exactly the case of immigrants. Therefore, one can
use immigrants as a proxy for the strength of social ties. Differently, business networks
refer to links existing between firms. Rauch and Trindade (2002) consider the overseas
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Chinese network, Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998), and Head and Ries (2001b) focus on
the case of Japanese keiretsu operating across national borders, while Combes et al (2005)
study the links between plants belonging to the same business group inside France. A
central issue to all these literature is the presence of organized structures. The capacity of
immigrants to organize in the host country, define common goals, raise funds, and undertake
joint actions in the benefit of their home country is revealed by the creation of migrant
associations in the host country. The latter can therefore be used as a measure of the
intensity of business networks. The approach adopted in this chapter consists in the joint
use of data on immigrants and migrant associations to quantify the impact of social and
business networks on the foreign trade and foreign direct investment in the case of France.
4.2 Networks, Immigrants, and Migrant Associations
The existing literature (Rauch (2001), Combes et alii (2005)) suggests that hidden border-
specific costs are greatly reduced in the presence of networks linking individuals or firms
in the importing and the exporting country. Cross border networks can by divided into
business and social. The former refer to preferential linkages between trading firms, while
the latter designate similar characteristics of individuals (consumers and employees) in the
two countries. The magnitude of information, contract enforcement and related costs can
therefore also be inferred indirectly from the strength of social and business linkages.2
Members of a social network can acquire information about a firm or product in the
origin or host country at a low [or zero] cost since they speak the local language, can learn
about economic risks and opportunities from their family and friends, or rely on their own
2The term strength is preferred to the presence of networks or linkages in order to emphasize the fact
that networks differ in intensity and their effect on trade. The presence or absence of networks therefore
provides insufficient information to draw unbiased conclusion. Moreover, the absolute absence of networks
is very rare and corresponds to a network of null strength; selected individuals form all countries share at
list some kind of common characteristics (e.g. English speaking people exist virtually in all countries of
the world).
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past experience. Usually, they have a more pronounced preference for goods produced in
their country of origin, but can also influence the consumption patterns of family members
and friends in favor of either origin or host country. As an illustration, a Vietnamese
immigrating to France will tend to consume more Vietnamese products than an average
French person. But he may also initiate his French friends to the consumption of products
specific to Vietnam, as well as persuade his friends and family members back in Vietnam
to purchase French products. Consequently, strong social cross-border networks translate
overall into increased bilateral trade flows between the countries of residence of individuals
in the network.
Networks formed by firms perform two main functions. As in the case of social net-
works, they permit a better information of members on potential partners, unavailable
on the market or available at a higher cost. In this way business networks contribute to
the reduction of information and partner search costs for its members, and a correspond-
ing increase of their profits on foreign markets (Casella and Rauch (2003)). A second
function specific to business networks is to facilitate the punishment of opportunistic be-
havior usually accomplished via well-established enforcement mechanisms. However, the
desired result can be achieved also implicitly through a full spread of information about
members within the network. The non respect of contractual stipulations by a member
is quickly learned by other members of the network, which strongly reduces the chances
of the former to find a partner inside the network (Greif (1993), Hsing (1999), Anderson
and Young (2002)). When networks comprise firms or organized structures from different
countries, cross-border trade is affected. Following the previous example, a French resident
of Vietnamese origin can persuade its French employer to engage into increased business
contacts with Vietnamese partners, given the low cost at which he can supply relevant skills
and information on those partners. Furthermore, Vietnamese immigrants settled in France
can create an association in charge of the development and implementation of different
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programs in Vietnam, the diffusion among the French business community of information
on business opportunities in Vietnam, the matching of partners from the two countries etc.
In either case the development of bilateral ties between organized countries will benefit
mutual trade.
We have concentrated so far on the impact of cross-border networks on trade. The
literature on foreign direct investment suggests that the above discussion can be safely
extended to firms’ investment decisions. Recently, Portes and Rey (2005) have shown, using
data on bilateral telephone traffic, that informational barriers are important in determining
cross-country capital flows. Information, search and contract enforcement costs are known
to matter as well for decisions to invest abroad. Lower costs increase potential profits
and attract investors. Possessing a cost advantage, members of a business network have
a higher incentive (can obtain a higher profit) to invest in countries of origin of other
firms from the network than outsiders. Alternatively, they can explore this opportunity
by serving as intermediary for an interested outside firm. On both occasions networks
generate additional FDI. The existence of a strong social network is favourable mainly for
exports-substituting tariff-jumping foreign direct investments. The awareness of goods that
are to be produced locally, the brand, or the company in the host country, as well as the
similarity in consumer tastes and preferences between the host and origin country are a
premise for the acquisition of a larger market share by the investor. It will reinforce the
probability of the FDI operation to take place in the first place, but may also determine
the firm to invest a larger amount.
Once the importance of networks for trade and foreign direct investment established,
the question arises of how to quantify networks and evaluate their effects. The presence of
historical, ethnic, religious, or linguistic links, all testify in favor of existing social networks.
Most empirical trade studies account for these aspects by using relevant dummy variables.
However even using quantitative variables, such as the percentage of population in each
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country speaking a common language or with an identical ethnic background, one needs to
make additional assumptions in order to construct a unique measure of the intensity of social
networks. A particular case when all or most of these characteristics are reunited is that
of migrants. Accordingly, bilateral flows and stocks of immigrants are a good instrument
of the unobserved networks’ strength. There is a growing recent literature illustrating the
pro-trade effect of migration using a gravity type framework. Authors also disentangle
between the preference and the information effect on trade. Combes et alii (2005) write:
“Presumably, the preference effect takes place for networks created and maintained by
individuals at the destination of the trade flow only (i.e. on imports). By contrast, migrant
networks at the origin of the trade flow (i.e. on exports) and firm networks are both origin
and destination should encompass information effects only.”
Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998) find support for both information and preference
channels. They attest the existence of a preference for home country products by showing
that immigrants increase imports substantially more than exports. Dunlevy and Hutchin-
son (1999) find support for the pro-import effect alone, especially for down-stream and
highly differentiated goods during the early periods of mass migration to the US. Their
result confirms the importance of the preference channel or “taste linkage” for international
trade.
More recent studies support the dominance of the information channel over the pref-
erence channel. Rauch and Trindade (2002) establish this conclusion in the case of the
worldwide Chinese networks and find that this effect is particularly large for trade in dif-
ferentiated products. They explain that for these goods networks provide information
unavailable on the market place. They reject the preference channel because some coun-
tries with a large Chinese population don’t have China as a trade partner at all. Girma
and Yu (2002) support the idea that immigrants improve trade through their superior
knowledge about foreign markets and different social institutions rather than their busi-
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ness connections or personal contacts in their home countries. They use recent UK data and
show that immigration from non Commonwealth countries to UK, contrary to immigration
from Commonwealth countries, has a positive and significant export-enhancing effect. Au-
thors attribute these results to the fact that knowledge brought by immigrants from former
colonies do not bring with them any new information that can help substantially reduce
the transaction cost of trade between their home countries and the host nation. Combes
et alii (2005) consider trade between French regions and reach similar findings. Authors
show that the preference effect has been overestimated by the earlier literature. Finally,
Herander and Saavedra (2005) complement this literature by revealing the positive relation-
ship between American states’s populations of immigrant groups and the volume of state
exports to the home country, and emphasizing the role of proximity of ethnic networks.
Business networks are much less revealed by the data. Rauch and Trindade (2002)
use data on ethnic Chinese population shares to evaluate the trade-creating effect of the
overseas Chinese network. Similarly, Gao (2003) and Bandelj (2002) employ population
shares of ethnic groups in the investing country to examine the role networks in interna-
tional investment. In fact, all these papers use population shares as proxy for both social
and business networks without separating the two types of ties. Differently, Belderbos
and Sleuwaegen (1998), and Head and Ries (2001b) consider the specific case of Japanese
keiretsu operating across national borders, much resembling the relationship between the
parent-company and its subsidiaries. Authors show that inter-firm relationships between
Japanese firms in a vertical keiretsu play an important role in export behaviour. Belderbos
and Sleuwaegen (1998) show that subcontractor firms were able to expand components
exports by supplying the European manufacturing plants of their parent firms, while Head
and Ries (2001b) show that firms who increased their manufacturing investment overseas
also tended to increase exports. Other studies on international trade and business networks
refer to domestic business groups such as keiretsu in Japan (Spencer and Qui (2001)), and
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chaebol in Korea (Feenstra et alii (1997), (1999)). Combes et alii (2005) measure business
networks by the number of financially-linked enterprises, and find that business networks
are more important than social ones for trade between French regions.
A different measure for cross-border business networks consisting in the number of asso-
ciations established by immigrants in the host country is proposed in the present chapter.
Migrant or home country associations can be interpreted as the organized aspect of interna-
tional migration. The establishment of such organisations indicates the ability of migrants
to associate into organized bodies (juridical persons), as well as their will to participate
in economic transactions involving their country of origin. Therefore, despite their ethnic
character, migrant associations reflect the intensity of business rather than social networks.
Using flows of immigrants to control for social ties between countries along with mi-
grant associations permits to separate the social and business aspect of cross-border ethnic
networks. Correspondingly, one can adopt a different terminology and refer to business
and social networks as organized and, respectively unorganized. From this point of view,
international migration can be considered as a two-stage phenomenon. First, there is the
arrival of immigrants in the host country associated with an inflow of information on ori-
gin countries. Secondly, organized structures (migrant associations) may be established to
assure direct contacts, intermediation, and even direct participation in bilateral projects.
The specific way in which networks distort trade and FDI is modelled in the next section.
4.3 The Model
In this section we model bilateral South-North trade and North direct investment in devel-
oping countries from the South in the presence of social and business cross-border networks.
More precisely, in our case the North se represented by a single country: France.
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4.3.1 A Trade Model with Social and Business Networks
We derive a model in which trade flows in general, and developing countries’ exports to
and imports from France in particular, are expressed as a function of bilateral social and
business linkages connecting the exporting and importing countries. It is based on the
stylized version of the standard new trade theory model introduced by Fujita et alii (1999),
and extended by Redding and Venables (2004) takes into account networks effects.
The R countries of the world economy exchange locally produced goods with each other
at some positive trade costs. There are two types of countries, one rich or industrialized
country and R − 1 developing countries, labelled accordingly North and South. There
are two sectors, a manufactured sector with an aggregate good M and an agricultural
sector with a numeraire good A, but only the former is exchanged internationally. Firms
in the manufactured sector in both industrialized and developing countries operate under
increasing returns and monopolistic competition.
On the demand side, manufactured products are differentiated across firms and used
both in final consumption and as intermediary inputs. There is a constant elasticity of
substitution σ for each pair of manufactured goods regardless of their origin. As a conse-














A1−µ, σ > 1. (4.1)
ni is the number of manufactured varieties produced in country i, and xijr is country j’s
demand for each variety r of the manufactured good produced in i. At the equilibrium all
manufactured varieties originating from i are demanded in country j in equal quantities.
Accordingly, for each importing country j we have a global price index Gj defined over
the price of all varieties of the manufactured good produced anywhere on the globe and












Symmetry applies as well to the price of products: All manufactured varieties from the
same origin country are sold at a unique price pij to importing country consumers.
All countries spend an equal share µ of their expenditure E on manufactured products,
and the 1− µ remainder on the agricultural good:
Ej = GjMj + pAjAj, (4.3)
where pAj is the price of the locally produced and consumed agricultural good Aj. The
budget contraint for the manufactured sector alone faced by the importing country can
then be expressed as follows:
R∑
i=1
nixijpij = µEj. (4.4)
Country j’s total expenditure on goods produced in i is the sum of its expenditure on
each variety produced in that country weighed by a probability function θij of firms from
the two countries to contact each other, and sign a contract. Although consumers from the
North may demand a large amount of a particular manufactured variety produced in the
South country i, firms from the North may not be able to satisfy it entirely because of the
difficulties in contacting relevant partners in i and/or reaching a mutual agreement. Thus,
North’s imports from and exports to a partner in the South are equal to:
mij = θijnipijxij. (4.5)
The volume of manufactured sales of all firms in i to each location j are obtained by
maximizing the first term of the utility function (4.1), corresponding to the utility level
associated with the consumption of manufactured products, under the budget constraint
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We assume mill pricing for all varieties, and an identical structure of trade costs for each
pair of countries. Under these conditions the price at destination is equal to the product of
the mill price pi and bilateral trade costs Tij. Substitute equation (4.6) in trade equation









Note that equation (4.7) holds for all types or trade, including South exports to and imports
from the North. Grouping importer and exporter specific terms of the right hand side
expression of (4.7), and taking logarithms on both sides:
lnmij = FEi + ln θijT
1−σ
ij + FMj. (4.8)
Adopting the terms introduced by Redding and Venables (2004), FMj = µEjG
σ−1
j repre-
sents importing country’s market capacity, and FEi = nip
1−σ
i exporting country’s supply
capacity. Without any additional knowledge on the elasticity of substitution σ one cannot
directly measure supply and market capacities. The use of country and partner fixed effects
as Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Redding and Venables (2004) permits the empirical
estimation of bilateral trade costs from equation (4.8).
We consider five elements of trade costs: transportation costs proportional to the phys-
ical distance dij, policy costs expressed by the ad-valorem import tariff tij in country j
on products from i, costs relative to the overall domestic economic and political situa-
tion, instrumented by the foreign aid received by countries, Si/j, and the participation in
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ω(1 + Iij)(1 + Cij). (4.9)
Positive institutional and armed conflict costs are assumed only for South countries. There-
fore, depending on the type of trade flows explained, these costs are specific to the importing
or exporting country. For French exports to the South we have Si/j = Sj and Wi/j = Wj,
while for French imports from developing countries Si/j = Si and Wi/j = Wi. The last two
types of costs in equation (4.9) are expressed in terms of tax equivalent and are therefore
included in a form similar to tariffs. Information and contract enforcement costs, as well
as the probability of firms from countries i and j to meet and sign a trade contract are
log-linear functions of the strength of network ties. Unobservable cross-border trade costs
decrease, while the probability value θij augments in the presence of strong social and
business networks:
1 + Iij = exp(SNij)
ν exp(BNij)
δ,





SNij and BNij measure the intensity or strength of social and respectively business net-
works between countries i and j. Network variables enter the trade costs equation with
negative coefficients ν, δ, ζ, ξ, and ψ, but have a positive impact on trade. Plug equations
(4.9) and (4.10) into (4.8) to reach the final trade specification:
lnmij = FEi + FMj + ρ(1− σ) ln dij + (1− σ) ln(1 + tij) + η(1− σ) lnSi/j (4.11)
+ω(1− σ)Wi/j + [ξ + ν(1− σ)]SNij + [ψ + δ(1− σ)]BNij.
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Equation (4.11) applies to all types of bilateral trade, including North-South trade flows in
either direction, and is a central identity tested in this chapter.
4.3.2 A Model of FDI with Network Effects
In this section we derive a simple location choice model with inspired from the large empiri-
cal FDI literature. The explained variable in our model is the number of French subsidiaries
operating in a developing country j during a each period (year) t, Njt. This number is
the outcome of a cumulative investment process starting at some point t0. French firms’
decision to invest in any period t > t0 is a discrete choice made among the R−1 alternative
locations. There is a total number cjt of alternative investment options that French firms
can undertake in each country j in period t. We allow cjt be greater than unity in order to
reflect a more realistic investment behaviour. Firms can make a green-field investment or
acquire an existent domestic capacity in one or more locations inside the same country op-
erating in the same or different sectors. Each location j and project s offers a time-variant
profit πsjt:
πsjt = Ujt + esjt, (4.12)
which can be expressed as the sum of a function Ujt of some country specific observable
characteristics Xjt and transaction costs τjt, Ujt = bXjt +βτjt, and an unobservable advan-
tage of each project esjt. We drop the origin specific subscript i as there is a single investing
country, the North, but one should keep in mind that transaction costs are truly bilateral.
Firms invest when profits exceed some country specific threshold value π∗jt, corresponding
to the fixed cost of the investment. In the absence of project specific observables, the
probability of a company from the North to invest in any project s in the South country j
is constant across investment projects and given by:
Prsjt = Prob(bXjt +βτijt +esjt > π
∗
jt) = 1−Prob(esjt ≤ π
∗
jt−bXjt−βτijt)) ≡ Prjt. (4.13)
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The number of distinct investments operations in that particular developing country is




Prkjt = cjtPrjt, (4.14)
and is equal to the country-level probability with which projects yield profits superior to
the threshold value π∗jt, times the number of individual projects. Cumulate Sjt across time
to obtain the number of subsidiaries functioning in each Southern country and any time
period:
Njt = Nj,t0 +
t∑
l=t0




The fixed cost π∗jt as well as the number of a country’s investment projects cjt are linear
functions of country specific characteristics, the same which shape profits πsjt. Thus, the
number of subsidiaries of firms from the North operating in the South country j during
any period is simply a function of observables Xjt, transaction costs τjt, and the number
of subsidiaries operating at t0, Nj,t0 .
Location specific observable characteristics Xjt include standard variables employed
in the FDI literature, as the size of the host market, and local operational costs, but
also variables describing the general framework of host countries. Similar to the trade
model presented in section 4.3.1, foreign aid is employed to portray the global economic
environment, and the participation of countries in armed conflicts to appreciate the internal
political stability. Network effects are introduced through bilateral transaction costs:
τjt = τ(dij, SNijt, BNijt). (4.16)
Investment-related costs are less burdening when the origin and host country are connected
by strong social and/or business ties. This comes through the same channels as in the case
of cross-border trade, i.e. lowering information and contract enforcement costs associated
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with investment projects in each South country. In line with the empirical literature, firms
also tend to invest less in distant countries. One reason explaining this phenomenon is that
many bilateral linkages such as similarity in institutions, practices, or tastes, and trust
decrease with distance. In addition to that, direct supervision of subsidiary’s activity by
the parent country is achieved at higher costs when the former are situated in faraway
countries. For these reasons we include distance proportional costs in the decomposition
(4.16) of transaction costs.
The number of subsidiaries owned by enterprises in the North and functioning in the
South country j in period t can be expressed by:
Njt = N (Nj,t0 , Xjt, dj, SNjt, BNjt) ≡ N (Zj,t) . (4.17)
We denote by Zj,t the set of independent variables in (4.17). This is the second relationship
studied in the empirical part of this chapter. However, a proper choice of the starting period
t0, such that Nj,t0=0, induces the irrelevance of the first variable on the right hand side
of equation (4.17). Note that the explained variable Njt takes non-negative integer values,
requiring an adequate functional form. Positive integer values of Njt are obtained assuming






where λ represents the conditional mean of the distribution, and is log linearly dependent




















where α is the overdispertion parameter. In section 4.5 we test which of the two models
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offers a better fit of the employed data.
4.4 The Data and Stylized Facts on Migrant Associa-
tions
The data used for the empirical application comprises French exports to and imports from
seventeen developing countries, as well as investments of French companies in these coun-
tries from 1980 to 2000. Trade data comes from Feenstra and Lipsey’s (html), and covers
trade flows at SITC 4-digit level. Data on French subsidiaries is from the 2002 version of
the database constructed by the Direction of Foreign Economic Relations (DREE) of the
French Ministry of Economics and Finances. For each French subsidiary, it provides the
year of the beginning of activities abroad, the host country, and a number of additional at-
tributes. We compute the number of average-size French affiliates in each country and year
using the number of local employees in 2000 as weights. Annual flows of immigrants from
the considered 17 developing countries to France is from EUROSTAT. We use an original
and entirely new data base on home country (migrant) associations settled in France, which
we present below. Data on GDP, per capita GDP, and foreign aid is obtained from the
World Bank’s Development Indicators. Unweighted average import tariff rates computed
by the World Bank on the basis of data supplied by WTO and UNCTAD are used. Bilateral
distances are the distances between Paris and the capital cities of the selected countries.
Whether trading countries have been or not engaged at any time period into a militarized
conflict is documented from the “Correlates of War” database (SOURCE).
The final version of the French data base on migrant associations (bsta), also known
as organizations of international solidarity emerged from migration (OISM), used in this
chapter has been released in 2005 and has not been previously employed in economic stud-
ies. OISM are non-profit associations created by immigrants settled in France or their
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descendants, and whose activities are at least partially turned toward solidarity with na-
tionals from their countries of origin. They are federated at national level under a common
platform known as the Forum of Organizations of International solidarity emerged from
Migration (FORIM), created in 2002 as an working group of the Co-operation and De-
velopment Commission at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and charged
with the collection of data on migrant associations functioning in France. The creation
of OSIM can not be simply attributed to the reach by ethnic communities of a critical
mass or their maturity. They reveal the true ability of immigrants to organize in their host
country. Indeed, representatives of large and relatively old communities do not necessarily
participate at the establish home country associations. A good illustration of that is the
case of most North-African immigrants established in France (e.g. Tunisians, Algerians).
Contrary to Morrocan natives, these communities are very little, if at all, involved in the
OISM phenomenon.
The data base provides information on the following points: associations’ address, area
and country of intervention, creation date, affiliation to a national or international group,
financing origins, types of activities carried in France and abroad, association’s budget and
its use in France and abroad. For a limited number of associations it also provides the
number of employees, members, volunteers and sympathizers in France and abroad, and
the precise budget. We have employed and complemented the data base elaborated by the
FORIM, mainly with respect to the year of creation and address in France, by contacting
directly the associations for which missing values have been reported in FORIM’s data
base.
The entire data base on home country associations settled in France comprises 198
establishments carrying economic, social, and cultural actions in 48 countries. The oldest
of them was created in the late 1960s. Even though the biggest part of migrant associations
are situated in and around Paris, all country’s largest towns (Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse,
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etc.) host an important number of associations. Because of the non-exhaustive character
of the data, we restrict the sample to associations acting in countries which benefited by
the year 2004 from projects conducted by at least three OISM situated in France. In
this way the sample is reduced to 161 migrant associations and 17 developing countries,
most of them African. In terms of the number of associations, Mali and Senegal are in
the front of the list with 54 and 31 OISM respectively. Largest associations with respect
to the budget used get involved in countries where few OISM are present. Although a
large part of the selected home country associations are quite recent: about half of them
have been created during the last seven years, there are associations existing for more
than three decades. 70% of the OISM function with very small budgets (less than 10000
USD per year), and use the largest part of their funds on programs and projects abroad.
Regardless of the broad areas of intervention, three-fourths of associations carry at least
some kind of economic actions. Their geographical spread inside France is very uneven,
with two-thirds of OISM being concentrated in Paris and its suburbs. Figure 4.1 shows the
evolution of home country associations by country of intervention. Migrants from former
colonies established in France have developed more rapidly their capacity to organize in
the host country. Detailed data on the explained and independent variables employed in
the chapter, including the ones constructed in order to evaluate migrant associations, is
displayed in table E.1 of the Appendix E.1.
4.5 Foreign Trade in the Presence of Ethnic Networks
The trade model presented in section 4.3.1 is applied to recent trade between France and
seventeen foreign partners. The role of social and business networks for the international
exchange of products is assessed via the use of information on international flows of im-
migrants and on the existing home country associations. Migration flows are preferred
to stock values for explaining cross-border social ties from two considerations. New im-
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migrants bring more recent and economically valuable information to the host country,
preserve to higher degree their traditions and consumption habits, and keep tighter con-
tacts with their place of origin than elder settlers. The establishment of home country
associations, reflecting business networks in our case, is more likely to occur in large popu-
lations of immigrant groups, and the use of these variables on the same side of the equation
will generate multicolinearity. We are able to avoid this problem by choosing immigrants
flow data. One should also recall that migration arises mainly from countries with lower
per capita GDP to countries with higher GDP per capita. Foreign nationals settled in
France and associations created by them are thus a relevant proxy of the intensity of ties
between France and origin countries, shaping reciprocal trade in either direction.
Before proceeding to the estimation of migrants’ and home country associations’ effect
on trade, we start with a graphical representation of these phenomena. The positive corre-
lation between trade and migrant associations is reflected in figure 4.2. We divide migrant
associations in two broad groups: those conducting at least some sort of economic projects,
and the ones with purely non-economic activities (social, cultural, etc.). Both types of orga-
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nizations increase the intervention country’s trade with France. Surprisingly, non-economic
associations enhance trade at a greater extend, revealing the importance of cultural and
social ties as a complement for strictly economic connections. The figure shows as well that
cross-border linkages have a stronger exports promoting role. The positive correlation per-
sists when product level bilateral trade corrected by countries’ economic size and distance
is used on the vertical axis. However, in this case similar size effects are observed for both
exports and imports. This outcome is due to the fact that countries’ products overestimate
product level production to a larger extent than consumption values. Overall, regardless
of the fact that migrant associations target with priority actions in the origin country of
their founders, they contribute to the general development of foreign trade.
Next, we use Rauch (1999)’s classification of products into homogeneous, reference
priced, and differentiated to visualize the previous relationship. Rauch (1999) demon-
strates that markets provide sufficient information on relatively homogeneous goods, and
any additional knowledge procured via network ties is unlikely to alter trade patterns.
Differentiated products, on the contrary, increase their odds of being exchanged between
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partners connected by social and business networks. According to figure 4.3, the effect
of migrant associations, i.e. business ties, on trade varies with respect to products’ level
of differentiation. Cross-border business networks established via migrant associations in
France have the largest positive impact on origin countries’ imports of French homogeneous
goods and exports of their differentiated products to France. Thus, for the selected sample
of countries, Rauch (1999)’s statement is verified by exports alone. The opposite result for
developing countries’ imports from France can be the result of the concentration of business
contacts in France developed by the means of home country associations in homogeneous
goods’ industries. We are unable to verify this affirmation because of lack of detailed data
on the specific projects and partners of French OISM.
The overall impact of new immigrants from the selected developing countries on their
trade with France is identical for imports and exports (figure 4.4). This exhibits the non-
relevance of the preference channel of ethnic networks for trade, similar to findings by
Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Combes et alii (2005). However, one needs to control
for all possible sources of bias, such as superior trade costs charged on goods imported
from the migrants’ origin countries, which may reject the exclusively informational role of
social networks. On average, immigrants have a small positive effect on trade. But the
effect is different whether country-year pairs for which a migrant association was created
or not are considered. Interestingly, new information brought by immigrants translates
into larger trade of their origin countries with France when it is not provided by new
home country associations. The effect of migrant associations on bilateral trade in either
direction, however, is reinforced with every new association.
As in the case of migrant associations, the affirmation that networks are of greater
importance for trade in differentiated goods is verified only for exports to France. Ethnic
social networks have very similar effects on trade whether homogeneous, reference priced,
or differentiated goods are considered. This reveals the asymmetry of networks formed by
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Note: Gravity adjusted imports (exports) on the vertical axis are computed as the logarithm value
of imports (exports) divided by countries’s GDPs and bilateral distance separating them.
immigrants settled in France. They contribute to the diffusion of specialized information
on potential French customers for products exported by their home country, but only of
general information on the economic environment of the latter.
The estimated specifications of North-South trade are obtained from equation (4.11).
Exports to France are estimated according to equation:
lnEXP ijt = a0 + a1 lnDISTij + a2COLONYij + a3 lnAIDit + a4WARit (4.20)
+a5 lnMIGRFLOWijt + a6MIGRASSOijt + FEi + FTt + ǫit.
The constant term a0 represents the market capacity of France. Variable DISTi represents
the distance between Paris and the capital city of the exporting country i. Since thirteen
out of the considered seventeen trade partners of France belonged to its colonial empire,
we add a dummy variable COLONYi to control for this aspect in the data. AIDit and
WARit are variables describing the global economic and political environment of country
i in period t, and refer to the amount of total foreign aid received by the country, and its
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implication in a militarized dispute respectively. Social and business networks are reflected
by the next to variables in (4.20). MIGRFLOWit denotes annual flows of immigrants to
France, and MIGRASSOit stands for home country associations created by immigrants
from i or their descendants. Exporter and year fixed effects FEi and FTt are added to
control for supply capacity and global shocks. Data on bilateral tariffs are very scarce
for the developing countries, and we use instead the average import tariff. However, this
informations cannot be used in equation (4.20) because of perfect collinearity with time
effects.
Imports of developing countries from France are expressed by:
ln IMP ijt = b0 + b1 lnDISTij + b2 ln(1 + TARIFFjt) + b3COLONYij (4.21)
+b4 lnAIDit + b5WARjt + b6 lnMIGRFLOWijt
+b7MIGRASSOijt + FMj + FTt + εijt.
Right hand side variables are the same as previously, except for the average tariff rate
TARIFFjt of the importing country j. The supply capacity of the French economy is
constant across destinations and reflected by the intercept b0. Country and time specific
effects capture importer’s market capacity and international shocks.
MIGRASSOijt in equations (4.20) and (4.21) can denote different aspects of the home
country associations. We construct the following variables referring to migrant associations:
• Dummy variables for the creation of a migrant association in the current and previous
five years, varying across intervention countries.
• Number of associations created in the current and previous five years, by country of
intervention.
• The number of associations acting in each foreign country in the current year.
• The average budget spent in each intervention country in the current year.
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The second and third sets of variables take positive integer values. The last one is a
qualitative variable because migrant associations in the database declare their budgets
according to nine predefined value intervals. These variables are highly correlated with
each other, and for that reason are used separately in trade and investment equations.
As suggested by figure 4.3, the effect of networks varies with the degree of homogeneity
of traded goods. We divide bilateral trade with France using the classification of goods
into homogeneous, reference priced, and differentiated introduced by Rauch (1999), and
estimate coefficients for exports to and imports from France of a selection of seventeen
developing countries separately for each product group.3 The disaggregate level of employed
trade data is characterized by a large number of zero values. Developing countries import
most of internationally traded French products, while export only a very limited range of
domestically produced goods, most of them labelled as homogeneous and reference priced.
Equations (4.20) and (4.21) are estimated for exports to and imports from France over
the last two decades of the twentieth century. We apply the Heckman two-step procedure
to correct for the uneven distribution on the explained variable. Significant coefficients
on independent variables other than bilateral distance are obtained only for differentiated
products and are displayed in table 4.1. The data reveals that ethnic networks do not play
a significative role for trade in non differentiated products. Partially this is due to the fact
that about half of observations in the sample are differentiated products. Hence, we focus
our discussion exclusively on this category of products.
The first five columns in table 4.1 refer to imports from France, while the last five exhibit
estimates for exports of French products. Tariff data are available only for a limited num-
ber of observations: its consideration reduces the sample by half. Therefore, we disregard
the tariff variable in the expression of imports. All estimations include country, year, and
product specific effects. The first column shows estimates when immigrants alone are con-
3Estimating the model with country, year and product specific effects on a large set as in the present
case becomes very cumbersome.
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sidered. Coefficients on all independent variables are highly significant. Goods produced
in France are shipped to its trading partners included in the sample almost exclusively by
boat, yielding a coefficient on the distance variable larger than unity in absolute value.
Colonial ties display a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that former French
colonies consume almost 2[≈ exp(0.63)] times more products from their former colonizer
than the rest of the countries. Large financial aid from abroad can be simultaneously an
indicator of poor domestic social and/or economic environment, and of on-going reforms
consuming these resources. The positive elasticity of trade with respect to foreign aid sig-
nals their partial employment on the acquisition of products from industrialized countries
including France. As expected, countries engaged into an armed conflict import less. Fi-
nally, the positive and significant coefficient on migration flows confirms that information
bridged through social networks yields higher trade.
In columns 2 to 5 of table 4.1 we add different variables describing the migrant as-
sociations established in France. Coefficients on other variables deviate very little from
their values in the first column. Dummy variables indicating whether an OISM was or not
created in the studied and past five time periods are included in column 2. Significant
coefficients are obtained for associations created in periods t− 1, t− 3, and t− 4. This sets
forth that home country associations become relevant for trade with a delay of two to four
years, the time needed to develop local business contacts in France and the home country.
In the following column we use the current and lagged number of newly created OISM.
Results show that migrant associations start to generate additional trade four years after
they have been founded. The total number of functioning associations at the considered
time period t and their average budget are used in columns 4 and 5. Both measures con-
firm that immigrant-based business networks help French firms to increase their exports to
origin countries. One supplementary association increases imports from France by 1.2%,









































Table 4.1: Trade, immigrants, and home country associations:
differentiated products
Dependent variable: imports from France IMPijt exports to France EXPijt
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln distance -1.18a -1.28a -1.21a -1.28a -1.27a -1.16c -1.54c -1.32c -1.71b -1.57a
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.70) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71)
colonial relationship 0.63a 0.79a 0.69a 0.71a 0.73a 1.10 1.17 1.13 1.10 1.16
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (1.65) (1.66) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65)
ln foreign aid 0.11a 0.15a 0.12a 0.13a 0.13a 0.34a 0.34a 0.35a 0.37a 0.35a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
armed conflict -0.11a -0.13a -0.12a -0.10a -0.10a -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ln immigrants 0.07a 0.07b 0.07b 0.06c 0.05c -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
association created in t 0.033 0.172c
(0.032) (0.089)
association created in t− 1 0.058c 0.222b
(0.033) (0.096)
association created in t− 2 -0.005 0.185c
(0.031) (0.096)
association created in t− 3 0.053c 0.084
(0.032) (0.089)
association created in t− 4 0.097a -0.011
(0.038) (0.095)








































Table 4.1: Trade, immigrants, and home country associations:
differentiated products (continued)
Dependent variable: imports from France IMPijt exports to France EXPijt
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
number of new associations in t 0.022 0.068
(0.015) (0.054)
number of new associations in t− 1 0.006 0.128c
(0.017) (0.068)
number of new associations in t− 2 -0.011 0.076
(0.017) (0.066)
number of new associations in t− 3 0.024 0.001
(0.024) (0.075)
number of new associations in t− 4 0.041c -0.083
(0.024) (0.078)
number of new associations in t− 5 0.004 0.124c
(0.014) (0.074)
total number of associations in t 0.012a 0.068a
(0.004) (0.011)
average associations’ budget in t 0.004a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.004)
country, year, and product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14987 14987 14987 14987 14987 2678 2678 2678 2678 2678
R2 0.489 0.490 0.490 0.489 0.490 0.520 0.523 0.522 0.523 0.522
RMSE .795 .794 .795 .794 .794 1.433 1.431 1.431 1.428 1.430
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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The last five columns of table 4.1 displays estimates for exports to France. Bilateral dis-
tance, foreign aid, and migrant association variables are the only ones for which significant
coefficients are obtained. Less significant results compared to import flows are due to the
large gap in the the number of observations. Indeed, the imports sample is 5.6 times larger
than the exports sample. Social networks do not improve the odds of firms from developing
countries to export their products to the French market, but this outcome is very probably
due to sample selection, and unaffected by the introduction of variables reflecting business
ties. Again, all four types of variables employed present home country associations as a
pro-trade factor. But the effect on exports is larger and faster. Migrant associations begin
to provide assistance to firms in the home in country in the very year they were created.
Any additional association generates in average 7% more of home country’s exports to
France.
When the tariff term in equation (4.20) is also considered, coefficient estimates for
migrant associations drop in significance. Results are shown in table E.2 of the Appendix
E.2 shows that OISM generate additional trade only in the next year after their creation.
The pro-trade effect, however, decreases with the number of founded associations. It can
thus be concluded that direct business contacts provided by organized structures are more
relevant for commercial transactions than information acquired from other members of
one’s ethnic group.
4.6 French Subsidiaries and Cross-border Networks
Similar to the case of developing countries’ trade with France, immigrant-based networks
can influence the decision of French firms to invest abroad. The effect of business and
social networks between the same countries considered in section 4.5, expressed by home
country associations and flows of immigrants, is depicted in figure 4.5. Both types of
ties are positively correlated with the number of French affiliates situated abroad. The
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effect of migration is almost unchanged when host countries are divided into former French
colonies and others, or according to their development level (upper part of the figure). New
information brought by immigrants to France is equally pertinent for investment projects in
ex-colonies and other countries, low and very-low income economies. The effect of migrant
associations, on the contrary, changes a lot across country types. French enterprises possess
increased knowledge and business contacts on countries colonized in the past. Therefore,
services provided by OISM on projects hosted by these countries have little impact on the
final decision to invest. For other countries less familiar to the French business community,
however, this information is particularly valuable. As shown in figure 4.5, this is also the
case of larger-income economies. A possible explanation is reduced number of profit-making
investment opportunities in the less developed countries.
The number of French subsidiaries in country i in the time period t is explained by a
number of country specific observables, distance, and immigrant-based social and business
networks:
lnNjt = β0 + β1 lnGDPjt + β2 lnPERCAPGDPjt + β3 lnDISTij (4.22)
+β4COLONYij + β5 lnAIDjt + β6 lnWARjt + β7MIGRFLOWijt
+β8MIGRASSOijt + υjt.
Host country’s nominal and per capita GDP, GDPjt and PERCAPGDPjt in equation
(4.22), account for the economic size and unit costs at location j. The rest of independent
variables are the same as in trade equations (4.20) and (4.21). We prefer to explain the
number of French affiliates to a discrete choice variable stating whether French firms have
invested in a particular South country or not. The dependent variable Njt permits to
account for the establishment of two or more French subsidiaries during the same year,
and the shutting down of a subsidiary, both phenomena being present in our data. French
affiliates abroad are very different in size: they range from simple representatives to large
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production capacities. To control for this heterogeneity, we consider the number of average-
size French subsidiaries, using 2000 employees as weights, rather than the rough number
of affiliates.
In a locational choice model with the number of subsidiaries as the dependent vari-
able, taking non-negative integer values, we employ count model techniques.4 Parameter
estimates of (4.22) are obtained using maximum likelihood procedures. Table 4.2 displays
4The Njt data are strongly skewed to the right, suggesting that OLS regression would be inappropriate.
Panel specific techniques, however, could not be employed due to the low number of observations in the
panel.
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results obtained with the Poisson model. In column 1 we estimate equation (4.22) with-
out network variables. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and are
comparable to other findings in the literature. Large countries attract a higher number of
French investments. Per capita GDP is an indicator of unit costs in the host country and
enters equation (4.22) with a negative coefficient. Likewise, French firms invest more in
near countries, former colonies, large foreign aid recipients, and peaceful economies. These
results are very robust to the inclusion of ethnic social and business networks. In the sec-
ond column we introduce the social networks variable and get a positive but statistically
non-significant coefficient. Dummy and count variables on the creation of home country
associations and their number are added in the next two columns. For the two sets of
business networks variables, results confirm the positive role of both social and business
networks established by immigrants settled in France on decisions to invest in their home
countries. Still, information and contacts supplied via organized networks prevail in im-
portance. This outcome is similar to the one found by Combes et alii (2005) for trade
between French regions. Unlike trade flows, investment decisions benefit from new migrant
associations starting with the year of their foundation. The last two columns of table 4.2
confirm previous results: strong business networks, revealed by more and larger associa-
tions, increase the investments of French multinationals in immigrants’ home country.
The Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent
variable equals its variance. The poisson goodness-of-fit test displayed in the lower part of
table 4.2, shows that the data rejects this hypothesis. The χ2 statistics gives the deviance
D, equal to twice the difference between the log-likelihood that would be achieved if the
model offered a perfect fit and the log-likelihood of the model under consideration. If the
value of deviance is greatly in excess of the number of degrees of freedom df , the model
is overdispersed due to missing variables and/or non Poisson form. Thus, the ratio D
n−df
significantly larger than 1 in the last row of table 4.2 indicates over-dispersion. This can
4.6. FRENCH SUBSIDIARIES AND CROSS-BORDER NETWORKS 177
Table 4.2: French subsidiaries, immigrants and migrant associations: Poisson model
Dependent variable: number of average-size French subsidiaries Njt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept -12.17a -13.76a -13.91a -15.45a -15.67a -14.79a
(0.42) (0.80) (0.90) (0.91) (0.87) (0.84)
ln GDP 0.97a 1.03a 1.02a 1.06a 1.07a 1.03a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ln per capita GDP -0.64a -0.72a -0.65a -0.65a -0.59a -0.58a
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ln distance -0.45a -0.43a -0.42a -0.39a -0.42a -0.42a
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
colonial relationship 0.36a 0.20c 0.22c 0.34a 0.54a 0.50a
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
ln foreign aid 0.36a 0.52a 0.44a 0.49a 0.49a 0.49a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
armed conflict -0.19a -0.23a -0.29a -0.24a -0.21a -0.21a
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln immigrants 0.031 0.050a 0.043b 0.003 -0.014
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
association created in t 0.234a
(0.037)
association created in t− 1 0.073c
(0.038)
association created in t− 2 0.064c
(0.035)
association created in t− 3 0.019
(0.035)
association created in t− 4 -0.061
(0.039)
association created in t− 5 -0.015
(0.043)
number of new associations in t 0.058a
(0.015)
number of new associations in t− 1 0.026
(0.018)
number of new associations in t− 2 0.039b
(0.018)
number of new associations in t− 3 0.003
(0.024)
number of new associations in t− 4 -0.012
(0.024)
number of new associations in t− 5 0.024
(0.020)
total number of associations in t 0.022a
(0.003)
average associations’ budget in t 0.008a
(0.001)
N 207 97 97 97 97 97
Pseudo R2 0.737 0.715 0.728 0.724 0.731 0.734
χ2 test: goodness-of-fit 1454.00 588.81 537.80 552.70 526.70 516.70
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/(N − df) 6.21 6.54 6.40 6.58 5.92 5.81
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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be also identified by comparing the mean and variance of the the dependent variables Njt.
Indeed, the variance of Njt is nearly 50 times larger than its mean (see table E.1 of the
Appendix E.1). To deal with the over-dispersion we select a less restrictive distribution
function, allowing for the variance to be greater than the mean: the negative binomial dis-
tribution represented by (4.19). The negative binomial distribution arises as a continuous
mixture of Poisson distributions, where the mixing distribution of the Poisson rate is a
gamma distribution. It is especially useful for discrete data over an unbounded positive
range whose sample variance exceeds the sample mean. Since the negative binomial distri-
bution has one more parameter, α, than the Poisson, it can be used to adjust the variance
independently of the mean.
Parameter estimates of (4.22) with a negative binomial model are shown in table 4.3.
When the over-dispersion parameter α is zero, the negative binomial distribution is equiva-
lent to a poisson distribution. Under all specifications, α is significantly different from zero,
confirming that the poisson distribution is not appropriate for our data. Although coeffi-
cient values are slightly different from those obtained with the Poisson model, conclusions
formulated relative to the contribution of business and social networks remain unchanged.
The elasticity of trade with respect to flows of immigrants increases in value, but not in sta-
tistical significance. Coefficient estimates on variables describing home country associations
become less significant. Parameter estimates in column 3 show that migrant associations
have a strong and positive immediate effect on foreign investment, but no lagged effect.
Still, business networks are found to have a stronger impact on foreign direct investment
than social ties. The model confirms as well the positive role of the total number of asso-
ciations and their financial size.
Table E.3 of the Appendix E.2 reports estimated coefficients transformed to incidence-
rate ratios. Incidence rate ratios are obtained by exponentiating β coefficients in the
negative binomial regressions. The reported IRRs represent the percentage change in the
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Table 4.3: French subsidiaries, immigrants and migrant associations: Negative binomial
model
Dependent variable: number of average-size French subsidiaries Njt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept -1.88a -1.79a -1.88a -1.84a -1.88a -1.91a
(0.12) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
ln GDP 0.93a 0.94a 0.90a 0.92a 0.91a 0.89a
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
ln per capita GDP -0.58a -0.62a -0.54a -0.53a -0.48a -0.46a
(0.07) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
ln distance -0.46a -0.37b -0.37b -0.32b -0.36b -0.37a
(0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
colonial relationship 0.37a 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.22
(0.12) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
ln foreign aid 0.37a 0.59a 0.51a 0.53a 0.51a 0.51a
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
armed conflict -0.09 -0.21c -0.26b -0.21c -0.19c -0.19c
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ln immigrants 0.074 0.093c 0.091c 0.055 0.037
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054)
association in t 0.253b
(0.116)
association in t− 1 0.065
(0.115)
association in t− 2 0.048
(0.108)
association in t− 3 -0.056
(0.106)
association in t− 4 -0.131
(0.117)
association in t− 5 -0.078
(0.115)
number of new associations in t 0.048
(0.046)
number of new associations in t− 1 0.015
(0.049)
number of new associations in t− 2 0.051
(0.053)
number of new associations in t− 3 -0.020
(0.066)
number of new associations in t− 4 -0.019
(0.067)
number of new associations in t− 5 0.006
(0.053)
total number of associations in t 0.016b
(0.007)
average associations’ budget in t 0.006b
(0.002)
N 207 97 97 97 97 97
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.140 0.146 0.144 0.146 0.147
over-dispersion parameter α 0.152 0.167 0.153 0.159 0.153 0.149
p-value (0.018) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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dependent variable (the number of average-size French subsidiaries) for a change of one
standard deviation in the independent variable under consideration. Thus, one standard
deviation change in the logarithm value of the immigrants brings a 1.1% increase of the
number of French affiliates in their origin country. Origin specific information carried by
12 [≈ [(1/35.87 ∗ 100)/1.10] ∗ exp(1.58)] new immigrants settled in France generates on
the average one additional French affiliation in their home country. Likewise, it takes 1[≈
[(1/35.87∗100)/1.29]∗0.44] new home country association, or 15[≈ [(1/35.87∗100)/1.02]∗
5.58] functioning associations to raise the number of French affiliates in their home country
by one.
4.7 Conclusion
The recent literature sets forward the positive role of business and social networks on
international trade. Empirically, most studies rely at least partially on the use of migration
data to account for these phenomena. However, very few of them succeed in separating the
two types of networks. The present chapter introduces an innovative way to evaluate the
effect of cross-border networks, and shows that similar effects are observed for foreign direct
investment. Data on the flows of immigrants and their capacity to organize into associations
in the host country are used to differentiate the social and, respectively, business aspect
of ethnic networks. Accordingly, cross-border networks can be labelled as unorganized
and organized. We employ an entirely new data set on French migrant associations, and
study the effect of organized and unorganized ethnic ties on French foreign trade with, and
investment in seventeen selected developing countries over a twenty year period.
A statistically significant effect of network ties if found only for trade in differentiated
goods. Both organized and unorganized immigrant-based networks have a pro-trade effect
on French exports to the selected developing countries. Trade in the opposite direction,
however, benefits only from the knowledge channelled by home country associations, but to
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a greater extend than conjugate flows. The data sets forth that home country associations
become relevant for trade with a delay of two to four years, the time needed to develop local
business contacts in France and abroad. Ethnic networks also provide valuable information
and contacts for French firms’ decisions to invest abroad. Still, as in the case of trade, the
procurement or the relevant knowledge on host countries via organized structures, migrant
associations in particular, is more efficient.
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General Conclusion
The present thesis studies the burden of international trade costs on trade between coun-
tries, and the contribution of two new factors, institutions and networks, in lowering it.
It evaluates the size of overall border-related trade costs, and the extent to which their
reduction can be achieved via regional economic integration. A central place in this dis-
cussion is attributed to non-traditional trade determinants, represented by country-specific
institutions and transnational social and business networks. The latter increase the secu-
rity and contract enforcement in international transactions, and furnish foreign contacts
and information on potential partners, which all translate in reduced costs and uncertainty
of cross-border exchange. This study is important not only for a more thorough under-
standing of a series of phenomena observed in international economics, but also for the
development of specific economic policies assisting countries in the achievement of their
long term objectives.
The work presented in this thesis consists mainly in an empirical analysis of evoked
issues. Still, it takes advantage of recent theoretical advances in international trade litera-
ture. Thus, results and conclusions formulated in the thesis are supported by predictions
of theoretical trade models. For each chapter, we choose a group of countries for which the
set of questions treated in it find particular resonance. Accordingly, regional integration,
trade liberalization and institutional reforms are studies for the case of transition coun-
tries and their West European partners. Cultural aspects of social networks are considered
for a very large geographical span of trading countries. Finally, the role of migrant as-
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sociations, as a form of business networks, in shaping cross-border trade and investment
decisions is investigated for a limited number of French partners from the developing world.
We started our analysis by estimating the magnitude of total border-related costs, and
how economic integration reduces them. Trade both between transition countries, and with
EU members improved remarkably during the last decade of the twentieth century. The
former become more and more similar to their Western partners in many aspects, including
the way to trade. Continuous economic integration in Europe led to an important drop in
regional trade costs, reflected first by the removal of import tariffs. However, as additional
impediments or trade are reduced, important trade creation effects may be observed even
after CEE countries have joined the European Union. A possible quantification of these
effects is to compute East-West trade potentials, i.e. in terms of actual trade volumes.
Differently from traditional research in this field, we use trade within national borders as
reference for international trade, but similar to it estimate trade potentials with respect to
a control group of countries. The underlying idea of this innovative method, presented in
chapter one, is that extra trade arises as a result of lower transaction costs. Convergence of
CEE-EU trade costs to the lower intra-EU level is a primary result of European integration,
and should be exploited in the computation of the associated increase in trade.
Results obtained according to this technique show that there is still place for important
growth in bilateral CEE-EU transactions. They are very robust and confirmed by three
different theoretically compatible trade specifications employed. At the beginning of the
twenty-first century trade between CEE and EU countries represented about half of its
attainable level, suggesting a 100% increase with further EU integration. As for regional
CEE trade, its potential ranges depending on the model between 112 and 175%. And
this is regardless of the strong reduction of bilateral border effects between these countries
achieved during the 1990s. These findings contradict with those of traditional trade po-
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tential models, who claim that East-West European trade has already reached its highest
level. A discrimination test for monopolistic against perfect competition trade models,
based on the estimation of bilateral trade flows with country and partner specific effects,
is also developed in the chapter. According to it, European trade is better replicated with
monopolistic competition trade models à la DSK, and exhibits an elasticity of substitution
of traded varieties equal to three. This outcome complements the exiting literature, which
relies deeply on the share of intra-industrial trade and the presence/absence of the home
market effect to assess the empirical success of perfect and imperfect competition trade
models.
The size of estimated border effects and border-specific trade costs depends on a va-
riety of factors, among which the way in which distances are calculated. We address this
question in more detail in the last annex to chapter one. It discusses the necessity of using
compatible techniques for the computation of distances and the estimation of trade flows.
Trade theory predicts a nonlinear relationship between distance and trade, confirmed by
a multitude of empirical works. This aspect is ignored in the calculation of distances in
trade models that take into account the internal geography of trading countries. Instead
of simply summing weighted bilateral distances separating the different regions of import-
ing and exporting countries, we develop and apply a nonlinear procedure for computing
distances between and within countries as a function of the estimated distance elasticity
of trade. An iterated process of estimation of the distance elasticity of trade, and compu-
tation of distances, permits to estimate the true elasticity value that verifies the nonlinear
correlation suggested by the theory. Our results confirm previous findings on the general
overestimation of border effects in the literature. Defective computation of distances in-
flates border-specific trade costs by a factor of two. Nevertheless, the effect is constant in
time and does not affect conclusions formulated in the first chapter.
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The second chapter treats into more detail the role of national institutions and trade
liberalization in international trade. Recent European integration was initiated by the con-
clusion of regional trade agreement and the progressive reduction of tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers. It is brought to an upper level with the decision of transition countries’ gov-
ernments to improve their domestic institutions. These actions have been largely motivated
by their willingness to join the European Union. Besides the compulsory character of EU’s
recommendations regarding institutional reforms in these countries, included in bilateral
pre-accession agreements, institutional cohesion is required for the good functioning of a
Union with a large number of member countries. Accordingly, changes in the institutional
framework can generate a non-negligible increase of regional trade. We explore this idea
by estimating the impact of the quality of institutions in the origin and destination coun-
try on trade between 25 European countries. A monopolistic model of trade is employed,
which, according to the trade theory test developed in the first chapter, reproduces with
greater exactitude observed trade flows. National institutions, evaluated by different index
measures, are found to be a strong determinant of trans-European trade. The result is
confirmed when we control for endogeneity between trade and several right-hand variables.
Differently from the existing literature, we study as well the two-way causality between
trade and institutions. The pro-trade effect of well-functioning institutions is only a part of
the story. The participation in international trade helps countries improve their domestic
institutions. Like a small number of authors, we show that similarity in home country
institutions increases the extent to which firms engage in mutual transactions. However,
we reach this conclusion by employing a separate variable reflecting institutional hetero-
geneity. Given the specific composition of the sample, we divide institutions in two classes
according to their contribution to the general development of the country, and support of
market activities. To judge on the importance of institutional reforms on trade relative
to that of foreign trade policy, we include data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the
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analysis. Estimation results show that the two factors have effects of comparable size. A
large part of the trade potential predicted in the first chapter can be reached by raising the
quality of institutions in transition countries in general, and of those supporting the market
economy in particular. Finally, using continuous variables for the quality of institutions,
such as the size of private sector or the investment rate, we formulate a number of explicit
recommendations in terms of economic policy.
In the second part of the thesis we investigate the role of a different trade determinant,
transnational networks. Social and business networks increase trade by lowering mainly
information, search, and contract enforcement costs. Social networks benefited from in-
creased attention in the empirical literature due to the fact that they are relatively easy
to quantify. The literature relied mainly on ethnic ties, and the ability to communicate
in a common language. The third chapter of the thesis analyses a new aspect of social
networks. International trade itself can contribute to the development of transnational
social ties. Exchange of cultural goods can increase the awareness on and/or preference
for products from the origin country. Cultural goods (books, music, films, newspapers,
etc.) more than any other products emboby information on the origin market. Trade in
these products is much more sensitive to common ties between countries engaged in the
exchange. The presence of strong cultural and social links is a major factor in the purchase
decision, and increases the utility associated with the consumption of cultural goods. We
employ a simple gravity model to construct a measure of the intensity of the social net-
works from trade with cultural goods. Results indicate that trade with cultural goods is an
important interface for the assimilation of information about foreign markets and prefer-
ences. The simple consumption of the foreign goods with a cultural component generates
shifts in the structure of the preferences, but also contributes to a superior information on
foreign partners and markets. This outcome is confirmed even we adjust for the presence
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of culture-free bilateral linkages, such as the general preference of Americans for British
products. To separate the information from the preference effect of social networks, we
compare the effect of cultural ties estimated for seven types of cultural goods. By their
very nature newpapers and periodicals, booklets, and other printed advertising material
have mainly an informative role, while cinematographic films, books, recorded media, and
agricultural goods are more likely to produce shifts in the preference structure of con-
sumers. Estimation results confirm the importance of both channels in international trade.
The analysis is then carried separately for homogeneous, reference priced, and differenti-
ated goods, and partial support is found for the statement that networks are of particular
importance when markets fail to provide necessary information or enforcement mechanisms.
The recent literature sets forward the positive role on trade of both business and social
networks. Although the two types of ties may alter trade in similar ways, business networks
suggest the existence of organized structures. This difference is employed in the last chapter
to differentiate social from business networks. Transnational business networks help mem-
bers to find profitable trade opportunities through provision of market information, and
increase trust between network members and reduce opportunism by applying contract en-
forcement and punishment schemes. A special dimension of business networks is considered
in the chapter. It relies on a recent and expanding literature showing that international
transaction costs are generally lower in the presence of large flows or stocks of immigrants.
Immigrants increase trade by providing superior knowledge on their market of origin, and
business contacts between firms situated in the home and host country. Moreover, many
ethnic groups living outside their countries of origin create formal and informal associations
that facilitate the contact among businesses situated in the two countries. The capacity of
immigrants to organize in the host country is used to measure the intensity of cross-border
business networks. We employ an entirely new and previously unexplored data set on mi-
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grant associations established in France, and find that their presence affects positively the
decisions of French companies to trade with and invest in their home countries. Compared
to social ties, represented in the chapter by international flows of immigrants, business net-
works have a stronger and more robust effect. Information and business contacts supplied
by unorganized immigrant communities are less important or even irrelevant when these
can be procured via migrant associations.
This thesis elucidates certain aspects in which trade is affected by institutions and
international networks. These two non traditional determinants of international trade
patterns received until recently limited attention from economists. It has been shown
in the thesis that both factors permit to explain a large part of hidden border-specific
trade costs, and thus explain a part of the mystery of missing international trade. The
presence of sound and similar institutions in the home and partner country are comparable
in importance to foreign trade policies, and suggest that trade creation is still possible after
tariffs and non-tariff barriers are removed. Social networks promote trade not only via
common ethnic, linguistic and other ties, but also via information and tastes assimilated
with the consumption of foreign cultural goods. The strength of business networks can
be judged upon the capacity of immigrants to form home country associations in their
country of residence, and their suitability for promoting international transactions upon
the information and contacts they provide to interested parties.
The trade literature considers networks as established phenomena which can vary in
intensity. In microeconomics networks are the outcome of choices made by individuals of
a community, and their emergence is a central issue in their analysis. According to the
definition of social networks in the trade literature, individuals are unlikely to have the
option of forming a network or not, as well as to choose the strength of ties that connects
them. Business networks, on the contrary, are much more close to the definition employed in
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other parts of economics. Actually, firms possess the liberty to enter an existing network or
create one. Enforcement and punishment mechanisms functioning inside business networks
are an evidence of that. The effect on trade might be more complex and even different
than shown in the literature, if this aspect of networks is to be considered. Therefore, a
logical continuation of the literature and of questions treated in this thesis is to develop
a trade model where trading firms decide themselves to participate in a network or not.
An interesting issue that can be investigated by such a model is the reverse causality
between trade and networks. Past foreign trade experiences may be of great importance
when enterprises are free to chose the type of interaction, market or network. But if both
institutions and networks are regarded as the result of some optimization program solved
by economic agents, their interaction demands a thorough study. Attempts to treat this
subject exist in the literature, but they are scarce and detached from the international
trade context. Well-functioning institutions and strong network ties can be substitutes as
well as complements. The outcome depends on several things, among which the incentives
of firms and individuals to improve institutions and form networks (augment profits and/or
utility, preserve or improve the bargaining power parity, etc.) Finally, as shown in the last
chapter of the thesis, a large part of the analysis carried for international trade flows apply
as well to foreign direct investment.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Perfect Competition and Balanced Trade
A country’s income is the sum of revenues from the sales of its products to domestic
and foreign partners. Using notations introduced in section 1.3, and the assumption of
symmetric varieties, the income of country i can be written as:




The first term of the equation gives the value of domestic shipments, and the second term
is the expression on its exports to all foreign partners. Shipping costs are supported by the
importer.
Similarly, a country’s expenditure is equal to the sum spent by domestic consumers for
purchasing national and foreign varieties:




The right hand side of equation (A.2) is precisely the monetary value of the demand for
domestic products plus and total imports.
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Market clearance implies equality between revenues and expenditures:
yi = Ei. (A.3)
Replacing amounts on each side with expressions (A.1) and (A.2), yields equal exports and







an identity also called in the literature as balanced trade. The market clearing assumption
excludes any trade imbalances. The latter are particularly high at industry level even for
very similar countries, and their ignorance may significantly distort results. One should
therefore be cautious about imposing balanced trade especially with disaggregate data.
A.2 Data
The empirical application of theoretically derived trade equations encounters both data
availability and comparability problems. The use of different classifications, definitions
and registration criteria even for such standard economic variables as production and trade
may represent an additional source of errors and biases in results. The latter are yet more
pronounced in the estimation of border effects when internal trade volumes are computed
as the difference between national production and total exports in absence of regional data.
The present study carries over a sample of 25 countries: fifteen ‘old’ EU members
with Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated under a single observation, and ten Central
and East European countries, and a eight-year period from 1993 to 2000. Of the ten
CEE countries of the panel eight have joined the EU in May 2004 and two are candidate
countries scheduled to join the Union as early as in 2007. Two levels of aggregation are
considered: total manufacturing industry, and 27 product industries according to the ISIC
Rev.2 classification.
Data on total manufactured bilateral imports is obtained from the COMEXT (Euro-
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stat) database for trade flows engaging at least one EU partner, and from the COMTRADE
(World Bank) database for intra-CEE trade. GDP in current US dollars are from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank) database. Total manufacturing production
and wages, and expenditure are obtained from the New Cronos (Eurostat) database. In-
dustry level trade, production, and wage data are from the Trade and Production (UNIDO,
World Bank) database, with missing data on production and wage being complemented
with New Cronos (Eurostat) and OCDE data. Trade, production, and expenditure are
expressed in thousand of US dollars, and wages are in thousands of US dollars per year
and employee.
In order to ensure compatibility of different data sources, data has been adjusted by
applying a conversion rate equal to the average ratio of the value from the base source
and the value from the secondary source, and estimated separately for each country on
observations present in both databases.
For every year and country missing production data has been replaced by total produc-
tion multiplied by the average weight of the particular industry in the two preceding and
following years for which data were available.
Industry level expenditures are computed as the sum of demand for domestic goods and
imports from all trading partners, as in equation (A.2).
A.3 Distance Calculation
As simple as it can seem, measuring the distance is not always obvious. This is because
we seek the distance between two territorial units with positive area and non-uniformly
distributed economic activity, rather than between two points. There is some constancy in
the literature regarding bilateral distances: In most empirical studies the distance between
two countries is simply the distance between capitals or largest cities. As for distance
between partners situated within the same country, economists’ views are divided. The
necessity to compute intra-national distances, djj arises from the use of domestic trade,
which includes all commercial transactions between any two agents of the same country.
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The first to introduce internal distance in the estimation of border effects was Wei (1996).
Pioneer work on border effects by McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996), (1997) identify
trade within national borders with trade between Canadian provinces or American states,
ignoring transactions that take place within each sub national unit. Wei himself computes
internal distance as one fourth of the distance between a country’s capital city and that of
its closest neighbor. Wolf (2000) uses the distance between a country’s largest two cities.
Nitsch (2000) takes the radius R of a circle of an area equal to that of the country. Head and
Mayer (2000) develop a similar measure for a particular country geography with producers










Following Helliwell and Verdier (2001), and Head and Mayer (2000), (2002a) we compute
both international and internal distances as the weighted average of inter-regional distances,













and distance inside each region dkk computed according to equation (A.5) by replacing
countries with regions. Inter-regional distances are geodesic distances between the largest
central cities of any two regions. Table A.1 gives internal distances for the countries in the
study computed with (A.5), with 1995 population as weights.
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A.4 European Integration with the EU ‘core’




















1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
EU exports to CEE
CEE exports to EU
intra−CEE trade
intra−EU trade
Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equation (1.28)
for each year with industry level data. Effects for countries with no common
land border or language are represented.
































Note: Border effects are computed using estimated coefficients of equation (1.27)
for each year with industry level data. Effects for countries with no common
land border or language are represented.
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Note: Trade φ-ness for each year and type of trade are given by respective median
values of Φij computed with industry level data.
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Appendix B
Distance elasticity of trade and border
effects
Recent studies on subnational trade patters and border effects drove supplementary at-
tention to the use of distance in trade equations. The expression of trade flows at both
national and international level using the same gravity model asks for a compatible mea-
surement of distances. Rather than taking the distance between two points (capitals,
largest cities or closest harbours) as in most empirical papers, Head and Mayer (2000)
posit that international and internal distance should be computed as the weighted sum of
interregional distances. The computation of distances as arithmetic means, however, is not
compatible with the negative estimates of the distance elasticity of trade of most empirical
works. A first attempt to correct the measurement of distances was formulated by Head
and Mayer (2002b) who use a weighted harmonic mean.
The present annex makes an additional step by endogenizing the distance elasticity of
trade. Rather than imposing the distance elasticity of trade to be equal to unity, negative
one or some other amount, it is found through a nonlinear estimation procedure combining
the gravity model with nonlinear distance computations. This method is derived directly
from the fact that international (internal) trade is simply the sum of trade flows for all
pairwise combinations between the regions of the two countries (same country). This
annex treats jointly the concern for countries’ internal geography formulated by Helliwell
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and Verdier (2001) and the consistency with empirical findings.
The literature on border effects shows that the magnitude of the latter is very sensitive to
distances used (e.g. Head and Mayer (2000), (2002b)). The overestimation of international
distances artificially inflates border effects. Besides, distance proves to be an important
determinant for other bilateral economic linkages that follow a gravity model like price
covariations and migration flows (Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (2001)). For
all these reasons distance measurement calls for a thorough attention in empirical studies.
B.1 Gravity and distance
One of the most solid empirical results in international economics is that trade decreases
with distance and increases with the product of the two countries’ sizes. This relationship
known as the gravity equation is the ‘horsework’ model of many empirical studies on inter-
national trade and used as starting point in this annex. Trade between any two countries
i and j in logarithmic form can be expressed as follows:
lnmij = α0 + α1yi + α2yj + θdistanceij + ǫij. (B.1)
Exporter and importer sizes yi and yj are generally reflected by the corresponding GDPs.
According to the literature coefficients on countries’ GDPs should be positive and close to
unity. The coefficient of the distance variable gives the distance elasticity of trade and is
the one on which this annex focuses.
As there are no reasons to accept the gravity model only for international data, it can be
used also for trade between regions or cities. Indeed, empirical work confirm its suitability
at either level. Moreover, theoretical derivations of the gravity can also be carried on a
subnational basis. Hence, equation (B.1) can also be used to express trade flows between
two regions. Different (larger) trade costs for international transactions are reflected similar
to McCalumm (1995) by including a home dummy in (B.1) and using the resulting equation
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for both types of trade flows, international and internal:
lnmij = α0 + α1yi + α2yj + θdistanceij + α3homeij + εij. (B.2)
As simple as it can seem, measuring the distance is not always obvious. This is due
to the fact that we deal with distance between territorial units with positive area and
unequally distributed economic activity, and not simply between two points. There is
some uniformity in the literature as to measuring international distances, the distance
between capitals or the largest cities being mostly used, but there is an entire debate
about intra-national distances. Wei (1996) is the first to introduce internal distances in
the estimation of border effects, after developing a very easy way of computing unobserved
internal trade as the difference between domestic production and exports to all partners.
His work constitutes the basis of a genuine refinement of intra-national distance calculation.
Wei himself computes internal distance as one fourth of the distance between the considered
country and its closest neighbor. Wolf (2000) takes the distance between the largest two
cities, while Leamer (1997) and Nitsch (2000) use the radius of the circle of area identical
to the country area. Head and Mayer (2000) develop a similar measure for the particular
case when all producers are located in the center and consumers are equally distributed
on the area of the country (region), and which is equal to two-thirds of Nitsch’s measure.
Helliwell and Verdier (2001) and Helliwell (2002) come with a more sophisticated formula
for computing internal distances as an average of the distances between urban areas, intra-
city distances, distances from cities to rural areas and rural-area-to-rural-area distances.1
Despite the different approach used, all these methods produce very similar estimates of
the trade equation and border effects.2
A much greater difference is obtained when computing both international and internal
distances as weighted average of inter and intra-regional distances, as formulated by Head
1For a more detailed discussion see Head and Mayer (2002b) (pages 10-11).
2See Head and Mayer (2002a).














yk, yl, yi, and yj stand for regional and respectively country specific products or populations.
Helliwell and Verdier (2001) use a similar principle for internal distances of Canadian
provinces. The main advantage of equation (B.3) is that it permits to take into account
the heterogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity within regions and countries.
However, depending on the sample used, one needs to ensure that it is compatible with
trade equations (B.1) and (B.2). We consider this question into detail in the next section.
B.2 The distance elasticity of trade
During the last decade empirical studies found a distance elasticity of trade close to negative
one, although slightly lower in absolute terms in most cases (e.g. Frankel (1997), Hummels
and Levinshon (1995), Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001)).3 Recent work involving
domestic or both domestic and foreign trade flows produced higher estimates in absolute
terms. In his pioneer work on border effects McCallum obtains a distance elasticity of
Canadian provinces’ trade with the U.S. states of -1.5. He attributes this gap in with
respect to earlier elasticity estimates to the different means of transport used in the U.S.-
Canada and global trade. These results need to be considered when computing international
and national distances.
We consider a sample of 25 European countries: fifteen old members, eight new member
countries (Malta and Cyprus are ignored), and two candidate countries, aggregated into 24
observations for our estimations. Table B.1 gives results obtained directly from estimat-
ing trade equation (B.1) for manufactured trade across 27 industries between European
countries for the year 2000. Different columns stand for different distance measures used
in the literature. The first column shows estimates when distance between largest cities
in each country is used, and the second one with distance between capitals. For most
European countries the latter two coincide, which explains the almost identical results. In
3For a fuller survey see Head and Disdier (2005).
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Table B.1: Gravity estimations with different distance variables: linear relationship with
respect to the distance assumed (international trade flows)
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij
intercept -1.18a -1.13a 0.49c 0.49c
(0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
ln GDP exporter 0.88a 0.89a 0.89a 0.90a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP importer 0.77a 0.78a 0.78a 0.79a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -1.39a -1.44a -1.67a -1.68a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15)
N 13388 13388 13388 13388
R2 0.506 0.51 0.52 0.519
RMSE 1.958 1.951 1.932 1.932
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c represent
respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
columns 3 and 4 bilateral distances are computing according to the expression (B.3) with
regions’ weights in national GDP and country’s population respectively. From table B.1 it
is straightforward that controlling for the internal geography produces larger in absolute
value distance elasticities.
Head and Mayer (2002b) derive an expression for distance computation which conciliates
the consideration of countries’ internal geography with the use of a unique gravity equation
for both internal and external trade.








Expressing trade flows from (B.2) and substituting in equation (B.4), while assuming uni-
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By definition the home dummy is equal to one only for i = j and null otherwise. Con-
sequently, it takes the same value for a given pair of countries and can be simplified in
equation (B.5). Divide both left and right hand side expressions by the product of coun-





























Equation (B.7) is also suitable for the computation of internal distances djj. Interregional
distances dkl are geodesic distances between the largest cities of the two regions. The
distance form a region to itself dkk is calculated according to Head and Mayer (2000)’s
procedure, i.e. assuming that each region is represented by a cercle of equal area, all














Any other measure described in section B.1 would do the job. Head and Mayer (2002b)
make the realistic assumption of θ = −1 simply because it is compatible with empirical
findings, and calculate internal and international distances as harmonic rather than arith-
metic mean (as in equation (B.3)). It would be preferable, although, to use an estimated
value of θ, the very one obtained when estimating trade equation (B.1) or (B.2).
A nonlinear estimation procedure is developed here in order to find the true distance
elasticity of trade that should be used for distance computations. It consists of two repeat-
edly executed steps. First, distances are computed for a particular value of θ according to
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(B.7) and (B.8). Secondly, obtained distances are used to estimate trade equation (B.1) or
(B.2). The estimated distance elasticity of trade θ is then introduced in equations (B.7)
and (B.8) and the procedure is repeated until the new estimate of θ is not statistically
different from the old one. The process is performed starting with a distance elasticity of
trade θ = −1 close to values obtained by most empirical works. Results are very robust
and do not change when different starting elasticity values are used (e.g. θ0 = 1).
For the same set of observations as previously, table B.2 displays estimates obtained
with the nonlinear procedure described above. Estimations are run twice: using (a) regions’
weights in national GDP and (b) regions’ weights in national population for calculating
distances and country GDPs in the trade equation (B.1). Equation (B.1) is used here
because the sample is restricted international trade flows. Outcomes for the complete set
of internal and cross-border trade are presented in the next section.
Results are displayed in the first two columns of table B.2. The last two columns show
corresponding estimates if unitary coefficients on the size variables are imposed, as implied
by the theory. By endogenizing the distance elasticity of trade, an elasticity value of -
1.46 is obtained. This is significantly different from the one estimated under the linearity
assumption in table B.1.
Note that almost identical distance elasticities are obtained when theory is considered
more seriously and accordingly unitary coefficients are imposed on country GDPs. However,
this additional assumption generates an important loss in the explanation power of the
model. The positive share of non-traded goods and services in the national product also
speaks against its use for the selected sample of observations.
B.3 Distance elasticity and border effects
In this section we consider the relationship between the distance elasticity of trade and
border effects. Most European shipments both foreign and domestic being done by road,
there is no a priori reason to encounter a different distance elasticity when both types of
flows are jointly included in estimations. However, the mismeasurement of internal and
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Table B.2: Nonlinear distance elasticity of trade estimation (international trade flows)
Variable (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
intercept -0.55b -0.55b -4.67a -4.76a
(0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15)
ln GDP importer 0.76a 0.76a 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP exporter 0.87a 0.87a 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
ln distance (θ) -1.46a -1.47a -1.50a -1.48a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 13388 13388 13388 13388
R 2 0.519 0.519 0.200 0.201
RMSE 1.933 1.933 1.981 1.980
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c repre-
sent respectively statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
international distances due the inconsistency with distance elasticity estimates of the trade
equation can generate an important bias in border effect.
Table B.3 shows estimates of equation (B.2) for manufactured trade between and within
the same 25 European countries as in section B.2. Rather than using the border variable
as McCallumn (1995) and a number of works on border effects, its conjugate home which
takes the value 1 for internal trade flows and 0 otherwise is employed. This alters results
only in a single way: The estimated coefficient on home is the opposite of the one on border
variable. This specification is preferred as the exponential value of estimated coefficient
gives exactly the magnitude of the border effect.
Columns in table B.3 correspond to four different distance measures, the same used
in table B.1. Note that estimates are very similar to those obtained for international
trade alone. According to the third column (national and regional GDPs used both for
the calculation of distances and in the trade equation), European firms buy in average
about 8.33[= exp(2.12)] times more from domestic partners than from foreign European
partners. Border effects do not differ much upon the distance measure used when a linear
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Table B.3: Gravity estimations with different distance variables: linear relationship with
respect to the distance assumed (internal and international trade flows)
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij
intercept -0.98a -0.92a 0.59b 0.57b
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
ln GDP exporter 0.87a 0.88a 0.88a 0.89a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP importer 0.76a 0.77a 0.77a 0.78a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -1.38a -1.43a -1.65a -1.66a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
home 2.07a 1.97a 2.12a 2.14a
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
N 13843 13843 13843 13843
R2 0.558 0.561 0.569 0.568
RMSE 1.949 1.943 1.926 1.927
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c represent
respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
relationship with respect to the volume of trade is assumed. The ratio of internal to foreign
trade corrected for economic size and shipping distance ranges from 7.2[= exp(1.97)] to
8.5[= exp(2.14)].
Again the nonlinear procedure described in section B.2 is applied to the data sample
and estimates are presented in table B.4. In this case both internal and international
flows are considered and trade equation (B.2) is used. Columns (1a) and (2a) correspond
to the use of GDPs in distance computations, while columns (1b) and (2b) use regions’
and countries’ populations. Elasticity estimates are significantly lower in absolute terms
compared to those obtained with cross-border flows only (table B.2). This is due to the
weaker impact of distance on internal trade, which reflects the presence of cross-border trade
costs increasing with the distance such as cultural, ethnic, and institutional heterogeneity.
An even larger difference is observed for the coefficient of variable home. Border effect
estimates are considerably lower when a nonlinear variation of trade with respect to the
distance is assumed. Results in table B.4 show that in average domestic shipments are 3.7 to
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Table B.4: Nonlinear distance elasticity of trade estimation (internal and international
trade flows)
Variable (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
intercept -0.38c -0.37c -4.99 -4.80
(0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16)
ln GDP importer 0.75a 0.75a 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP exporter 0.85a 0.86a 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
ln distance (θ) -1.44a -1.45a -1.45a -1.48a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
home 1.50a 1.60a 1.32a 1.39a
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
N 13843 13843 13843 13843
R 2 0.567 0.568 0.298 0.300
RMSE 1.929 1.928 1.985 1.983
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c repre-
sent respectively statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
5 times larger than international shipments after controlling for country size and distance.
About 46% of the estimated border effect is explained by distance mismeasurement (column
3 in table B.3 compared to column 1a in table B.4). With population weights used to
compute distances (last column in table B.3 and column 1b in table B.4), a 42% drop in
the border effect is reached.
These findings confirm the result of Head and Mayer (2002b) of overestimation of border
effects due to the disregard of empirical results in the computation of bilateral and internal
distances. Note that border effects obtained from table B.4 are significantly lower than
those found in the literature. The gap is even more shocking if one takes into account
that the sample includes bilateral trade between Central and East European countries, a
considerably less integrated region than Western Europe, and that industry data is used.
Thus, a partial solution for the “missing” international trade is provided. Allowing for a
nonlinear relationship between trade and distance results in a more accurate computation of
internal and bilateral distances. Most empirical studies over-emphasize distances in general
and to a greater extend the larger ones. When both internal and foreign trade flows are
B.4. SUMMARY 219
considered, this results in amplified border effects.
Equation (B.2) assumes equal distance elasticity for all trade types and all distance
levels. But nothing tells us that this should be the case. In reality distance elasticity varies
across countries and industries. The evidence of that is the presence in the literature of
a relatively large range of estimates of the distance coefficient in trade equations. Table
B.5 gives the values of θ for different industries obtained with the nonlinear estimation
procedure presented in section B.2. Elasticities are rarely statistically different on whether
internal trade flows are encompassed in the sample. The largest difference is incurred for
tobacco products. The largest absolute values of the distance elasticity are observed for
printing and publishing and iron and steel industries, while some labour intensive products
(textiles, leather, beverages) and high-value products (electrical, professional, and scientific
goods) are the least sensitive to the shipping distance.
B.4 Summary
A nonlinear estimation method of the distance elasticity of trade integrated in the cal-
culations of international and internal distances is proposed in this annex. It takes into
account countries’ internal geography and conciliates theoretical derivations of the distance
equation with empirical estimates of the distance elasticity.
Allowing for a nonlinear relationship between trade and distance, in which the esti-
mated distance elasticity of trade is used to compute distances which are to be used for
trade estimations, yields lower absolute values of the distance elasticity of trade than under
assumption of a linear relationship between trade and distance. Our nonlinear estimation
procedure produces a elasticity of -1.47 for industry level manufactured trade between 25
European countries for the year 2000. Results are very robust and do not change when
different starting elasticity values are used, but vary across sectors. Applied to both inter-
nal and international flows, the method generates border effect estimates by at least 40%
lower, confirming the previous finding of Head and Mayer (2002b). Exaggerated distance
values used in most empirical works considerably magnify border effects.
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Table B.5: Distance elasticity of trade (θ) at industry level
Trade flows used in estimations






Wearing apparel -1.36 -1.30
Leather -1.30 -1.30
Footwear -1.43 -1.39
Wood Products -1.63 -1.59
Furniture -1.42 -1.39
Paper products -1.66 -1.63
Printing, publishing -1.88 -1.83
Industrial chemicals -1.56 -1.54
Other chemical products -1.45 -1.42
Products of petroleum and coal -1.69 -1.69
Rubber products -1.48 -1.44
Plastic products -1.60 -1.57
Pottery, china and earthenware -1.30 -1.28
Glass and glass products -1.73 -1.68
Other non-metallic mineral products -1.65 -1.63
Iron and steel -1.81 -1.78
Non-ferrous metals -1.75 -1.71
Fabricated metal products -1.64 -1.61
Machinery -1.45 -1.45
Electrical apparatus -1.26 -1.27
Transport equipment -1.68 -1.67
Professional, scientific, etc. goods -1.29 -1.26
Other manufacturing -1.40 -1.38
Note: Coefficients are obtained with the nonlinear estimation procedure
from section B.2 applied to trade flows for 25 European countries
and across 27 industries for the year 2000. All reported coefficients
are significant at the 1% level.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Institutional Variables
The Index of Economic Freedom computed by the Heritage Foundation is composed of
ten institutional measures, evaluating the level of economic freedom in as many different
dimensions. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has elaborated nine
institutional measures to evaluate economic reforms in transition countries. These are
published annually in the Bank’s Transition Report and are listed bellow.
According to the Heritage Foundation, among EU countries United Kingdom and Ire-
land have the most liberalized economies, and Spain and Greece are the least liberalized.
Among CEE countries the Czech Republic and Estonia take the lead, with Bulgaria and
Romania at the bottom of the list. The former two economies are characterized by a level
of economic freedom comparable to that of France. From the point of view of undertaken
economic reforms, i.e. EBRD index score, Hungary shows the best performance, while
Romania has the worst score of the sample. Hence, the well-functioning Czech and Esto-
nian institutions at the beginning of the XXIst century are at least partially due to the
inheritance of a relatively good institutional framework.
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Table C.1: Description of institutional and trade policy variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Institutional Variables
IEF index 135 0.60 0.12 0.28 0.81
Trade policy 135 0.69 0.20 0.25 1.00
Fiscal burden of government 135 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.63
Government intervention 135 0.62 0.19 0.00 0.88
Monetary policy 135 0.58 0.42 0.00 1.00
Capital flow and foreign investment 135 0.73 0.11 0.25 1.00
Banking and finance 135 0.66 0.20 0.25 1.00
Wages and prices 135 0.66 0.14 0.50 1.00
Property rights 135 0.76 0.21 0.25 1.00
Regulation 135 0.56 0.17 0.25 1.00
Black market 135 0.69 0.28 0.00 1.00
EBRD index 192 0.83 0.22 0.24 1.00
Price liberalization 192 0.84 0.20 0.30 1.00
Foreign exchange and trade liberalization 192 0.97 0.08 0.61 1.00
Small-scale privatisation 192 0.94 0.14 0.21 1.00
Large-scale privatisation 192 0.85 0.22 0.30 1.00
Enterprise reform 192 0.79 0.26 0.00 1.00
Competition policy 192 0.76 0.30 0.00 1.00
Infrastructure reform 192 0.74 0.34 0.00 1.00
Banking sector 192 0.83 0.23 0.00 1.00
Non-banking financial institutions 192 0.76 0.31 0.00 1.00
KKM index 72 0.71 0.12 0.46 0.89
Fraser index 48 0.63 0.12 0.31 0.82
Trade Policy Variables
Import tariff 3126 2.34 3.24 0.00 17.12
NTB coverage 358 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.97
NTB frequency 3126 2.34 3.24 0.00 17.12
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EBRD index 0.80 1.00
KKM index 0.87 0.87 1.00
Fraser index 0.88 0.88 0.89 1.00
Import tariff -0.42 -0.57 -0.51 -0.65 1.00
NTB coverage -0.16 -0.09 0.30 1.00
NTB frequency 0.06 -0.08 0.42 0.84 1.00
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Fiscal burden of gov’nt -0.16 1.00
Government intervention 0.12 0.16 1.00
Monetary policy 0.37 -0.31 0.03 1.00
Capital flow and foreign
inv’nt
0.36 0.00 0.04 -0.06 1.00
Banking and finance 0.16 -0.04 0.09 0.29 0.25 1.00
Wages and prices 0.24 -0.14 -0.21 0.26 0.38 0.46 1.00
Property rights 0.26 -0.13 0.20 0.74 0.26 0.44 0.35 1.00
Regulation 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.49 0.33 0.46 1.00
Black market 0.24 -0.34 0.06 0.78 0.06 0.32 0.25 0.75 0.23 1.00


























Small-scale priv’n 0.54 0.73 1.00
Large-scale priv’n 0.82 0.67 0.72 1.00
Enterprise reform 0.94 0.64 0.68 0.89 1.00
Competition policy 0.94 0.65 0.65 0.88 0.96 1.00
Infrastructure reform 0.93 0.67 0.65 0.87 0.94 0.94 1.00
Banking sector 0.93 0.66 0.70 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.95 1.00
Non-banking fin instit 0.93 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.00
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Additional results on cultural trade and social networks
Table D.1: Bilateral imports of cultural goods




















Dependent variable: ln cij ln cij ln cij ln cij ln cij ln cij ln cij
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 2.49a -0.85a 0.31b -0.33a 1.43a -9.13a 1.48a
(0.49) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.47) (0.40) (0.15)
ln GDP importer 0.20a 0.44a 0.36a 0.38a 0.59a 0.63a 0.34a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln GDP exporter 0.19a 0.51a 0.56a 0.56a 0.30a 0.90a 0.39a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ln distance -0.20a -0.56a -0.64a -0.71a -0.23a -1.07a -0.43a
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
common border -0.06 0.51a 0.64a 0.89a -1.44a 0.52a 0.61a
(0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.05)
militarized dispute -0.38 -0.64a -0.83a -0.15 0.34 -1.39a -0.69a
(0.36) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.38) (0.28) (0.18)
common official language 0.33a 1.23a 0.69a 0.93a 0.65a 1.23a 0.39a
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
colonial relationship 0.22b 1.02a 0.51a 0.76a 0.06 -0.38a 0.82a
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.11) (0.05)
mill’s ratio -0.03 0.29a 0.22a 0.33a -3.52a 2.40a 0.20a
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.20) (0.26) (0.04)
N 2548 18783 18139 8391 10666 19216 22744
R2 0.119 0.417 0.415 0.416 0.28 0.352 0.27
RMSE 1.198 1.274 1.219 1.273 2.146 2.222 1.561
Note: Heckman estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 1.39a 0.09a 0.58a 0.43a -0.87a -2.00a -0.86a
(0.24) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11)
ln GDP importer 0.66a 0.74a 0.75a 0.69a 0.88a 0.84a 0.78a
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln GDP exporter 0.66a 0.74a 0.69a 0.73a 0.79a 0.92a 0.87a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ln distance -0.51a -0.62a -0.60a -0.56a -0.80a -0.82a -0.79a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
common border 0.61a 0.60a 0.60a 0.60a 0.48a 0.58a 0.69a
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
militarized dispute 0.23 -0.83a 0.15c 0.11 -0.77a -0.60a 0.00
(0.24) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14)
common official language 0.35a 0.22a 0.45a 0.36a 0.76a 0.64a 0.71a
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
colonial relationship 0.36a 0.43a 0.38a 0.17a 0.02a 0.16a 0.50a
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
same country 0.97a 0.29a 0.26a 0.22a 0.07a 0.35a 0.23a
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
N 2548 18698 18110 8379 10222 18289 22744
R2 0.771 0.707 0.725 0.735 0.736 0.695 0.748
RMSE .805 1.076 1.021 .939 1.138 1.223 1.194
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table D.3: Bilateral imports of non-cultural products and cultural links (cultural trade
residual), fixed-effects























Dependent variable: ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 16.26a 9.60a 13.27a 15.57a 14.05a 17.33a 10.04a
(0.92) (0.66) (0.67) (0.88) (1.16) (22331.7)(0.95)
ln distance -0.65a -0.87a -0.85a -0.75a -1.14a -1.15a -1.00a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
common border 0.77a 0.32a 0.44a 0.48a 0.08c 0.17a 0.45a
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
militarized dispute 0.03 -0.81a -0.17c -0.12 -0.63a -0.48a -0.07
(0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11)
common official language 0.00a 0.17a 0.28a 0.23a 0.46a 0.45a 0.40a
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
colonial relationship 0.32a 0.82a 0.80a 0.36a 0.53a 0.53a 0.97a
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
same country 0.41a 0.48a 0.28a 0.24a 0.25a 0.51a 0.22a
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
cultural trade residual 0.08 0.17a 0.26a 0.23a 0.06a 0.10a 0.27a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)
N 2548 18698 18110 8379 10222 18289 22744
R2 0.923 0.848 0.862 0.894 0.868 0.831 0.861
RMSE .485 .782 .73 .604 .812 .916 .894
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively




























Table D.4: Imports of non-cultural products, cultural ties and
migration




















Selected second stage estimates:
Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij
ln immigrants 0.13a 0.11a 0.11a 0.05a 0.06a 0.08a 0.09a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural trade residual 0.04b 0.14a 0.15a 0.11a 0.06a 0.08a 0.05a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 951 4643 4202 2632 2530 4711 5706
R2 0.872 0.822 0.841 0.809 0.796 0.765 0.826
Dependent variable: lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij lnmij
ln migrations 0.13a 0.10a 0.11a 0.05a 0.06a 0.08a 0.09a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural trade residual -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.11a 0.07a
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln migrations × cult resid 0.02a 0.03a 0.03a 0.01a 0.01a 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
N 951 4643 4202 2632 2530 4711 5706
R2 0.873 0.823 0.843 0.809 0.796 0.765 0.826
Note: Estimations with year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table D.4: Imports of non-cultural products, cultural ties and
migration (continued)





















Dependent variable: ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij
ln migrations 0.12a 0.10a 0.07a 0.11a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural trade residual 0.11a 0.06a 0.09a 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
non-cultural trade residual 0.04a 0.07a 0.05a 0.07a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1176 1912 3259 2797
R2 0.892 0.827 0.795 0.854
Dependent variable: ln gij ln gij ln gij ln gij
ln migrations 0.12a 0.10a 0.07a 0.11a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cultural trade residual 0.07c 0.03 0.13a -0.05
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
non-cultural trade residual -0.07b 0.04 -0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ln migrations × cult resid 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ln migrations × non-cult resid 0.02b 0.01a 0.01a 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
N 1176 1912 3259 2797
R2 0.893 0.828 0.795 0.854
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Appendix E
Appendices to Chapter 4
E.1 Descriptive statistics
Table E.1: Data description
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max
ln imports 55239 12.55 2.42 5.86 0 19.36
ln exports 11869 12.63 3.49 12.18 0 20.19
average-size French subsidiaries 231 35.87 39.13 1531.16 0 192.94
ln GDP 346 21.93 1.55 2.40 18.52 25.74
ln per capita GDP 346 6.12 0.74 0.55 4.48 8.26
ln distance 357 8.51 0.38 0.14 7.50 9.14
colony 357 0.76 0.42 0.18 0 1
ln aid 357 3.52 0.88 0.77 0.67 5.02
armed dispute 357 0.21 0.45 0.20 0 1
ln (1+tariff/100) 133 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.57
ln immigrants 154 6.10 1.58 2.50 2.40 9.79
association 357 0.27 0.44 0.19 0 1
new associations 357 0.45 0.92 0.86 0 5
total migrant associations 357 3.37 5.58 31.14 0 41
economic migrant associations 357 2.36 4.18 17.47 0 31
budget 357 14.19 17.60 309.78 0 119
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E.2 Additional estimation results
Table E.2: Trade, tariffs, immigrants, and home country associations: differentiated goods
Dependent variable: imports from France ln IMPijt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln distance -0.71a -0.84a -0.61a -0.76a -0.77a
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
colonial relationship 0.63a 0.80a 0.57a 0.66a 0.70a
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
ln foreign aid 0.11b 0.13b 0.12b 0.11b 0.11b
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
armed conflict -0.10c -0.13b -0.13b -0.10c -0.09c
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
ln (1 + tariff/100) -0.54 -0.24 -1.03c -0.45 -0.31
(0.49) (0.60) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50)
ln immigrants 0.16a 0.15a 0.18a 0.15a 0.13a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
association created in t 0.068
(0.052)
association created in t− 1 0.120b
(0.051)
association created in t− 2 0.060
(0.049)
association created in t− 3 -0.071
(0.056)
association created in t− 4 -0.052
(0.072)
association created in t− 5 0.050
(0.069)
number of new associations in t 0.007
(0.036)
number of new associations in t− 1 -0.020
(0.026)
number of new associations in t− 2 -0.009
(0.026)
number of new associations in t− 3 -0.150a
(0.052)
number of new associations in t− 4 -0.116c
(0.060)
number of new associations in t− 5 0.010
(0.036)
total number of associations in t 0.012
(0.011)
average associations’ budget in t 0.006b
(0.003)
country, year, and product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899
R2 0.507 0.510 0.509 0.507 0.508
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table E.3: French subsidiaries, immigrants and migrant associations: Negative binomial
model, incidence-rate ratios
Dependent variable: number of average-size French subsidiaries Njt
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP 2.52a 2.56a 2.46a 2.50a 2.49a 2.44a
(0.10) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
ln per capita GDP 0.56a 0.54a 0.58a 0.59a 0.62a 0.63a
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
ln distance .63a 0.69b 0.69b 0.73b 0.70a 0.69a
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
colonial relationship 1.45a 1.03 1.00 1.06 1.20 1.24
(0.17) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36)
ln foreign aid 1.45a 1.79a 1.66a 1.69a 1.67a 1.66a
(0.08) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17)
armed conflict 0.91 0.81c 0.77b 0.81c 0.83c 0.83c
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ln immigrants 1.08 1.10c 1.10 1.06 1.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
association created in t 1.29b
(0.15)
association created in t− 1 1.07
(0.12)
association created in t− 2 1.05
(0.11)
association created in t− 3 0.95
(0.10)
association created in t− 4 0.88
(0.10)
association created in t− 5 0.92
(0.11)
number of new associations in t 1.05
(0.05)
number of new associations in t− 1 1.02
(0.05)
number of new associations in t− 2 1.05
(0.06)
number of new associations in t− 3 0.98
(0.06)
number of new associations in t− 4 0.98
(0.07)
number of new associations in t− 5 1.01
(0.05)
total number of associations in t 1.02b
(0.01)
average associations’ budget in t 1.01a
(0.00)
N 240 97 97 97 97 97
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.140 0.146 0.144 0.146 0.147
overdispersion parameter α 0.152 0.167 0.153 0.159 0.153 0.149
p-value (0.018) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c represent respectively statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Summary
This dissertation studies the burden of international trade costs on trade between coun-
tries, and the contribution of two non-traditional factors to lowering these costs. It evalu-
ates the size of overall border-related trade costs, and the extent to which their reduction
can be achieved via regional economic integration. A central place in this discussion is at-
tributed to non-traditional trade determinants, represented by country-specific institutions,
and by transnational social and business networks. The latter furnish foreign contacts and
information about potential partners and increase the security and contract enforcement
in international transactions, which all translate in lower costs and reduced uncertainty
of cross-border exchanges. This study is important not only for a more thorough under-
standing of a series of phenomena observed in international economics, but also for the
development of specific economic policies assisting countries in achieving their long term
objectives.
The work presented in this thesis consists mainly of an empirical analysis of the above-
mentioned issues. But it also takes advantage of the recent theoretical advances in inter-
national trade literature. This thesis shows that there is room for non-traditional trade
costs in explaining missing international trade. Trade potentials may actually have been
underestimated in the literature, and trade creation associated with regional economic in-
tegration might be much larger than expected. This finding is illustrated in the particular
case of trade between East and West European countries. Results presented in different
chapters confirm the pro-trade effect of both institutions and transnational networks. The
well-functioning of domestic and foreign institutions is a factor comparable in importance
to foreign trade policies. Even after all tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed, institu-
tional reforms can generate a large increase in international trade. Social networks promote
trade not only via common ethnic, linguistic and other ties that connect their members, but
also via information and tastes acquired from the consumption of foreign cultural goods. A
particular form of business networks, home country associations established by immigrants
in their host country, is studied in the last part of the dissertation. Migrant associations
have a stronger effect on trade than social network ties, they shape foreign trade and affect
decisions to invest abroad.
Field: Economic Sciences (05).
Keywords: International trade, trade potential, trade policy, institutions, social and
business networks, cultural trade, migration, home country associations.
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Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris CEDEX 13.
